s 


SMALL   PROBLEMS  FOR 
INFANTRY 


SMALL  PROBLEMS 
FOR  INFANTRY 


Prepared  by 
CAPTAIN  A.  W.  BJORNSTAD 

16th  Infantry,  Instructor 


Under  the  direction  of 
DEPARTMENT  OF  MILITARY  ART 

The  Arvry  Service  ScJiools 


Press  of 

The  Army  Service  Schools 

Fort   Leavenworth,    Kansas 


1916 


^ 


Pref 


rerace 


THIS  work  was  undertaken  in  view  of  the  many  applications  re- 
ceived by  The  Army  Service  Schools  for  information  as  to 
literature  which  would  assist  in  the  instruction  and  training 
of  noncommissioned  officers.  Its  purpose  is  to  place  before  infantry 
officers  and  noncommissioned  officers  a  series  of  problems  which  may 
be  studied  to  advantage.  The  principal  value  of  the  book,  however, 
is  believed  to  lie  in  the  method  which  it  teaches.  There  are  hundreds 
of  single  sentences  in  Infantry  Drill  Regulations,  1911,  each  of  which 
can  be  made  the  basis  for  an  instructive  problem  for  indoor  or  out- 
door work.  It  is  hoped  that  the  examples  contained  in  this  book  will 
assist  industrious  company  officers  in  preparing  problems  for  platoons, 
squads,  patrols,  outguards,  etc.,  using  the  applicatory  method  which 
is  so  largely  responsible  for  whatever  success  The  Army  Service 
Schools  have  achieved  in  teaching  tactics. 

To  Captain  A.  W.  Bjornstad,  16th  Infantry,  was  assigned  the 
task  of  writing  the  .proposed  work.  The  Infantry  and  Engineer 
Corps  members  of  the  Class  of  1916,  Army  Staff  College,  devoted 
five  days  to  the  development  of  certain  problems  outlined  to  them. 
With  this  valuable  assistance,  the  work  has  been  completed  during 
such  odd  times  as  could  be  spared  from  the  normal  duties  of  an  in- 
structor. 

It  is  in,  accordance  with  the  practice  of  these  Schools  to  view 
many  of  the  solutions  herein  as  no  better  than  other  possible  solu- 
tions. The  essential  thing  is  to  train  officers  and  noncommissioned 
officers  to  adopt  promptly  some  measure  which  is  practical,  effective, 
and  consistent  with  the  team-work  which  Infantry  Drill  Regulations 
seek  to  establish.  To  quote  paragraph  372  of  those  Regulations. 
"In  a  given  situation  it  is  far  better  to  do  any  intelligent  thing  con- 
sistent with  the  aggressive  execution  of  the  general  plan,  than  to 
.search  hesitatingly  for  the  ideal.  This  is  the  true  rule  of  conduct 
for  subordinates  who  are  required  to  act  upon  their  own  initiative." 

The  author  is  indebted  to  Captain  L.  M.  Nuttman,  4th  Inf.,  Cap- 
tain J.  B.  Gowen,  10th  Inf.,  and  Lieutenant  Aristides  Moreno,  In- 
fantry, for  valuable  assistance  in  collecting  and  proof-reading  the 
manuscript. 

W.  A.  Holbrook, 
Lieutenant  Colonel,  Cavalry, 
Senior  Instructor, 
Department  of  Military  Art. 
The  Army  Service  Schools, 

Fort  Leavenworth,  Kansas, 
May  10,  1916. 


348663 


The  original  plan  for  this  book  contemplated  14  problems,  or. 
more  accurately  speaking.  14  series  of  situations,  dealing  with  advance 
guards,  outposts,  and  patrols,  and  6  problems,  or  series  of  situations, 
in  attack  and  defense,  illustrating  the  leading  of  a  platoon  as  part  of 
a  large  force  of  all  arms.  The  6  problems  in  attack  and  defense 
were  not  ready  for  the  printer  when  War  Department  orders  were 
received  closing  the  Army  Service  Schools  within  "24  hours  and  re- 
turning officers  to  their  regiments.  It  was  decided  to  publish  the 
completed  problems  and  to  add  a  chapter  on  combat  instruction,  to 
include  as  many  examples  of  exercises  as  could  be  prepared  in  the 
short  time  remaining  available. 

A.  W.   B. 
May  13,  1916. 


VI 


Table  of  Contents 


Introduction.     To   Company    Commanders  1 

Organization  of  First  Platoon 8 

Conventional  Signs 9 

First  Problem — An  Advance  Guard  Point 10 

I.  The  point  marches  out 10 

II.  Road  space  and  estimating  numbers 14 

III.  The  point  marches  too  slowly 16 

IV.  Leaving  the  road   for  observation 17 

V.  The  point  discovers  a  Red  patrol 17 

VI.  The  enemy  fires  on  the  advance  party V.) 

VII.  The  point  as  a  march  outpost 21 

Second  Problem — An  Advance  Guard  Connecting  File 23 

I.  During   a   halt 23 

II.  When  to  use  signals 25 

III.  <  are  in   transmitting  signals 26 

IV .  Maintaining   distance    26 

Third  Problem — An  Advance  Guard  Flank  Patrol 28 

I.  The   patrol   stai*ts   out 29 

II.  Waiting  for  the  advance  party 

III.  Passing   through   woods 

IV.  On    emerging    from    woods 

V.  ("hanging  the  formation.     

VI.  A   road   formation 

VII.  The   point   is   fired   upon 

VIII.  The  patrol  continues  by  a  new  route 

IX.  The  patrol  drives  off  a  Red  cavalry  patrol 39 

X.  Returning  to  the  column 41 

XI.  Reporting  to  nearest  company  commander.   41 

Fourth  Problem — The  Platoon  as  an  Advance  Party \ ■', 

I.  The    start    A'-', 

II.  The  point  loiters 

III.  The   enemy   opens    fire 48 

IV.  The  advance  party  returns  the  fire 19 

V.  The  advance  party  attacks 54 

VI.  The   march    is    resumed 57 

VII.  The  enemy  fires  from  the  left  flank 

VIII.  The  advance  party  replies 

IX.  The   advance    party   and   support   attack 63 

Fifth  Problem— A   Combat  Patrol 65 

I.  The  patrol  starts 66 

II.  Drives  off  small   patrol 70 

III.  Posting    the    patrol 71 

IV.  The  patrol  changes  its  position 75 

vii 


Sixth  Problem— A  Picket 78 

I.  The  first  disposition, 79 

II.  A   change  after  reconnaissance 83 

III.  Preparations  for  the  night 83 

Seventh   Problem — Another  Picket 89 

I.  Marching   out    89 

II.  The  first  disposition 90 

IV.  Preparations  _" 95 

V.  Changing  an  outguard  for  the  night 98 

VI.  Correct  names  and  numbers 99 

VII.  Orders   to   a    visiting   patrol 102 

VIII.  Sending  out  a   reconnoitering  patrol 103 

IX.  An   alarm   at  night 10.r> 

X.  An  investigation  on  the  outpost  line 10<> 

Eighth  Problem — Cossack  Post  and  Sentry  Squad 109 

I.  Arrangements 109 

II.  A    Red   patrol   approaches 110 

III.  The  Red  patrol  is  stopped 112 

IV.  Awaiting  other    Reds 113 

V.  A  Red  patrol  under  different  conditions 114 

VI.  Arrangements  for  the  night 11(5 

Ninth    Problem — A  Reconnoitering  Patrol 117 

I.  Preparations 117 

II.  The    first    formation 119 

III.  Reds    are    seen 121 

IV.  Another  formation 122 

V.  An   inhabitant  of  the  hostile  country 124 

VI.  A    disarmed    Red   soldier   appears 124 

VII.  Red  cavalry  discovered 125 

VIII.  Red   cavalry  marches   past 127 

IX.  The  return   and  report 129 

Tenth  Problem— A  Visiting  Patrol 131 

I.  Preparations  and  march  formation 131 

II.  The  patrol  hears  firing 133 

III.  Approaching   a   sentinel    post 134 

IV.  Exchanging    information    134 

V.  A  sudden  encounter  in  the  dark 135 

VI.  The  disposition  of  a  stranger 136 

Eleventh   Problem— A   Detached   Post 138 

I.  Security  while  marching  out 138 

II.  The  day  disposition 141 

III.  The  night  disposition   143 

IV.  Instructions   to   a    requisitioning  detachment 144 

Twelfth   Problem — A   Requisitioning  Detachment  or  Patrol 148 

I.  Preparations   148 

II.  Formation   and   route    149 

III.  Formation   and   route,  continued 150 

IV.  Arrangements  for  seizing  cattle 151 

Y.  The    return    152 

viii 


Thirteenth  Problem — A  Contact  Patrol 155 

I.  Equipment,  route  and  formations 156 

II.  Strangers  seen  at  a  distance 162 

III.  Investigating  evidences  of  a  camp 162 

IV.  The  patrol  remains  in  observation   163 

Remarks  on  the  Plainview  Outpost 166 

Fourteenth  Problem — A  Small  Outguard 170 

I.  The    squad    marches    out 170 

II.  Day  and  night  positions  compai-ed 173 

Combat  Instruction 177 


IX 


INTRODUCTION 


To  Company  Commanders 

THE  non-commissioned  officer  of  infantry  is  called  upon 
to  perform  a  greater  variety  of  duties  than  the  non- 
commissioned officer  of  any  other  arm  or  special  ser- 
vice, except,  probably,  cavalry.  He  deals  with  elements 
which  at  first  glance  seem  quite  simple — men  and  rifles — 
marching  and  shooting.  But  when  the  varied  employment 
of  these  elements  in  war  is  fully  comprehended  and  analyzed, 
we  find  human  and  mechanical  vagaries  and  uncertainties 
which  defeat  the  leadership  of  a  novice,  or  even  of  a  prac- 
ticed non-commissioned  officer  whose  development  of  mind 
and  soul  has  been  so  deficient  as  to  leave  him  without  cou- 
rage, force,  and  initiative. 

The  possession  of  force  and  initiative  inspires  self-con- 
fidence. Courage  is  two  parts  self-confidence  and  one  part 
bravery.  The  non-commissioned  officer,  or  prospective  non- 
commissioned officer,  who  after  a  fair  trial,  displays  no 
progress  in  the  development  of  force  and  initiative,  should 
be  dropped  before  he  becomes  a  fixture  in  the  company.  It 
is  not  in  every  man  to  become  even  a  fair  non-commissioned 
officer  and,  considering  the  heavy  demands  on  courage  and 
discipline,  the  infantry  can  least  afford  to  tolerate  a  non- 
commissioned officer  who  is  only  fair. 

Our  difficulty  seems  to  lie  in  the  failure  to  appreciate 
the  conditions  under  which  the  non-commissioned  officer 
must  work  in  war.  An  indifferent  sailor  can  sail  a  ship  in 
fair  weather  and  off  shore.  His  ship  will  seem  as  trim  and 
sightly  as  any  other — if  we  do  not  inspect  it  too  closely. 
But  the  sailor  who  is  to  weather  a  storm,  like  the  infantry 
sergeant  or  corporal  who  faces  an  enemy,  must  have  a  re- 
serve of  courage,  driving-power,  and  skill.  In  time  of  peace 
we  can  hardly  simulate  conditions  which  make  a  demand  on 
this  reserve,  but  we  must  build  it  up,  nevertheless.  It  is  the 
distinguishing  mark  of  well  trained  troops.  The  lack  of  it 
accounts  for  the  low  value  of  organizations  of  reasonably 
l 


2  INTRODUCTION 

brave  men.  the  officers  and  non-commissioned  officers  of 
which  carry  only  the  outward  marks  of  leadership. 

If  Sergeant  What's-his-name  barks  "squads  right, 
march"  and  "club  rifle,  swing"  at  a  flock  of  recruits  for  five 
years,  and  does  it  well,  he  will  acquire  a  certain  confidence 
and  bearing,  it  is  true.  This  is  valuable,  but  he  needs  more. 
The  thousand  and  one  situations  that  may  confront  him  in 
war  should  be  presented  to  him  in  various  guises  under  con- 
ditions which  compel  him  to  decide,  to  act,  to  indicate  his 
a- ill,  and  to  enforce  his  will.  He  is  a  trained  and  dependable 
man  when  he  is,  and  knows  he  is,  fitted  to  meet,  squarely  and 
vigorously  and  understandingly,  any  likely  combination  of 
circumstances.  His  men  must  have  a  justifiable  confidence 
in  him,  and  he  must  have  a  justifiable  confidence  in  himself. 
This  can  result  only  when  he  possesses  the  essential  mili- 
tary virtues  of  a  non-commissioned  officer, — courage,  force, 
and  initiative. 

Quite  recently  I  expressed  some  views  on  the  training 
of  platoon  leaders  and  guides  (Military  Historian  and  Eco- 
nomist, April,  1916).  It  seems  appropriate  to  quote  the 
following: 

"The  platoon  is  the  largest  unit  susceptible  of  direct 
personal  control  of  individuals  in  the  firing  line  by  a  leader. 
It  is  our  present  purpose  to  point  out  two  of  the  most  im- 
portant functions  of  the  platoon  in  modern  battle,  and  the 
change  from  old  conditions. 

"In  the  days  of  short-range  weapons  a  company  was 
under  the  direct,  personal  control  of  the  captain.  It  never 
exceeded  100  men  in  our  service,  and  was  generally  smaller. 
It  fought  in  close  order  and  responded  quite  easily  to  the 
vocal  commands  of  the  captain.  Improved  small  arms  and 
artillery  long  ago  made  this  conception  of  company  leading 
obsolete.  With  the  necessity  for  deploying  skirmishers  and 
the  utilization  of  all  available  cover,  the  grip  of  the  captain 
was  lost.  After  a  period  of  years,  during  which  no  satis- 
factory substitute  for  the  former  control  of  the  captain  was 
devised,  the  Infantry  Drill  Regulations,  1911,  appeared  with 
a  practical  solution.  Direct,  personal  control  is  now  passed 
to  the  platoon  leaders  the  moment  the  company  is  deployed. 
Henceforth  the  captain  exerts  his  will  through  his  four 
platoon  leaders,  dispensing  with  much  of  the  detail  which 
was  formerly  his  concern.  The  company  has  become  a  small 
battalion.     The  platoon,  formerly  an  unimportant  sub-divi- 


INTRODUCTION  3 

sion  for  maneuver,  has  risen  to  the  dignity  of  an  important 
fighting  unit.  The  sergeant  of  infantry  has  become  a 
leader  with  a  grave  responsibility  thrust  upon  him,  as  we 
shall  show  later. 

"The  final  test  of  infantry  is  its  ability  to  attack.  At- 
tack by  infantry  is  a  combination  of  fire  and  movement 
while  under  fire  of  the  enemy.  To  fire  effectively,  and  thus 
reduce  loss  from  the  enemy's  fire,  and  to  move  resolutely 
forward  at  every  opportunity,  are  the  simple  elements  of 
infantry  attack.  A  few  tubes  of  paint,  a  brush,  and  a 
piece  of  canvas  are  the  simple  elements  of  a  Rembrandt 
painting. 

"The  platoon  organization  and  the  allotment  of  leaders 
are  designed  primarily  with  a  view  to  the  maximum  effi- 
ciency in  these  elements  of  infantry  attack — fire  and  move- 
ment. 

"Ordinarily,  the  infantry  firing  line  has  for  its  target  a 
thin  and  indistinct  horizontal  line.  Parts  of  the  line  may 
be  invisible  or  indistinguishable.  All  parts,  however,  must 
be  covered  with  fire,  else  the  sine  qua  non  condition  to  for- 
ward movement,  the  reduction  of  hostile  fire  effect,  may  be 
absent.  Each  man  is  taught  to  fire  constantly  on  one  point 
in  the  thin,  horizontal  target,  or  line,  that  point  being  the 
one  which,  with  respect  to  the  section  of  target  previously 
allotted  and  announced  to  his  platoon,  corresponds  to  his 
own  position  in  platoon.  Since  no  two  shots  fired  by  him 
with  the  same  point  of  aim  are  likely  to  strike  the  same  spot, 
the  trajectories  of  his  shots  will  in  time  describe  a  curved 
cone.  The  dimensions  of  the  base  of  the  cone  will  increase 
as  the  dispersion  (wild  firing)  increases.  If  we  now  ima- 
gine the  figures  described  by  the  cones  of  many  men  placed 
side  by  side,  we  see  a  wide,  thin  sheaf  of  fire,  the  thickness' 
of  which  increases  as  the  dispersion  increases.  It  is  as  if 
many  men  played  streams  of  water  on  the  target,  the  noz- 
zles being  held  parallel  to  each  other.  In  battle,  the  bases 
of  the  cones  merge  into  one  another.  Symmetry  is  lost. 
Individual  fire  is  lost  in  the  sheaf.  Only  the  fire  effect  of 
the  sheaf  can  be  observed,  if  indeed  that  much  can  be  ob- 
served. Fire  control  is  the  effort  to  make  the  sheaf  effec- 
tive; that  is,  to  carry  it  into  the  target  and  to  increase  its 
density  by  regulating  the  volume  and  decreasing  the  dis- 
persion. It  is  impracticable  to  control  the  sheaf  of  a  long 
firing  line  as  one  unit.  The  platoon  is  the  sub-division  for 
fire  control,  the  fire  unit,  and  the  sheaves  of  the  platoons  are 
regarded  and  controlled  separately. 

"Movement,  the  second  element  to  enter  into  infantry 
attack,  must  ordinarily  be  effected  by  small  groups  making 
short  rushes.     To  be  under  fire  possibly  for  hours  and  then 


4  INTRODUCTION 

to  rise  from  a  position  of  real  or  fancied  security  and  rush 
forward  50  or  100  yards  under  a  hail  of  bullets  and  shrap- 
nel demands  an  effort  that  all  men  are  not  equal  to.  In 
former  times  infantry  fought  standing  up,  partly  because 
it  was  in  close  order  and  partly  because  the  old  muzzle-load- 
ing musket  could  not  otherwise  be  loaded  conveniently. 
It  was  more  difficult  for  skulkers  to  escape  observation. 
Today  each  man  while  firing  is,  or  should  be,  screened  from 
the  enemy's  view  and  this  makes  both  his  location  and  con- 
dition more  difficult  to  observe.  Furthermore,  it  is  more 
difficult  to  advise  him  of  an  intended  rush  and  many  men 
who,  if  duly  warned,  would  willingly  join  the  rush,  find 
themselves  mentally  and  physically  inert  when  they  finally 
realize  that  their  neighbors  have  dashed  forward.  A  bat- 
tlefield is  strewn  with  men  whose  only  ailment  is  inertia, 
induced  by  causes  too  numerous  to  mention.  It  is  folly  to 
fly  in  the  face  of  history  and  deny  that  American  troops  do 
such  things.  Raw  troops  are  hopeless  in  attack,  more  so 
under  modern  conditions  than  ever  before.  The  temper 
of  partially  trained  troops  is  very  uneven.  Trained  troops 
will  have  skulkers  enough. 

"The  number  of  men  to  engage  in  a  single  rush  is,  of 
course,  variable  and  depends  upon  the  conditions  of  the  fire 
fight.  The  ideal  unit  for  the  rush  is  the  platoon.  We  may 
be  able  to  use  a  larger  fraction,  but  we  shall  frequently  be 
obliged  to  use  a  smaller.  In  any  event,  the  preparations, 
the  warning,  and  the  execution  are  in  the  hands  of  the  pla- 
toon leader  and  his  assistant,  the  platoon  guide.  The  de- 
tails are  slurred  too  much  in  peace  time  exercises  by  those 
who  fail  to  comprehend  the  difficulties  peculiar  to  a  battle- 
field. In  itself  the  movement  looks  simple  enough,  but  it 
requires  infinite  care,  close  observation,  good  leading,  and 
rough  discipline.  The  final  signal  must  not  be  given  until 
firing  has  ceased  and  observation  has  disclosed  that  every 
man  is  "set"  and  is,  therefore,  warned  and  ready.  The 
leader  leads  the  way  to  a  suitable  fire  position  and  halts,  but 
behind  the  platoon  is  the  sergeant  who  drives — the  platoon 
guide.     He  is  the  man  with  the  club — the  policeman. 

"This  dual  leadership  of  the  platoon  is  peculiar  to  our 
service,  and  new.  Its  usefulness  in  the  forward  movement 
has  just  now  been  explained.  In  fire  control  it  is  likewise 
useful.  Fire  control  may  be  described  as  a  two-man  job. 
The  leader's  duties  in  other  directions  are  too  numerous  and 
exacting  to  permit  of  necessary  attention  to  the  conduct 
of  the  individual  men  of  the  platoon.  The  duties  of  platoon 
disciplinarian  fall  to  the  platoon  guide.  It  would  not  reme- 
dy matters  to  divide  the  platoon  and  give  each  sergeant  a 
half.     There  would  still  be  a  two-man  job. 


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INTRODUCTION  5 

"A  third  reason  for  this  novel  organization  lies  in  the 
fact  that  losses  occur  under  peculiar  conditions.  In  battle, 
leaders  and  men  spend  most  of  their  time  concealed,  or  par- 
tially concealed,  from  the  enemy  and,  therefore,  to  a  more 
or  less  extent,  from  each  other.  But  concealment  of  this 
kind  does  not  render  them  immune  from  bullets.  It  often 
happens  that  a  man  lying  some  paces  from  his  neighbor  is 
out  of  action,  without  the  fact  being  known.  If  such  a 
fate  befall  a  few  platoon  leaders,  the  result  could  easily  be 
inertia  and  loss  of  control,  the  disintegrating  factors  of  in- 
fantry combat.  We  have,  however,  a  second  in  command 
who  lies  close  to  the  leader.  It  is  not  likely  that  both  will 
be  put  out  of  action  in  the  same  instant.  If  one  is  killed 
or  severely  wounded,  the  survivor  calls  a  corporal  to  his 
side  and  the  pair  is  restored. 

"The  obstacles  to  good  platoon  leadership  are  innumer- 
able ;  poor  training,  excitement,  sluggishness,  and  what  not. 
*  *  *  In  view  of  the  unavoidable  scarcity  of  officers, 
due  to  absence  on  other  duty  and  losses,  and  in  view  of  the 
heavy  losses  of  infantry  in  action,  it  may  be  asserted  con- 
fidently that  no  company  is  well  fitted  for  battle  unless  it 
has  at  the  outset  twelve  men  trained  to  the  point  which 
justifies  us  in  calling  them  good  platoon  leaders.  Further- 
more, students  of  Civil  War  methods  and  tactics,  who  are 
at  the  same  time  familiar  with  the  requirements  of  modern 
war  and  training,  will  agree  that  a  sergeant  of  infantry,  as 
our  infantry  is  organized,  must  possess  training,  and  a 
quality  of  leadership  in  action  fairly  comparable  to  that 
demanded  of  a  captain  in  the  Civil  War." 

Each  of  the  twelve  senior  non-commissioned  officers 
should  be  able  to  handle  a  platoon ;  the  corporals  at  least 
fairly  well.  When  squad  organization  is  possible,  as  is 
generally  the  case  in  the  Regular  Army,  and  also  in  the 
Militia  when  in  camp,  it  is  well  to  designate  a  permanent 
second  and  third  in  command  of  the  squad  and  give  these 
men  ample  opportunity  to  lead  the  squad.  A  company  of 
65  men  would  thus  in  time  have  at  least  12  additional  and 
fairly  well  trained  squad  leaders,  and  they  will  be  needed 
to  meet  expansion  and  losses. 

Instruction  on  the  map  is  at  best  a  poor  substitute  for 
well  planned  field  exercises  where  persons  and  things  are 
real.  The  problems  in  this  book  may  serve  best  as  a  guide 
to  the  preparation  of  field  exercises  or  tactical  walks.  There 


INTRODUCTION  5 

"A  third  reason  for  this  novel  organization  lies  in  the 
fact  that  losses  occur  under  peculiar  conditions.  In  battle, 
leaders  and  men  spend  most  of  their  time  concealed,  or  par- 
tially concealed,  from  the  enemy  and,  therefore,  to  a  more 
or  less  extent,  from  each  other.  But  concealment  of  this 
kind  does  not  render  them  immune  from  bullets.  It  often 
happens  that  a  man  lying  some  paces  from  his  neighbor  is 
out  of  action,  without  the  fact  being  known.  If  such  a 
fate  befall  a  few  platoon  leaders,  the  result  could  easily  be 
inertia  and  loss  of  control,  the  disintegrating  factors  of  in- 
fantry combat.  We  have,  however,  a  second  in  command 
who  lies  close  to  the  leader.  It  is  not  likely  that  both  will 
be  put  out  of  action  in  the  same  instant.  If  one  is  killed 
or  severely  wounded,  the  survivor  calls  a  corporal  to  his 
side  and  the  pair  is  restored. 

"The  obstacles  to  good  platoon  leadership  'are  innumer- 
able ;  poor  training,  excitement,  sluggishness,  and  what  not. 
*  *  *  In  view  of  the  unavoidable  scarcity  of  officers, 
due  to  absence  on  other  duty  and  losses,  and  in  view  of  the 
heavy  losses  of  infantry  in  action,  it  may  be  asserted  con- 
fidently that  no  company  is  well  fitted  for  battle  unless  it 
has  at  the  outset  twelve  men  trained  to  the  point  which 
justifies  us  in  calling  them  good  platoon  leaders.  Further- 
more, students  of  Civil  War  methods  and  tactics,  who  are 
at  the  same  time  familiar  with  the  requirements  of  modern 
war  and  training,  will  agree  that  a  sergeant  of  infantry,  as 
our  infantry  is  organized,  must  possess  training,  and  a 
quality  of  leadership  in  action  fairly  comparable  to  that 
demanded  of  a  captain  in  the  Civil  War." 

Each  of  the  twelve  senior  non-commissioned  officers 
should  be  able  to  handle  a  platoon ;  the  corporals  at  least 
fairly  well.  When  squad  organization  is  possible,  as  is 
generally  the  case  in  the  Regular  Army,  and  also  in  the 
Militia  when  in  camp,  it  is  well  to  designate  a  permanent 
second  and  third  in  command  of  the  squad  and  give  these 
men  ample  opportunity  to  lead  the  squad.  A  company  of 
65  men  would  thus  in  time  have  at  least  12  additional  and 
fairly  well  trained  squad  leaders,  and  they  will  be  needed 
to  meet  expansion  and  losses. 

Instruction  on  the  map  is  at  best  a  poor  substitute  for 
well  planned  field  exercises  where  persons  and  things  are 
real.  The  problems  in  this  book  may  serve  best  as  a  guide 
to  the  preparation  of  field  exercises  or  tactical  walks.  There 


6  INTRODUCTION 

is  scarcely  any  incident  so  trivial  that  it  does  not  teach  a 
lesson. 

Any  one  who  uses  this  book  for  self-instruction  should 
pause  when  he  reaches  such  a  question  as,  "What  do  you 
do?"  or  "What  do  you  think?" — then  re-read  the  situation 
until  he  understands  it,  and  finally  frame  in  his  own  mind, 
if  not  on  paper,  the  answer  to  the  question  put.  Then,  and 
not  until  then,  he  should  read  the  solution  and  discussion 
which  follow. 

A  beginner  would  do  well  to  study  the  appropriate 
paragraphs  of  the  Infantry  Drill  Regulations  (I.  D.  R.)  and 
Field  Service  Regulations  (  F.  S.  R.)  before  deciding  upon 
his  answer.    • 

Company  commanders  who  desire  to  use  problems  of 
this  character  for  instruction  on  the  map  or  on  the  ground 
can,  with  patience  and  practice,  prepare  their  own  prob- 
lems quite  readily.  The  essential  thing  is  to  dispose  of 
one  point  at  a  time,  and  dispose  of  it  thoroughly.  A  thor- 
ough understanding  of  I.  D.  R.  will  be  the  reward  of  the  offi- 
cer who  studies  its  paragraphs  systematically  in  search  of 
ideas  for  problems  for  his  non-commissioned  officers. 

Battalion  and  regimental  commanders  who  believe  such 
problems  are  useful  might  require  each  of  their  officers  to 
prepare  one  each  month.  The  best  of  these  problems  could 
be  furnished  to  the  companies,  and  a  file  kept  for  future  use. 
This  applies  to  problems  on  the  ground  as  well  as  on  the 
map.  Many  an  excellent  problem,  worked  out  near  a  mili- 
tary post  or  camp,  has  been  lost  to  contemporary  and  fu- 
ture company  commanders  because  of  the  lack  of  system  and 
co-operation.  In  time  of  peace  the  military  service  is  a 
school.  A  file  of  old  problems  (if  they  are  good  ones)  is 
as  new  and  useful  to  a  new  batch  of  non-commissioned 
officers  as  a  standard  work  on  algebra  is  to  successive  clas- 
ses of  schoolboys. 

It  is  necessary  to  explain  that  it  has  been  impracticable 
for  the  author  to  visit  the  Hunterstown  region.  The  prob- 
lems in  this  book  are  based  upon  the  map  which  accompanies 
the  book  (Hunterstown  sheet,  R.  F.  ^nuu,  of  the  Gettysburg- 


INTRODUCTION  7 

Antietam  Map,  Army  Service  Schools)  and  not  upon  the 
ground  itself.  An  inspection  of  the  ground  would  probably 
suggest  the  wisdom  of  some  minor  changes. 

A.  W.  B. 


THE  FIRST  PLATOON,  COMPANY  "A" 

For  convenience,  an  imaginary  platoon  has  been  organ- 
ized and  appears  below  in  column  of  squads.  The  various 
situations  are  faced  by  this  platoon,  or  members  of  it.  The 
numbers  indicate  second  and  third  in  command  of  squads, 
under  the  system  recommended  on  page  5. 


1st 
Squad 


2d 
Squail 


Hill 
(  Sgt. ) 


Clark 
(corp.  I 


Ami's 


Koenijr 
i  corp. i 


Brown 
(2) 


MARCH    DIRECTION 


Hii'-'t'i: 


I'iin 
(3) 


Sch  . 


Quinn 


McGowan 

Peterson 
(3) 


Stone 

Butler 
(2) 


1st  Lt. 
Allen 


1  n     some 
1  problems 
the   platoon 
leader     is 
1st    Sjrt. 
Holmes    or 
Spt.     Hill 


Walinski  Morgan 


Carter 


Pickett 


3d 

S(|\ia.l 


Adams 
(corp.) 


Hush 


Bennett  Schmidt 


Willis 


Miller 


To\\  Hey 

(2) 
Kelley 


4  th 
Squad 


Nelson 
(corp.  i 


Schwartz 


Humphrey 
(2) 


Stevens 
(3) 


Barrj 


Fassett 


Wilson 


Murphy 


Commanding  Officer,  Company  A:   Captain  Rowen 
Commanding  Officer,  First  Battalion:    Major  Crosby 


CONVENTIONAL  SIGNS    FOR     WAR     GAME    MAPS 

AdoD+ed    by  Army  Service    Schools 


Improved  Roods 
Unimproved  Roods 
Trails 

Railroads, Single  Trgc'* 
"        Double  Track 
"         Urban  or  Suburban 
Fences,  Barbed  Wire 
Smooth   » 
Worm 
Si"one 
"      Hedge 
Streams  under  15' wide 

"  over      "        " 

Errbanhmen+ 
Cutting 
Arroyo  or  Ditch 

Buildings 
Bridges 
Stone  Culver  +  s 


i  i  )  i  i  i  i 


1-1  i  I  !  I  I 


-o o o- 


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CSacKLf^O'.^:^ 


rVTVTVTTT 

w>«*  Ml  »u« 

■« « tit*  *  «»»* 


Corn 


+ 

>r 

-r 

«T 

J 

■r 

/ 

>l  I 

Cultivated    Land 


Trees  without  Underbrush 


Woods  with    Underbrush 


_o     3  _  >_Q>     o 


Brush 


Pme  Trees  and    Rocks 


\.  *    4    ■''  * 


Orchard 


0999100 

ooooooo 

OOOOOOO 
OOOOOOO 


Marsh 


=  *%  ™^=^= 

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fWt-^-=^H^ 

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■       -------^T 

—         ■ 

AH   open   spaces  are  Grass    Lands 


Firft  Problem 

An  Advance  Guard  Point 


EXPLANATION 

"The  formation  of  the  advance  guard  must  be  such  that 
the  enemy  will  be  met  first  by  a  patrol,  then  in  turn  by  one 
or  more  larger  detachments,  each  capable  of  holding  the 
enemy  until  the  next  in  rear  has  time  to  deploy  before  com- 
ing under  effective  fire."      (I.  D.  R.  642.) 

The  "patrol"  which  leads  the  way  is  called  the  "point." 
It  is  followed  by  the  advance  party,  support,  and  reserve,  in 
the  order  named.  These  parts  combined  make  up  the  ad- 
vance guard.  The  advance  guard  is  followed  by  the  main 
body. 

Sometimes  an  advance  guard  is  so  small  that  it  will 
have  no  reserve.  It  even  may  be  so  small  that  it  will  be 
divided  into  point  and  advance  party  only.  Finally,  if  the 
whole  column  on  the  road  is  very  small,  for  example  a  pla- 
toon, the  advance  guard  may  be  only  a  point,  but  always 
there  is  an  advance  guard  and  a  main  body  if  the  column 
is  marching  toward  the  enemy;  and  the  advance  guard  al- 
ways has  a  point,  although  that  may  be  all  that  it  does  have. 

The  commander  of  the  point  is  under  the  orders  of  the 
advance  party  commander. 

Sometimes  an  advance  guard  has  two  points,  one  being 
mounted  (cavalry  or  mounted  orderlies)  and  riding  far  in 
advance  of  the  other  point.  To  avoid  confusion  we  call  one 
the  "mounted  point" ;  the  other  the  "infantry  point". 

SITUATION     I 

Your  battalion  camped  last  night  along  the  farm  road 
east  of  636  (northeast  of  Granite  Hill  Sta.),  in  friendly 
country.  The  battalion  has  a  cossack  post  in  the  edge  of 
the  woods  and  near  the  road  1100  yards  north  of  636.     It 

10 


AN  ADVANCE  GUARD  POINT  11 

is  late  Fall  and  the  corn  is  cut  and  shocked. 

At  7-30  o'clock  this  morning  your  battalion  formed, 
ready  to  march.  Your  captain  ordered  the  pieces  to  be 
loaded,  assembled  the  officers  and  non-commissioned  officers 
opposite  the  center  of  the  company,  and  gave  the  following 
verbal  order : 

A  red  Cavalry  squadron  was  wrecking  the  railroad  south  of 
Biglerville  yesterday.  Biglerville  is  7  or  8  miles  northwest  of  here. 
There  are  no  Blue  troops  north  of  here.  Our  battalion  is  going  to 
march  to  a  place  called  Hershey  Mill,  about  6  miles  north  of  here,  to 
pick  up  some  wagons  and  haul  back  to  this  place  a  lot  of  forage  and 
flour  that  the  inhabitants  have  collected  for  us  at  the  mill.  This 
company  will  be  the  advance  guard.  The  main  body,  which  is  the 
rest  of  the  battalion,  follows  at  500  yards.  Mr.  Allen,  your  platoon 
and  the  Second  Platoon  will  form  the  advance  party.  Here  is  a  map 
for  you.  Take  that  road  (pointing  to  the  map  and  to  the  north) 
through  585,  537,  546,  Woodside  School  House,  616,  to  Hershey  Mill. 
March  at  once.  The  rest  of  the  company  will  be  the  support  and  will 
follow  the  advance  party  at  300  yards.  I  shall  be  with  the  support. 
Posts. 

Lieutenant  Allen  summoned  the  non-commissioned  of- 
ficers of  the  First  and  Second  Platoons  and  gave  the  follow- 
ing verbal  orders : 

Sergeant  Hill,  take  four  men  of  the  first  squad  and  march  north 
on  that  road  (pointing  to  road  a  half  mile  north  of  camp)  as  the 
point.  Precede  the  advance  party  by  about  200  yards.  At  cross- 
roads and  roadforks  flash  me  W,  W,*  and  I  will  signal  the  direction. 
The  rest  of  the  platoon  is  the  advance  party.  I  shall  be  with  it. 
Start  at  once. 

You  are  Sergeant  Hill,  platoon  guide  of  the  First 
Platoon.  What  do  you  do,  up  to  the  time  that  the  point 
takes  up  the  march  on  the  road? 

Note. — Before  reading  what  appears  below,  study  your  problem 
and  solve  it  as  explained  on  page  6.  Observe  the  same  rule  here- 
after whenever,  at  the  end  of  the  statement  of  a  "situation,"  you  are 
asked:  "What  do  you  do?"  or:  "What  do  you  think?"  The  question. 
"What  do  you  do?"  will  be  asked  frequently.  The  answer  to  it  should 
include  all  orders,  exactly  as  you  would  give  them  in  the  field. 

SERGEANT  HILL'S  SOLUTION 

I  call  out : 

Rear  rank,  First  Squad,  follow  me, 


*W,  W,  means,  "Which  way?"  It  can  be  semaphored  in  a  second  and  is  very 
useful  to  patrols,  connecting  files,  or  detachments  which  need  to  be  guided  or 
directed  by  someone  beyond  the  reach  of  the  voice. 


12  FIRST  PROBLEM 

and  march  towards  the  point  where  the  fence  meets  the 
bend  in  the  road  800  yards  north-northeast  of  636. 

First  I  make  sure  that  the  four  men  follow  me,  then  I 
call  them  alongside  and,  while  crossing  the  field,  I  tell  them 
what  they  ought  to  know  about  the  situation,  which  is  as 
follows : 

The  battalion  is  going  about  (5  miles  north  of  here  to  haul  back 
some  forage  and  flour  which  we  shall  find  at  a  place  called  Hershey 
Mill.  There  are  no  Blue  troops  in  that  direction,  but  we  may  meet 
Red  cavalry,  most  likely  from  the  west.  We  are  the  point.  We  must 
keep  200  yards  ahead  of  the  advance  party.  The  lieutenant  com- 
mands the  advance  party.  He  has  a  map  and  will  signal  to  us  which 
load  to  take  when  we  come  to  crossroads  or  roadforks.  Stone  is 
next  in  command.     Any  questions? 

I  will  answer  the  questions  and  add  whatever  is  neces- 
sary to  make  the  men  understand  their  duties  more  clearly. 
On  reaching  the  road  I  direct : 

McGowan,  along  the  left  of  road;  Stone,  along  the  right.  Move 
out.  I'll  follow  you  at  10  paces.  Schafer  and  Ames,  follow  me  at  10 
paces.  Schafer,  along  the  left  of  the  road;  Ames,  along  the  right. 
Ames,  you  watch  to  the  rear  for  signals. 


DISCUSSION 

Inasmuch  as  the  battalion  is  ready  to  march,  its  actual 
start  depends  upon  how  soon  your  point  marches  out.  In 
special  cases  a  point  may  be  told  to  march  out  at  an  in- 
creased gait  or  even  at  double  time,  but  ordinarily  there  is 
no  occasion  for  doing  this.  You  should,  however,  lose  as 
little  time  as  possible  in  starting  out.  It  is  not  necessary 
to  give  your  instructions  before  marching.  You  can  utilize 
the  first  minute  or  two  for  that  purpose,  and  in  the  present 
problem  you  can  safely  go  bunched  as  far  as  the  road ;  then 
take  up  a  more  scattered  formation.  You  will  remember 
that  there  is  a  cossack  post  in  the  woods  north  of  you  and 
there  is  little  to  be  feared  until  you  pass  that  post. 

The  lieutenant  let  you  choose  your  four  men  from  the 
First  Squad ;  but  since  the  duties  of  the  point,  aside  from  the 
duties  of  the  leader,  are  very  simple,  every  requirement  is 
answered  by  merely  taking  the  rear  rank. 

Whenever  you  take  a  patrol  or  detachment  out  for 
some  special  task,  you  should  make  use  of  the  first  opportu- 


AN  ADVANCE  GUARD  POINT  13 

nity  to  explain  to  your  men  exactly  what  the  conditions  are 
and  what  you  are  expected  to  do.  For  your  guidance  in 
these  problems  it  is  suggested  that  you  study  carefully  the 
information  and  instructions  given  to  subordinates  in  the 
solutions,  and  reason  out  the  purpose  of  each  sentence. 
Also  determine,  if  you  can,  whether,  in  your  opinion,  any- 
thing of  importance  has  been  omitted. 

You  may  prefer  to  tell  your  men  that  the  company  is 
the  advance  guard ;  that  Lieutenant  Allen  and  the  First  and 
Second  Platoons  are  the  advance  party ;  that  the  other  pla- 
toons are  the  support  and  follow  the  advance  party  at  300 
yards,  but  all  this  is  not  necessary.  The  essential  things 
are:  Your  command  is  the  point;  it  must  keep  200  yards 
ahead  of  the  advance  party;  and  Lieutenant  Allen  is  your 
immediate  commander. 

The  advance  guard  point  is  a  patrol,  but  its  route  is 
exactly  defined  and  it  cannot  march  with  the  caution  that 
is  usually  observed  by  a  patrol.  It  is  compelled  to  use  the 
road.  At  the  same  time  it  should  conceal  its  advance  as 
much  as  possible.  For  this  reason  we  sent  McGowan  and 
Stone  abreast  of  each  other  along  the  sides  of  the  road, 
where  they  may  take  advantage  of  trees,  ditches,  or  other 
road  features,  and  avoid  the  middle  of  the  road.  Naturally. 
McGowan  would  observe  the  country  to  the  front  and  left 
and  Stone  the  country  to  the  front  and  right.  You  follow 
at  10  paces,  but  to  one  side  of  the  road  in  order  not  to  at- 
tract attention  from  a  distance. 

The  troops  in  rear  are  compelled  to  expose  themselves 
by  marching  in  the  middle  of  the  road,  but  the  object  of 
the  point  is  to  see  the  road  and  country  in  front  and  flank 
before  any  enemy  that  might  be  there  sees  the  point.  This 
is  possible  less  often  than  it  is  impossible,  but  the  attempt 
must  be  made.  Also,  by  using  this  formation,  the  patrol 
is  a  less  definite  target  in  case  it  draws  fire. 

One  member  of  the  point  should  always  be  charged 
with  the  duty  of  watching  the  advance  party  for  signals. 
You  will  be  too  much  interested  in  the  country  in  front  and 
to  the  flanks  to  do  so. 


14  FIRST  PROBLEM 

SITUATION     II 

You  have  reached  the  crossroads  585.  You  notice 
that  the  cossack  post  has  joined  the  column. 

Mark  on  the  map  in  pencil  (or  on  tracing  paper)  the 
location  of  the  different  parts  of  the  battalion,  assuming 
that  the  battalion  marched  as  ordered,  but  disregarding 
any  patrols  that  may  be  out.  Connecting  files  every  100 
yards. 

The  field  train  is  not  with  the  battalion. 

SERGEANT  HILL'S  SOLUTION 

I  measure  distances  from  crossroads  585.  Call  this 
place  "X".  The  point  is  at  X.  It  can  be  represented  by  a 
dot  (though  there  may  be  20  yards  between  the  leading  and 
rear  men  of  the  point). 

The  advance  party  is  at  the  place  where  the  wire 
fence  runs  west  from  the  road.  Its  column  is  so  short  that 
it  can  be  represented  by  a  short  dash  that  scales  30  yards. 

The  head  of  the  support  is  therefore  530  yards  south 
of  X.  The  support  is  about  30  yards  long.  It  is  repre- 
sented by  a  short  dash  that  scales  30  yards. 

The  head  of  the  main  body  is  500  yards  south  of  the 
tail  of  the  support,  hence  1060  yards  south  of  X.  Its 
length  is  represented  by  a  line  that  scales  300  yards.  220 
yards  of  this  represents  the  length  of  three  companies,  the 
remaining  80  yards  represent  the  length  in  column  of  the 
four  vehicles  which  constitute  the  combat  train  (3  ammu- 
nition wagons  and  1  ambulance). 

Connecting  files  will  be  represented  by  a  dot  between 
the  point  and  advance  party,  two  dots  between  advance  par- 
ty and  support,  and  four  dots  between  support  and  main 
body. 

The  tail  of  the  column  is  therefore  in  front  of  the  farm- 
house 1360  yards  south  of  X. 

DISCUSSION 

Of  course,  you  will  never  be  required  to  make  such 
calculations  and  measurements  in  the  field,  but  the  problem 


AN  ADVANCE  GUARD  POINT  15 

is  given  now  for  several  good  reasons: 

First,  you  should  have  a  fair  idea  of  the  make-up  of  an 
advance  guard  and  how  it  looks  on  the  road. 

Second,  this  problem  and  those  which  follow  must  be 
studied  on  the  map,  and  it  will  be  necessary  to  learn  to 
measure  distances  on  the  map  instead  of  estimating  them 
by  eye,  as  you  usually  do  in  the  field. 

Third,  you  are  obliged  to  apply  a  rule  for  determining 
the  road  space  ocupied  by  infantry  and  wagons.  We  said 
that  the  main  body  (3  companies)  was  220  yards  long.  The 
3  companies  have  about  432  men  (144  men  in  a  company). 
The  easiest  rule  to  remember  is  that  when  infantry  is 
marching  in  column  of  squads  2  men  equal  one  yard  of  road 
space.  Therefore,  432  men  will  make  a  column  216  yards 
(roughly,  220  yards)  long;  that  is,  they  will  occupy  220 
yards  of  road  space.  At  drill  the  distance  is  less,  but  on  the 
march  the  rule  given  here  is  accurate  enough.  Artillery 
carriages  (guns  or  caissons),  wagons,  ambulances,  and 
auto  trucks  each  occupy  about  20  yards  of  road  space.  To 
know  this  rule  assists  you  in  estimating  numbers.  Suppose 
someone  shows  you  a  sack  of  beans  and  asks  you  how  many 
beans  are  in  the  bag.  Of  course  you  cannot  begin  to  guess. 
But  if  you  are  told  that  800  beans  weigh  one  pound  you  will 
lift  the  sack,  guess  at  the  weight,  and  multiply  the  number 
of  pounds  by  800.  Now,  if  you  are  sent  out  as  a  patrol 
leader  and  reach  a  hill  from  which  you  see  a  long  column  of 
infantry  followed  by  a  long  column  of  wagons,  you  cannot 
count  them,  of  course.  But  you  are  trained  in  estimating 
distances.  Suppose  you  estimate  the  infantry  column  to 
be  1000  yards  long  and  the  wagon  column  500  yards  long. 
Now  you  can  safely  report  that  you  have  seen  about  2000 
infantry  followed  by  about  25  wagons.  Or  suppose  you  had 
a  good  map  and  could  locate  on  it  the  position  of  the  head 
and  the  tail  of  the  column.  By  using  the  map  scale  and  a 
little  arithmetic  you  could  make  a  very  accurate  estimate. 
But  a  chance  to  use  this  method  occurs  less  often. 

SITUATION     III 

At  crossroads  585  you  semaphored  "W,  W,"  to  Lieuten- 


16  FIRST  PROBLEM 

ant  Allen.  He  gave  the  arm  signal,  "Forward,  march." 
You  therefore  marched  "through"  the  crossroads.  When 
you  reached  the  triangle  near  537,  Lieutenant  Allen  gave 
the  arm  signal,  "Column  left,  march,"  and  you  marched 
towards  546.  As  you  approach  the  first  house  on  the  left 
(500  yards  northwest  of  537),  McGowTan  slows  down  to 
about  a  mile  and  a  half  gait  and  looks  anxiously  toward  the 
orchard  and  woods  west  of  the  house.  Stone  follows  suit. 
You  call  out, 

What  is  the  matter,  McGowan,  do  you  see  anything-? 

He  replies. 

Not  a  thing,  hut  there  might  he  someone  in  those  woods. 

What  do  you  do? 

SERGEANT  HILL'S  SOLUTION 

I  call  out  to  McGowan. 

March  along  a   little  hetter  than   three  miles   an   hour   until   you 
see  something  real. 

DISCUSSION 

The  point  must  precede  the  advance  party  by  200  yards. 
The  advance  party  and  all  the  troops  in  rear  of  it  must 
march  at  a  steady  gait  unless  prevented  by  the  enemy.  This 
means  that  the  point  must  also  march  at  a  steady  gait.  It 
cannot  approach  woods  or  suspicious  places  as  cautiously  as 
a  reconnaissance  patrol  might  do.  At  maneuvers  and  field 
exercises  we  frequently  see  the  marching  rate  of  the  main 
body  reduced  to  2  miles  or  less  for  no  better  reason  than 
that  the  point  and  other  parts  of  the  advance  guard  are 
unnecessarily  cautious.  The  point  must  move  at  normal 
marching  rate  until  the  enemy  prevents  it  from  doing  so. 
The  point  must  take  chances  when  it  approaches  woods  or 
houses  such  as  caused  McGowan  to  slow  down.  When  the 
enemy  is  actually  seen,  or  wrhen  the  point  is  fired  upon, 
the  situation  is  quite  different,  but  we  shall  have  more  to 
say  about  that  later. 


AN  ADVANCE  GUARD  POINT  17 

SITUATION     IV 

When  the  point  reaches  the  house  on  the  right  hand 
side  of  the  road  about  600  yards  southeast  of  546,  McGowan 
says, 

Sergeant,  we  could  get  a  fine  view  to  the  north  from  the  second 
story  window  of  that  house.     Shall  I  go  there? 
What  do  you  do? 

SERGEANT  HILL'S  SOLUTION 

I  answer, 

No. 

DISCUSSION 

You  might  be  tempted  to  tell  McGowan  to  mind  his 
own  business,  but  that  is  not  necessary.  Never  squelch  a 
man  for  offering  a  suggestion  which,  from  his  standpoint, 
seems  reasonable,  unless  he  becomes  a  nuisance. 

No  doubt  a  good  view  to  the  north  can  be  obtained  in 
the  manner  suggested  by  McGowan,  but  before  the  observer 
returns  to  the  road  the  advance  party  will  reach  the  house. 
If  the  point  were  to  adopt  a  system  of  sending  a  man  to 
every  favorable  point  of  observation,  there  would  soon  be 
no  point  left  unless  the  advance  party,  and  therefore  the 
whole  column,  halted  while  the  point  made  use  of  these 
places.  This  is  out  of  the  question,  of  course.  It  often 
happens  that  a  member  of  the  point  can  be  directed  to 
march  so  as  to  get  a  better  view.  For  example,  if  the  road 
passes  through  a  long,  deep  cut,  one  man  can  be  sent  along 
the  top  of  the  cut.  The  thing  to  bear  in  mind  is  that  no 
man  should  be  sent  on  such  an  errand  if  he  will  be  unable 
to  get  forward  at  ordinary  marching  rate. 

It  is  the  duty  of  the  advance  parti/  or  of  the  support  to 
send  men  off  the  road  when  it  becomes  necessary  or  desira- 
ble to  do  so  for  reconnaissance  or  observation. 

SITUATION     V 

The  point  arrived  within  100  yards  of  546  and  you 
saw  a  Blue  patrol  along  the  Hunterstown — 546  road,  march- 
ing north,  and  now  700  yards  south  of  546.     A  moment 


18  FIRST   PROBLEM 

later  you  arrived  at  546.  McGowan  points  to  the  west. 
Between  the  rows  of  trees  in  the  orchard  straight  west  of 
546  about  ten  cavalrymen  are  hurriedly  mounting  up.  A- 
bout  half  of  them  are  already  riding  west  deeper  into  the 
orchard.  They  are  Reds  without  a  doubt. 
What  do  you  do? 

SERGEANT  HILL'S  SOLUTION 

I  extend  my  arms  horizontally  (the  signal  "as  skir- 
mishers, march")    and  call  out. 

Target,  cavalry   in   the   orchard,   clip   fire,   faster. 

Then  I  face  Lieutenant  Allen  and  semaphore 

Ten  men.     Cavalry. 

Then  I  join  the  men  who  are  firing,  in  order  to  observe  the 
enemy,  the  surrounding  country,  and  the  effect  of  our  fire. 

DISCUSSION 

By  the  time  you  have  clone  all  that  the  solution  in- 
cludes, it  is  likely  that  the  patrol  will  have  disappeared  and 
it  will  be  time  for  you  to  do  something  else.  What  you  will 
do  next  depends  upon  the  result  of  your  observation. 

The  Drill  Regulations  give  you  short  and  clear  com- 
mands and  signals.  They  constitute  a  special  language 
which  all  men  learn.  If  you  were  to  form  the  bad  habit  of 
breaking  out  into  ordinary  conversation  in  a  situation  like 
the  present  one,  it  is  not  probable  that  all  of  your  men 
would  know  exactly  what  you  wanted.  The  non-commis- 
sioned officer  who  is  so  trained  in  the  application  of  Drill 
Regulations  commands  and  signals  that  he  uses  them  in- 
stinctively and  correctly  will  get  far  better  results  in  any 
emergency.  Furthermore,  he  will  give  the  impression  a- 
mong  his  men  that  he  understands  his  business,  and  this 
in  itself  is  a  very  important  matter. 

In  future  problems  we  shall  have  occasion  to  apply  Drill 
Regulations  commands  and  signals.  We  may  as  well  indi- 
cate now,  in  the  beginning,  that  these  commands  and  signals 
can  frequently  be  used  to  indicate  to  your  men  exactly  what 
vou  want  done. 


AN  ADVANCE  GUARD  POINT  19 

When  you  shout  "target"  and  pause  for  a  moment,  as 
you  naturally  will,  your  men  will  instinctively  look  toward 
you  and  see  you  signal  "as  skirmishers,  march."  The  tar- 
get itself  is  so  apparent  to  any  one  who  glances  in  the 
direction  in  which  you  are  looking  that  it  would  hardly  be 
necessary  to  describe  it.  An  unmistakable  target  within 
500  yards,  as  in  this  case,  requires  no  announcement  of 
range.  The  comand  "clip  fire,"  without  announcement  of 
range,  denotes  battle  sight.  Batttle  sight  is  even  more 
suitable  against  cavalry  than  against  infantry,  on  account  of 
the  height  of  the  target.  It  is  entirely  proper  to  command 
"faster,"  even  before  firing  begins.  It  indicates  that  when 
fire  is  opened  you  desire  a  rate  of  fire  faster  than  the  normal. 

We  recommend  that  you  study  the  commands  and  sig- 
nals used  in  future  problems  and  determine  for  yourself 
whether  they  answer  every  purpose  and  would  be  perfectly 
clear  to  trained  troops. 

You  might  have  signalled  to  Lieutenant  Allen  by  hold- 
ing your  rifle  horizontally  over  your  head.  This  signal, 
which  has  been  used  many  years,  indicates  "enemy  in  sight 
in  small  numbers."  The  semaphore  message  "ten  men, 
cavalry,"  can  be  flashed  almost  as  quickly  and  it  is  more  de- 
finite. While  on  this  subject  of  semaphore  signalling,  it  is 
well  to  add  that  officers  and  non-commissioned  officers  and 
many  privates  should  be  able  to  semaphore.  It  is  very 
simple,  rapid,  and  easily  learned.  If  half  of  the  company  is 
proficient,  the  other  half  will  soon  be  able  to  signal  fairly 
well. 

There  is  no  doubt  as  to  the  propriety  of  opening  fire 
on  the  Reds.  Their  hurried  movements  would  indicate  that 
their  halt  in  the  orchard  had  been  interrupted  by  the  warn- 
ing of  their  lookdut.  They  know  that  Blue  troops  are  ap- 
proaching, but  in  order  to  prevent  them  from  getting  too 
much  information  of  our  own  forces  it  is  best  to  shoot  them 
up  while  you  have  a  chance,  and  fill  them  with  a  strong  de- 
sire to  get  away. 

SITUATION     VI 

The  Red  patrol  disappeared  and  was  screened  from 


20  FIRST   PROBLEM 

view  by  the  orchard  before  your  men  exhausted  the  first 
clip. 

You  immediately  directed  your  point  to  resume  its 
march  to  the  north  at  an  increased  gait,  since  the  advance 
party  had  now  closed  up  to  50  yards.  In  the  meantime 
you  shouted  to  Lieutenant  Allen, 

Reds  have  gone  west  through  the  orchard. 

When  the  point  arrives  at  the  stream  crossing  between  road- 
fork  544  and  crossroad  616,  a  lively  fire  opens  from  the 
woods  east  of  the  road  and  directly  north  of  you.  The  fire 
is  over  your  head  and  apparently  is  directed  at  the  advance 
party.  You  judge  that  there  may  be  either  a  squad  firing 
very  rapidly  or  a  platoon  firing  slowly.  A  glance  down  the 
road  shows  you  that  the  advance  party  has  started  to  de- 
ploy. 

What  do  you  do'.' 

SERGEANT  HILL'S  SOLUTION 

I  shout. 

Off  the  road  to  the  left  and  up  that  hollow, 

pointing  to  the  shallow  hollow  50  yards  west  of  the  road, 
and  to  the  northwest  of  me.  I  march  to  the  north,  parallel 
to  the  road,  and  as  close  to  it  as  I  can  without  giving  up 
cover.  I  personally  march  far  enough  to  the  right  to  be 
able  to  peer  over  the  crest  and  watch  the  edge  of  the  woods. 
It  is  my  intention  to  halt  about  half  way  to  the  wire  fence, 
and  then  decide  what  to  do  next  when  I  see  what  our  column 
is  doing  and  what  has  happened  to  the  enemy. 

DISCUSSION 

There  are  several  reasons  why  it  would  be  unwise  for 
the  point  to  drop  in  its  tracks  and  open  fire.  In  the  first 
place,  it  would  have  a  bad  firing  position.  Also,  the  fire  of 
four  or  five  men  would  add  little  to  the  fire  effect  unless  de- 
livered from  the  flank.  The  point  is  not  being  fired  upon 
and  for  the  present  is  free  to  move.  A  quick  movement  off 
the  road  and  to  the  left  may  draw  a  few  shots  from  the 


AN  ADVANCE  GUARD  POINT  21 

enemy,  but  it  would  probably  amount  to  nothing.  The 
point  can  help  the  column  most  by  placing  itself  in  a  posi- 
tion to  get  information  and  at  the  same  time  be  ready  to 
resume  the  march  promptly.  If  you  find  later  that  you 
can  deliver  a  flank  fire,  you  should  seize  the  opportunity  to 
do  so,  but  for  the  present  it  is  best  to  get  forward  under 
cover  so  that  you  can  watch  not  only  the  enemy  in  the  woods, 
but  the  road  to  the  north  and  the  main  road  a  half  mile 
west  of  you.  Your  first  position  at  the  stream  crossing  was 
unfavorable  under  any  circumstances,  but  in  choosing  a  bet- 
ter place  you  should  not  be  drawn  farther  from  the  road 
than  is  absolutely  necessary,  and  you  should  not  fall  back 
if  it  is  possible  to  get  forward.  The  hostile  force  is  prob- 
ably small  and  will  stand  for  a  short  time  only.  It  may  be 
the  same  cavalry  party  which  you  drove  out  of  the  orchard. 
In  this  case  its  intention  probably  is  to  delay  our  column  or 
make  it  show  its  strength.  The  duty  of  an  advance  guard 
in  such  a  case  is  to  act  vigorously  and  enable  the  column  to 
march  with  as  little  delay  as  possible. 

SITUATION     VII 

The  enemy  disappeared  north  through  the  woods.  In 
the  meantime  the  advance  party  had  crossed  the  stream  and 
is  now  assembling  in  the  road.  The  point  was  able  to  fire 
a  few  shots,  and  then  to  return  to  the  road  and  resume  the 
march.  When  the  point  arrives  50  yards  south  of  crossroad 
616,  the  command,  "halt,"  is  signalled  from  the  rear.  You 
can  see  the  men  of  the  advance  party  and  support  fall  out 
and  sit  down.  The  main  body  is  in  the  valley  and  is  not 
visible. 

What  do  you  do? 

SERGEANT  HILL'S  SOLUTION 

I  continue  the  march  to  crossroad  616  and  give  orders 
as  follows : 

Stone,  post  yourself  here  and  watch  the  roads  to  the  northeast, 
northwest,  and  southwest.     Other  men  fall  out. 

I  sit  down  in  a  place  from  which  I  can  see  the  advance 
party. 


22  FIRST  PROBLEM 

DISCUSSION 

The  column  has  apparently  halted  for  a  rest.  When 
a  column  halts,  the  point  becomes  a  "march  outpost." 
If  necessary,  it  shifts  its  position  so  as  to  get  the  best  view 
of  the  roads  and  country  to  the  front  and  flank.  The  point 
should  not  move  a  great  distance  for  this  purpose.  How  far 
is  a  matter  of  judgment.  Over  200  yards  to  the  front,  or 
100  yards  to  the  flank,  or  100  yards  to  the  rear,  would 
probably  be  too  far.  In  the  present  case  an  advance  of  50 
yards  enabled  you  to  place  Stone  at  the  crossroads.  This  is 
also  the  highest  point  on  the  spur,  and  from  this  position 
one  man  can  see  practically  as  much  as  two  men  can. 
Hence,  the  others  may  just  as  well  rest. 


Second  Problem 

An  Advance  Guard  Connecting  File 


EXPLANATION 

"When  the  distance  between  parts  of  the  advance  guard 
or  the  nature  of  the  country  is  such  as  to  make  direct  com- 
munication difficult,  connecting  files  march  between  the  sub- 
divisions to  keep  up  communication.  Each  element  of  the 
column  sends  the  necessary  connecting  files  to  its  front.'1 
(I.  D.  R.  645.) 

Usually,  a  connecting  file  consists  of  two  men,  but 
special  conditions  may  require  the  use  of  one  man,  or  more 
than  two  men.  The  men  of  a  connecting  file  march  to- 
gether. 

The  distance  between  connecting  files,  or  between  a 
connecting  file  and  the  subdivision  nearest  to  it,  varies  ac- 
cording to  the  situation.  Naturally,  the  distance  would 
be  greatest  in  flat,  open  country,  in  broad  daylight,  and  in 
this  case  may  be  as  much  as  200  yards.  The  distance  would 
be  least  on  a  very  dark  night.  In  the  latter  case  the  con- 
necting files  may  be  so  close  as  to  form  a  single  file  at  about 
5  yards  distance. 

In  daylight,  and  in  case  of  doubt,  100  yards  may  be 
considered  a  satisfactory  average.  This  distance  has  two 
advantages:  '  First,  men  are  trained  to  measure  distances 
by  eye  in  units  of  100  yards.  Second,  the  prescribed  dis- 
tance between  subdivisions  is  easily  maintained  by  send- 
ing connecting  files  100  yards  apart;  thus,  when  600  yards 
distance  is  ordered,  the  head  of  the  subdivision  which  is  to 
march  with  600  yards  distance  marches  100  yards  behind 
its  fifth  connecting  file. 

SITUATION     I 

You  are  Private  Dixon  of  Company  B.  Your  battalion 
camped  last  night  along  the  farm  road  east  of  hill  636  (north- 

23 


24  SECOND  PROBLEM 

east  of  Granite  Hill  Station).  At  7-30  o'clock  this  morning 
the  battalion  formed,  ready  to  march.  Your  captain  ordered 
the  pieces  to  be  loaded,  assembled  the  officers  and  non-com- 
missioned officers  opposite  the  center  of  the  company,  and 
gave  the  following  verbal  order  loud  enough  for  the  com- 
pany to  hear  it : 

A  Red  cavalry  squadron  was  wrecking  the  railroad  south  of 
Biglerville  yesterday.  Biglerville  is  7  or  8  miles  northwest  of  here. 
Our  battalion  is  going  to  march  about  6  miles  north  of  here  to  haul 
back  to  this  place  some  forage  and  flour.  Company  A  will  be  the 
advance  guard  at  500  yards.     Posts. 

You  saw  Company  A  march  out  with  point,  advance 
party,  and  support.  It  marched  north  to  the  road  which 
leads  towards  585.  When  the  support  had  marched  about 
50  yards  to  the  north  from  your  company,  the  captain 
said  to  Private  Scott  of  your  squad, 

Scott,  take  Hanson  with  you  and  follow  the  advance  guard  at 
100  yards  as  connecting  file. 

A  moment  later,  when  Scott  had  marched  about  50 
yards,  the  captain  said  to  you : 

Dixon,  take  Smither  with  you  and  follow  Scott  at  100  yards 
as  connecting  file. 

When  you  reached  the  road,  you  saw  the  main  body 
marching  300  yards  in  rear  of  you  and  two  connecting 
files  between  you  and  your  company.  You  also  noticed  that 
the  major  was  riding  at  the  tail  of  the  advance  guard. 

After  marching  about  one  and  one-half  miles  you  turn- 
ed the  corner  150  yards  northwest  of  roadfork.537,  and  now, 
when  you  are  15  yards  beyond  the  corner,  you  see  that  the 
advance  guard  support  and  Scott's  connecting  file  have  just 
halted  in  the  road.  On  account  of  the  woods  you  cannot  see 
the  next  connecting  file  in  rear  of  you. 

What  do  you  do? 

PRIVATE  DIXON'S  SOLUTION 

I  halt  and  say  to  Smither, 

Go  back  to  the  roadfork  and  stand  where  the  next  connecting  file 
can  see  you. 


AN  ADVANCE  GUARD  CONNECTING  FILE  25 

DISCUSSION 

Imagine  that  the  advance  guard  support  is  dragging  be- 
hind it  a  string  100  yards  long.  Scott's  place  is  at  the  end 
of  that  string.  Imagine  also  that  Scott  drags  a  string  100 
yards  long.  Your  place  is  at  the  end  of  that  string.  You 
also  drag  an  imaginary  string  at  the  end  of  which  the  next 
connecting  file  is  supposed  to  be.  Finally,  the  captain  of 
your  company  is  ordinarily  at  the  end  of  the  string  of  the 
last  connecting  file,  but  he  may  close  up  or  drop  back  for 
reasons  of  his  own.  You  have  no  such  discretion.  All 
you  can  do  is  to  shift  slightly,  if  necessary,  in  order  to  see 
the  next  connecting  file  in  front,  or  in  order  to  be  seen  by 
the  next  connecting  file  in  rear.  For  this  reason  you  sent 
Smither  back  to  the  roadfork.  If  the  distance  to  the  road- 
fork  had  been  40  or  50  yards  or  more,  there  would  have 
been  no  object  in  sending  him.  The  next  connecting  file 
would  have  been  there  at  the  same  time,  or  sooner,  and 
would  have  halted  when  it  saw  you  had  done  so. 

SITUATION     II 

When    Smither   reached    the    roadfork,    he    signalled, 
"halt,"  to  the  next  connecting  file. 
What  do  you  do? 

PRIVATE  DIXON'S  SOLUTION 

I  call  to  Smither: 

Don't    signal,   just    stand    there. 

DISCUSSION 

Smither  does  not  know  his  business  and  exceeded  his 
instructions.  If  the  signal  "Halt"  is  transmitted  back  to 
your  captain,  he  will  assume  that  the  major  has  ordered 
"Halt."  You  received  no  such  signal  and  hence  should  not 
permit  it  to  be  sent  back.  If  your  connecting  file  merely 
halts,  it  is  sufficient  notice  that  your  imaginary  string  has 
halted.  Each  subdivision  of  the  advance  guard  tries  to 
march  steadily,  but  sometimes  receives  short,  unavoidable 


26  SECOND  PROBLEM 

checks.  The  officer  in  command  of  the  next  subdivision 
in  rear,  or  of  the  main  body,  may  wish  to  avoid  numerous, 
short  halts,  which  irritate  the  men  and  do  no  good,  and  to 
adjust  the  distance  by  a  slower  gait;  or  he  may  wish  to 
close  up  a  part  of  the  distance  in  order  to  reach  a  shady  place 
in  the  road,  or  in  order  to  get  off  a  conspicuous  hill.  If  h*3 
receives  the  signal  "Halt,"  and  knows  the  major  is  in  front, 
he  must  halt  practically  where  he  is.  Bear  in  mind,  there- 
fore, that  signals  are  to  be  transmitted  only  when  ordered 
by  proper  authority,  or  when  unmistakably  given  to  you  by 
the  next  connecting  file  in  front  or  rear  of  you. 

SITUATION     IU 

You  reach  a  point  about  50  yards  north  of  roadfork 
544,  when  fire  opens  to  the  north  of  you.  The  advance 
guard  support  has  halted  near  the  summit  of  the  low  ridge 
(about  250  yards  north  of  544) .  You  are  then  halted  on  the 
upslope  of  that  ridge.  A  minute  later  Scott  signals,  "As- 
semble." 

What  do  you  do'.' 

PRIVATE  DIXON'S  SOLUTION 

I  signal 

Assemble 

to  the  next  connecting  file  in  rear,  and  continue  the  signal 
until  I  see  that  the  connecting  file  repeats  the  signal. 

DISCI  SSION 

You  have,  of  course,  no  reason  to  question  the  authority 
for  Scott's  signal.  The  main  body  is  under  cover  from 
the  fire  which  you  have  heard,  and  can  advance.  The  major 
is  ahead  and  evidently  wants  the  main  body  to  close  up  on 
him;  that  is,  ssemble  on  him.  The  important  thing  for 
you  to  do  is  to  continue  the  signal  until  you  are  sure  that  the 
next  connecting  file  in  rear  has  passed  it  along. 

SITUATION     IV 

You  are  still  halted  north  of  544.     The  advance  guard 


AN  ADVANCE  GUARD  CONNECTING   FILE  27 

support  has  deployed  east  of  the  road,  but  has  not  yet  ad- 
vanced. Scott  is  still  halted.  The  main  body  has  advanced 
a  little  more  than  100  yards  and  in  the  meantime  has  picked 
up  the  last  connecting  file.  There  is  now  only  one  connect- 
ing file  between  you  and  the  main  body,  and  that  connecting 
file  is  now  closing  up  on  you  and  keeping  about  100  yards 
ahead  of  the  main  body. 
What  do  you  do? 

PRIVATE  DIXON'S  SOLUTION 

I  stand  fast. 

DISCUSSION 

The  connecting  file  in  rear  of  you  made  a  mistake.  In 
our  present  case  it  will  make  little  or  no  difference.  You 
should  remember,  however,  that  it  is  important  for  each 
commander  of  a  subdivision  of  a  column  to  know  whethei 
the  next  subdivision  in  front  is  advancing  or  has  halted. 
Generally,  this  can  be  determined  only  by  observing  the 
connecting  files.  In  thick  country,  and  on  a  winding  road, 
where  only  one  connecting  file  is  visible,  that  connecting  file 
will  deceive  the  commander  if  it  takes  its  distance  from  the 
rear;  that  is,  if  it  starts  to  wind  up  its  hundred  yards  of 
string,  instead  of  halting  at  the  end  of  it. 

In  a  night  march  the  situation  is  more  difficult.  The 
advance  guard  and  all  connecti'ng  files  must  guide  on  I 
main  body.  At  the  same  time,  the  main  body  must  be 
warned,  quietly,  if  it  is  jamming  up  on  the  advance  guard. 
A  connecting  file  must  therefore  keep  its  distance  ahead  oi 
the  connecting  file  or  body  of  troops  next  in  rear,  and  at  the 
same  time  give  warning  if  the  maintenance  of  this  distance 
results  in  jamming.  For  this  reason,  the  proper  distance 
at  night  between  connecting  files  is  the  maximum  distance 
at  which  a  man  can  be  seen  in  outline. 


Third  Problem 

An  Advance  Guard  Flank  Patrol 


EXPLANATION 

"To  afford  protection  to  an  infantry  column,  the  coun- 
try must  be  observed  on  each  side  of  the  road  as  far  as  the 
terrain  affords  positions  for  effective  rifle  fire  upon  the 
column.  If  the  country  that  it  is  necessary  to  observe  be 
open  to  view  from  the  road,  reconnaissance  is  not  neces- 
sary."     (I.  D.  R.  648). 

"Where  the  country  is  generally  open  to  view,  but  lo- 
calities in  it  might  conceal  an  enemy  of  some  size,  recon- 
naissance is  necessary.  Where  the  road  is  exposed  to  fire 
and  the  view  is  restricted,  a  patrol  should  be  sent  to  examine 
the  country  in  the  direction  from  which  danger  threatens. 
The  object  may  be  accomplished  by  sending  patrols  to  ob- 
serve from  prominent  points.  When  the  ground  permits 
and  the  necessity  exists,  patrols  may  be  sent  to  march 
abreast  of  the  column  at  distances  which  permit  them  to 
see  important  features  not  visible  from  the  road."  (I.  D. 
R.  650). 

Infantry  on  the  march  must  protect  itself  from  being 
surprised  or  being  fired  upon,  not  only  from  the  front,  but 
also  from  the  right  or  left.  To  guard  against  the  latter  we 
send  out  flank  patrols  when  necessary.  It  often  happens 
that,  from  the  road  itself,  we  can  see  all  the  ground  so  far 
to  the  right  or  left  that  nothing  more  than  small  hostile 
patrols  could  be  within  easy  rifle-shot  of  our  column  with- 
out being  seen  from  the  road.  In  such  cases  we  do  not 
bother  to  send  out  flank  patrols,  because  a  hostile  patrol  will 
hardly  fire  on  a  company  or  a  battalion.  If  the  distance  is 
great,  they  could  not  hit  anything.  If  the  distance  is  short, 
it  is  not  healthy  to  open  fire  and  generally  nothing  is  gained 
by  doing  so.  Only  poorly  instructed  patrols  at  maneuvers 
do  such  things.     Rut  from  time  to  time  it  is  necessary  to 

28 


AN  ADVANCE  GUARD  FLANK  PATROL        29 

send  out  flank  patrols  towards  woods,  houses,  or  hills  in 
order  to  find  out  whether  the  enemy  is  there  with  enough 
men  to  be  dangerous.  These  patrols  are  sent  by  the  ad- 
vance guard,  generally  by  the  advance  party  if  it  is  strong 
enough.  In  this  way  the  information  can  be  obtained  be- 
fore the  troops  in  rear  of  the  advance  party  come  within 
easy  rifle-shot  of  the  ground  examined  by  the  patrol.  Of 
course,  mounted  men  are  generally  best  for  such  patrols; 
but  if  there  are  none  on  hand,  or  if  the  ground  is  difficult, 
we  must  use  infantry. 

The  patrol  leader  is  told  when  to  leave  the  column, 
where  to  go,  and  about  where  to  come  back  on  the  road  on 
which  the  column  is  marching.  When  the  patrol  gets  back 
on  this  road,  the  leader  will  usually  find  that  his  company 
is  ahead  of  him.  He  is  expected  to  overtake  the  company 
if  possible,  but  without  double  timing.  If  the  patrol  has 
lost  considerable  distance  (say  more  than  a  half  mile),  the 
patrol  leader  should  report  to  the  first  battalion  or  company 
commander  that  he  meets. 

SITUATION     I 

The  situation  is  the  same  as  in  the  First  Problem, 
to  include  Lieutenant  Allen's  order,  page  11. 

You  are  Corporal  Clark,  First  Squad,  at  the  head  of  the 
advance  party  and  approaching  crossroads  585.  Your  rear 
rank  is  in  the  point,  and  Pine  and  Hagen  are  ahead  as  con- 
necting file. 

f 

A  few  minutes  ago  Lieutenant  Allen  passed  the  word 
along  that, 

Farmers  have  telephoned  that  Red  cavalry  is  active  again  this 
morning  south  of  Biglerville;  that  is  seven  miles  northwest  of  here. 

When"  you  are  on  the  road  where  the  fence  ends,  200 
yards  south  of  585,  Lieutenant  Allen  says  to  you : 

Corporal,  when  we  reach  the  crossroads  in  front  of  us,  take 
three  men  and  patrol  to  those  woods  (north  of  letter  "S"  in  hunters- 
town).  A  half  mile  beyond  the  crossroads  our  road  turns  to  the 
northwest.  From  the  woods  you  also  go  northwest  until  you  strike 
a  main  road.  There  is  the  road  I  mean  (pointing  towards  S.  H., 
700  yards  north  of  Hunterstown).  That  road  will  take  you  back  to 
the  column.     Keep  about  abreast  of  the  advance  party. 


30  THIRD  PROBLEM 

(1)  What  do  you  think? 

(2)  What  do  you  do  up  to  the  time  your  patrol  starts 
out  in  patrol  formation? 

CORPORAL  CLARK'S  SOLUTION 

(1)  I  am  to  go  to  the  woods ;  then  northwest.  Column 
goes  northwest  also,  but  on  the  road.  First  main  road  takes 
me  back  to  the  column.     Keep  abreast  of  the  lieutenant. 

Approaching  the  woods  I  want  some  one  in  front  of 
me  and  some  one  behind.  Better  have  two  men  in  front. 
They  will  have  more  confidence.  We  shall  be  on  a  low 
ridge,  and  I  will  have  no  trouble  seeing  the  advance  party. 
But  the  first  thing  to  do  is  to  get  through  the  fence  and  then 
organize. 

(2)  At  the  crossroad  I  call  out, 

Brown,  Quinn,  and  Peterson,  follow  me. 

I  take  them  through  the  fence  and  walk  towards  the 
woods,  meantime  telling  the  men, 

We  are  going  to  patrol  those  woods;  then  go  northwest  to  the 
first  main  road;  then  along  that  road  to  the  road  the  column  will  be 
on.  We  have  to  keep  abreast  of  the  advance  party.  Brown,  you 
go  ahead  now  to  the  nearest  point  of  the  woods  (south  corner).  Quinn, 
25  yards  to  the  right  of  Brown.  I  will  follow  Quinn  at  50  yards. 
Peterson,  50  yards  behind  me. 

We  take  up  this  formation  and  march,  and  watch 
Hunterstown. 

DISCUSSION 

When  you  are  given  a  thing  to  do,  the  logical  way 
to  go  about  it  is  as  follows: 

1.  Be  sure  you  understand  what  you  are  ordered  to  do. 

2.  Determine  the  best  way  to  do  it. 

3.  Do  it. 

Sometimes  you  will  have  ample  time  to  follow  out  this 
idea.  Sometimes,  however,  you  will  have  barely  time  to 
"do  it"  and  must  trust  to  your  instinct  to  pull  you  through. 

In  the  present  problem,  your  first  thought  should  be 
to  fix  firmly  in  your  mind-the  instructions  given  you  by  Lieu- 
tenant Allen.  You  have  time  before  reaching  the  crossroads. 


AN  ADVANCE  GUARD  FLANK  PATROL  31 

He  planned  your  route  with  the  assistance  of  his  map,  but 
you  will  have  to  go  without  a  map.  You  can  not  see  what 
lies  beyond  the  woods.  You  only  know  that  northwest  of 
the  woods  there  is  a  main  road  that  will  take  you  back  to 
the  column.  Lieutenant  Allen's  directions  look  simple 
enough  when  you  examine  a  perfect  map ;  but  if  you  were  on 
the  ground,  you  would  realize  the  importance  of  repeating 
aloud,  or  at  least  to  yourself,  the  route  given  you.  If  there 
is  any  doubt  in  your  mind,  you  should  ask  Lieutenant  Allen 
to  explain  it  away.  If  Lieutenant  Allen  did  not  have  a  good 
map,  he  would  not  be  able  to  see  beyond  the  first  woods.  In 
that  case  he  would  probably  send  your  patrol  to  the  first 
woods  only.  Then,  later,  when  the  advance  party  reached 
the  north  end  of  the  woods,  he  would  have  to  send  another 
patrol  through  the  second  woods.  But  he  has  a  map  and 
the  advance  party  is  small,  so  he  trusts  to  your  intelligence 
to  make  the  patrolling  easier. 

You  will  observe  that  your  patrol  left  the  column  with- 
out any  inspection,  and  marched  without  trying  to  use 
cover.  Also,  Lieutenant  Allen  did  not  say  what  the  patrol 
was  to  look  for.  At  first  glance  you  would  think  that  this 
is  contrary  to  Infantry  Drill  Regulations  (par.  609).  But 
there  is  a  difference  between  your  advance  guard  flank 
patrol  and  the  patrols  that  par.  609  has  specially  in  mind. 
Your  flank  patrol  must  go  out  at  once.  The  men  are  already 
in  marching  trim  and  pieces  are  loaded.  The  patrol  will 
not  be  out  of  sight  of  the  column  except  perhaps  for  a  few 
minutes  at  a  time. 

Furthermore,  if  a  flank  patrol  is  required  to  advance 
under  cover  and  the  column  keeps  up  the  average  rate  of 
march,  the  patrol  will  usually  fail  to  get  anywhere  in  time 
to  be  of  use.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  column  slows  up  to 
let  patrols  advance  cautiously  under  cover,  the  column  will 
not  get  anywhere.  Of  course,  you  will  use  whatever  cover 
you  find,  but  the  main  thing  is  to  get  over  your  ground  fast 
enough  to  give  the  column  on  the  road  no  excuse  for  slow- 
ing up. 

The  other  point  that  we  raised  was,  why  did  not  Lieut- 
enant Allen  tell  you  what  to  look  for?     If  you  are  sent  on 


THIRD  PROBLEM 

reconnaissance,  this  would  be  very  important,  but  the  pur- 
pose of  an  advance  guard  flank  patrol  is  always  the  same. 
The  purpose  is  to  give  warning  of  an  enemy,  if  seen,  in  time 
to  save  the  column  from  being  surprised,  and  incidentally 
to  drive  off  any  hostile  patrols  that  have  a  chance  to  get 
information  of  our  column.  You  should  understand  .this 
so  well  that  it  should  not  be  necessary  for  Lieutenant  Allen 
to  tell  you  each  time  that  you  are  sent  out.  How  to  get 
this  information  and  how  to  transmit  it  to  the  column  will 
be  explained  later. 

At  the  crossroads  you  commanded  : 

Brown,  Quinn,  and  Peterson,  follow  me, 

and  led  them  through  the  fence.  That  is  short,  complete, 
unmistakable,  and  businesslike. 

Three  of  you  fellows  come  along  with  me 

is  the  way  we  frequently  hear  it.  It  is  wrong.  Pick  your 
men  and  name  them.  Under  Lieutenant  Allen's  orders  to 
"take  three  men,"  you  would  ordinarily  take  them  from 
your  own  squad  if  you  had  that  many  left.  You  would  not 
in  that  case  take  any  from  other  squads  except  for  excellent 
reasons,  and  in  any  event,  only  after  telling  the  lieutenant 
that  you  wished  to  do  so. 

At  first  you  are  so  close  to  the  advance  party  that  you 
can  safely  advance  bunched  for  75  or  100  yards  and  while 
marching  thus  you  may  give  your  information  and  orders. 

Your  men  have  heard  Lieutenant  Allen  give  you  the 
route.  Nevertheless  you  will  repeat  it  to  them  as  a  matter 
of  habit  and  precaution.  The  patrol  may  become  scattered, 
or  temporarily  separated,  and  you  should  make  sure  that 
each  man  knows  what  ground  the  patrol  is  to  cover. 

More  often  you  will  have  a  single  place  to  go  to,  instead 
of  a  long  parallel  route  as  in  this  case.  But  even  then  you 
should  tell  your  own  men,  for  example, 

We  are  going  to  that  hill  to  take  a  look  at  the  country  on  the 
other  side,  then  come  back  to  the  column. 

The  formation  that  we  adopted  sends  two  men  towards 
the  woods.  They  are  25  yards  apart.  Peterson  is  in  the 
rear  for  the  special  purpose  of  keeping  the  advance  guard 


AN  ADVANCE  GUARD  FLANK  PATROL  33 

in  sight  so  as  to  transmit  signals.  You  are  in  the  middle 
where  you  can  see  the  whole  patrol  and  run  both  ends  of 
it.     Bear  in  mind  four  things : 

(a)  Some  one  must  march  so  as  to  be  able  to  explore 
the  ground  assigned  to  you. 

(b)  Some  one  must  march  so  as  to  keep  in  touch  with 
the  advance  guard. 

(c)  You  must  place  yourself  where  you  can  handle 
the  patrol  and  its  movements. 

(d)  The  patrol  must  make  progress  in  the  right  di- 
rection. 

Any  formation  (diamond,  single  file,  a  sort  of  skir- 
mish line,  etc.)  which  will  accomplish  these  four  things  is 
correct,  but  as  a  matter  of  safety  you  would  never  march 
bunched. 

There  are  times,  of  course,  when  you  cannot  help  losing 
sight  of  the  advance  guard  temporarily. 

Brown  is  second  in  command  in  your  squad  (see  page 
8).     Otherwise  you  would  name  a  second  in  command. 

SITUATION     II 

Brown  and  Quinn  have  just  reached  the  south  corner 
of  the  woods.  Peterson  has  veered  to  the  northeast  so  as 
to  keep  the  advance  party  in  sight,  and  is  now  at  the  wire 
fence  and  100  yards  southeast  of  Quinn.  You  cannot  see 
the  advance  party,  but  you  assume  that  it  is  on  the  road  just 
east  of  the  last  letter  "N"  in  hunterstown,  and  is  still 
marching.  You  estimate  that  in  the  woods  in  front  you 
will  be  able  to  see  a  man  about  75  yards  off  in  any  direction. 

What  do  you  do? 

CORPORAL  CLARK'S  SOLUTION 

I  signal  to  Brown  and  Quinn,  "As  skirmishers,  guide 
left,  march,"  and  shout, 

One  hundred  yards.     Close  up  to  the  edge  of  the  woods  and  halt. 
I  call  to  Peterson, 
Fifty  yards  on  the  right  of  Quinn. 


34  THIRD  PROBLEM 

Then  I  move  northeast  on  the  ridge  and  halt  (between 
the  tops  of  the  letters  "TO"  in  hunterstown),  where  I 
can  see  what  the  advance  party  is  doing. 

DISCUSSION 

The  Infantry  Drill  Regulations  recommend  that  a  pa- 
trol advance  in  a  thin  skirmish  line  when  penetrating 
woods.  (Par.  612) .  You  are  not  ready  yet,  however,  to  go 
into  the  woods.  It  is  best  to  make  sure  of  the  direction  of 
march  and  location  of  the  advance  party.  Meantime  the 
men  can  be  placed  so  as  to  be  ready  to  go  ahead  in  a  thin 
skirmish  line  when  you  decide  to  advance. 

We  have  here  a  practical  application  of  the  use  of  the 
Drill  Regulations  signals  in  connection  with  orders.  It  is 
doubtful  if  you  could  devise  a  shorter  and  clearer  method  of 
separating  Brown  and  Quinn  by  a  hundred  yards.  This  is 
a  trifling  detail  perhaps,  but  you  should  always  look  for  the 
shortest  and  clearest  way  of  getting  a  thing  done. 

SITUATION     III 

The  point  has  arrived  about  100  yards  southeast  of  the 
small  orchard  which  lies  700  yards  northeast  of  you.  A 
connecting  file  has  just  appeared  from  the  cover  of  the  woods 
and  is  about  100  yards  behind  the  point. 

What  do  you  do? 

CORPORAL  CLARK'S  SOLUTION 

I  place  myself  between  Brown  and  Quinn,  signal 

Forward,  march, 
and  march  a  little  west  of  north  into  the  woods. 

DISCUSSION 

You  are  now  sure  that  you  know  the  route  of  the  ad- 
vance party.  By  starting  now  you  are  somewhat  in  ad- 
vance of  the  advance  party.  This  has  two  advantages. 
First,  you  can  give  warning  more  quickly  if  you  encounter 
anything,  and  second,  you  will  overcome  in  part  the  delay 


AN  ADVANCE  GUARD  FLANK  PATROL        35 

which  the  underbrush  will  cause  and  thus  be  more  nearly 
abreast  of  the  advance  party  when  you  get  through  the 
woods.  A  thin  skirmish  line  enables  you  to  examine  a 
greater  area  of  the  woods.  Even  so,  you  are  going  to  miss 
the  north  half  of  the  woods,  but  that  is  not  very  important. 
The  point  will  pass  the  north  end  of  the  woods,  and  between 
you  and  the  point  there  is  little  room  for  a  hostile  force 
large  enough  to  be  dangerous  to  the  column.  You  cannot 
expect  to  comb  the  woods  for  hostile  patrols.  It  is  suffi- 
cient for  you  to  protect  the  column  against  surprise  by 
larger  forces. 

The  patrol  will  naturally  guide  on  you,  and  at  first  will 
have  to  shift  about  to  get  the  50  yard  intervals  that  you 
ordered,  but  very  soon  your  patrol  will  be  marching  on  a 
front  of  150  yards  and  will  be  able  to  observe  a  strip  of 
woods  300  yards  wide.  Your  interval  between  men  might 
be  greater  than  50  yards,  if  you  can  see  75  yards  as  you 
estimated,  but  it  is  better  to  be  safe  and  keep  the  patrol 
under  control. 

You  are  going  to  lose  sight  of  the  column  temporarily, 
but  this  cannot  be  avoided.  If  you  left  a  man  in  position 
to  see  the  column,  he  would  not  be  in  a  position  to  be  seen 
by  you,  and  therefore  he  would  be  practically  useless. 

SITUATION     IV 

You  emerge  from  the  woods  where  the  wire  fence  en- 
ters it,  350  yards  east  of  hill  592.  Because  of  the  under- 
brush your  progress  has  been  slow.  The  point  and  con- 
necting file  are  on  the  road  northeast  of  you. 

What  do  you  do? 

CORPORAL  CLARK'S  SOLUTION 

I  give  the  signal 

Change  direction  to  the  left, 
and  I  personally  march  towards  the  southwest  corner  of 
the  orchard,  walking  slowly  until  Quinn  and  Peterson  are 
abreast  of  me.     Meantime  I  shout  to  Brown, 

Move  to  the  left  and  follow  the  high  ground  so  that  you  can 
watch  to  the  west. 


36  THIRD  PROBLEM 

DISCUSSION 

It  is  difficult  to  keep  direction  accurately  in  the  woods 
or  to  tell  how  or  where  you  are  coming  out.  The  first  thing 
you  discovered  on  emerging  was  the  fact  that  high  ground 
obstructed  your  view  to  the  west.  Also,  to  the  northwest 
you  see  a  line  of  trees  and  can  distinguish,  because  of  their 
regularity,  the  trees  which  belong  to  the  orchard.  There- 
fore, since  you  have  not  yet  reached  the  main  road  men- 
tioned in  Lieutenant  Allen's  orders,  the  patrol  must  get  a 
view  to  the  west  and  at  the  same  time  proceed  towards  the 
woods  to  the  northwest.  Your  present  formation  is  suit- 
able for  the  next  woods  and  not  unsuitable  for  crossing  the 
open  space,  since  one  man  now,  and  yourself  later,  will  be 
able  to  observe  to  the  west  while  the  other  men  of  the  pat- 
rol are  extended  in  the  direction  of  the  advance  party. 

SITUATION     V 

You  emerge  from  the  woods  800  yards  south  of  road- 
fork  546  and  50  yards  east  of  the  road.  You  see  the  point 
marching  on  the  road  in  the  hollow  near  the  house  300  yards 
southeast  of  roadfork  546. 

What  do  you  do? 

CORPORAL  CLARK'S  SOLUTION 

I  signal 
Assemble 
and  get  on  the  road  at  the  bend. 

DISCUSSION 

It  is  plain  that  from  the  road  you  can  see  both  the. ad- 
vance party  and  the  country  to  the  west.  There  is  no  ob- 
ject in  marching  across  country  when  a  road  serves  the 
purpose,  unless  a  route  across  country  can  be  found  which 
offers  concealment  and  easy  marching  without  interfering 
with  observation  and  communication  with  the  advance  party. 

SITUATION     VI 

The  patrol  is  assembled  on  the  road,  except  Peterson, 


AN  ADVANCE  GUARD  FLANK  PATROL        37 

who  is  now  climbing  the  fence. 
What  do  you  do  ? 

CORPORAL  CLARK'S  SOLUTION 

I  order, 

We  will  march  north,  zigzag,  at  ten  paces.  Brown,  lead  off  on 
the  right  of  the  road;  then  myself,  on  the  left;  then  Quinn,  on  the 
right;  then  Peterson,  on  the  left.     March  out,  Brown. 

DISCUSSION 

You  have  nearly  a  half  mile  to  march  before  you  rejoin 
the  column.  You  know  that  cavalry  has  been  reported  to 
the  northwest.  The  patrol  cannot  march  concealed,  but  it 
should  avoid  marching  in  a  bunch.  A  small  cavalry  party 
may  run  into  you  from  the  rear  or  the  left.  For  this  rea- 
son, men  should  be  placed  so  as  to  make  a  poor  target.  A 
patrol  which  is  marching  along  a  road  and  which  is  not 
compelled  to  conceal  itself,  but  on  the  contrary  must  ad- 
vance at  the  normal  marching  gait,  would  use  the  same  for- 
mation as  an  advance  guard  point.  It  is  recommended  that 
you  compare  the  formation  in  the  present  case  with  the 
formation  of  Sergeant  Hill's  point  in  the  first  problem,  re- 
membering that  there  were  five  men  in  the  point. 

SITUATION     VII 

You  have  just  taken  up  the  formation  described  in  the 
preceding  situation.  You  see  the  point  jump  into  the  road 
at  roadfork  546  and  fire  into  the  orchard  west  of  546.  The 
tree  tops  prevent  you  from  seeing  the  ground  more  than  50 
yards  beyond  the  south  and  east  edges  of  the  orchard.  You 
see  no  signs  of  the  enemy. 

What  do  you  decide  to  do? 

CORPORAL  CLARK'S  SOLUTION 

I  decide  to  keep  a  sharp  lookout  west  of  the  road,  par- 
ticularly towards  the  orchard ;  meantime,  advance  north  on 
the  road  to  the  end  of  the  fence  which  passes  along  the 
south  edge  of  the  orchard,  halt  there  in  observation  and 


38  THIRD  PROBLEM 

place  myself  where   I   can  communicate   with   Lieutenant 
Allen  by  signal. 

DISCUSSION 

The  reasons  for  closing  in  are  to  see  more  of  the  orchard 
and  to  get  into  communication.  Lieutenant  Allen  will  be 
somewhere  around  546.  Under  the  circumstances  you  can- 
not yet  join  the  column.  Lieutenant  Allen  needs  you  and 
your  eyes  where  you  now  are.  But  also  he  may  want  to 
tell  you  presently  what  to  do.  You  must  make  it  possible 
for  him  to  communicate  with  you.  Semaphore  signalling 
without  flags  is  not  very  dependable  beyond  600  yards. 

If  you  go  too  far,  the  orchard  will  obstruct  your  view. 
From  the  position  indicated  you  can  see  the  road  which 
lies  a  half  mile  west,  the  farm  road  and  the  woods  south  of 
hill  574,  and  the  hill  itself  as  far  north  as  the  number  574. 
At  the  same  time  you  are  able  to  communicate  with  Lieu- 
tenant Allen. 

SITUATION     VII 1 

As  you  arrive  at  your  new  position  (50  yards  south  of 
the  fence)  firing  ceases.  You  see  no  signs  of  the  enemy 
anywThere.     Lieutenant  Allen  semaphores 

Attention. 
You  acknowledge,  and  he  semaphores 

Patrol  orchard  and  return. 

What  do  you  do? 

CORPORAL  CLARK'S  SOLUTION 

I  acknowledge  the  message  (semaphore  the  letter  "R"), 
and  order, 

Quinn,  25  yards  on  my  left.  Peterson.  25  yards  on  my  right. 
Brown,  follow  Peterson  at  40  yards. 

Then  I  march  northwest. 

DISCUSSION 

The  situation  now  is  a  little  different  from  the  situa- 


AN  ADVANCE  GUARD  FLANK  PATROL  39 

tion  in  the  woods,  where  you  marched  on  the  broadest 
possible  front.  You  know  that  you  will  be  able  to  see  far 
between  the  rows  of  trees  in  the  orchard.  You  can  extend 
the  vision  of  the  patrol  considerably  only  by  separating  its 
members  by  so  much  distance  that  you  will  lose  control. 
There  was  something  in  the  orchard  a  moment  ago.  It  is 
best  to  keep  control  and  get  at  least  three  rifles  on  anything 
that  you  meet. 

There  may  be  a  surprise  party  in  store  for  you,  hence, 
you  should  leave  one  man  farther  back.  This  will  lessen 
the  chance  of  a  complete  surprise,  since  this  man  may  es- 
cape or  otherwise  give  warning.  Suppose  that  the  patrol 
marched  well  bunched  and  was  caught  by  the  enemy  in  a 
situation  which  prevented  the  firing  of  a  shot.  This  would 
happen  very  seldom,  but  if  it  did,  Lieutenant  Allen,  hear- 
ing nothing,  would  assume  that  you  were  progressing  and 
that  therefore  the  orchard  was  clear  of  the  enemy.  But  in 
the  formation  actually  adopted  you  have  given  at  least  one 
man  a  chance  to  give  warning  either  by  fire  or  by  escape. 

By  placing  Brown  behind  Peterson,  Brown  is  nearer 
Lieutenant  Allen,  and  he  is  the  last  man  to  enter  the  orchard. 
Therefore,  his  position  has  a  double  advantage. 

SITUATION     IX 

You  emerge  from  the  orchard  at  the  farm  road  on  the 
west  edge.  You  see  four  Red  cavalrymen  slowly  riding 
north  on  the  road  700  yards  west-northwest  of  you.  There 
is  nothing  else  in  sight. 

What  do  you  do? 

CORPORAL  CLARK'S  SOLUTION 

Pointing  out  the  Red  cavalrymen  I  call  to  Quinn  and 
Peterson, 

Range,  seven  hundred.     Fire  at  will. 

Then  I  set  my  sight  and  fire. 

DISCUSSION 

An  advance  guard  flank  patrol  is  a  covering  patrol.  Be- 


40  THIRD  PROBLEM 

sides  giving  warning  of  the  approach  of  the  enemy,  it 
should  drive  off  the  enemy  when  possible.  The  more  in- 
formation the  enemy  gets  concerning  us  the  greater  is  the 
disadvantage  to  us.  A  column  can  seldom  march  secretly, 
but  frequently  it  can  prevent  the  enemy  from  learning  all 
that  is  worth  knowing.  This  leaves  the  enemy  more  or  less 
in  the  dark.  His  actions  cannot  be  planned  so  well,  and 
hence  they  will  not  be  so  inconvenient  or  damaging  to  us. 
You  may  not  hit  a  man  or  a  horse  in  the  present  case,  but 
the  mere  fact  that  these  four  men  were  fired  upon,  par- 
ticularly by  someone  off  the  road,  will  make  them  extremely 
cautious  for  some  time  to  come.  Cautious  men  learn  very 
little. 

The  disadvantage  of  firing  lies  in  the  fact  that  it  alarms 
the  column  and  may  delay  it  to  no  purpose.  However,  this 
depends  upon  the  commander  and  the  amount  of  firing. 
There  was  a  time  when  the  tactics  of  the  march  were  so 
imperfectly  understood  that  a  few  shots  on  the  flank  would 
stop  a  brigade,  but  now  we  seldom  see  such  absurd  things. 
You  knew  before  you  opened  fire  that  the  Red  cavalrymen 
would  gallop  off  and  probably  would  be  beyond  your  range 
or  vision  before  your  men  loaded  the  next  clip.  Then  all 
would  be  quiet.  The  column  would  continue  its  march.  So, 
under  the  circumstances,  50  cents  worth  of  ammunition  will 
do  more  than  50  cents  worth  of  good. 

Having  attracted  the  attention  of  the  column,  you 
should  show  yourself  as  soon  as  possible  and  make  it  ab- 
solutely clear  that  there  is  nothing  to  warrant  an  interrup- 
tion of  the  march. 

"The  aiming  point  or  target  is  carefully  pointed  out. 
This  may  be  done  before  or  after  announcing  the  sight  set- 
ting. Both  are  indicated  before  giving  the  command  for 
firing,  but  may  be  omitted  when  the  target  appears  sudden- 
ly and  is  unmistakable ;  in  such  case  battle  sight  is  used  if 
no  sight  setting  is  announced."  (I.   D.   R.  135). 

Sometimes  we  take  the  trouble  to  designate  the  target 
when  it  is  not  necessary.  On  the  other  hand,  we  sometimes 
fail  to  designate  the  target  when  it  is  so  indistinct  that 
there  is  slight  chance  that  our  men  will  pick  it  up  without 
careful  designation.     Only  experience  and  practice  will  re- 


AN  ADVANCE  GUARD  FLANK  PATROL  41 

medy  this.  In  the  present  case  there  should  be  no  difficulty. 
The  four  cavalrymen  loom  so  large  and  present  the  only 
possible  target  in  the  direction  in  which  you  are  pointing 
that  it  is  unnecessary  to  waste  words  in  designating  the 
target.  If  there  is  any  doubt  in  your  mind,  it  is  better  to 
describe  the  target. 

SITUATION     X 

The  Red  cavalrymen  have  disappeared.  There  are  no 
other  signs  of  the  enemy.  Between  the  rows  of  trees  the 
ground  is  visible  to  the  north  and  south  edges  of  the  orchard. 
Brown  is  about  75  yards  east  on  the  farm  road. 

What  do  you  do? 

CORPORAL  CLARK'S   SOLUTION 

I  call  to  Quinn  and  Peterson, 
Follow  me  at  20  yards. 

Then  I  march  east  along  the  farm  road  through  the  orchard, 
signalling  Brown, 

Forward,  March. 

DISCUSSION 

Nothing  remains  but  to  rejoin  the  column,  showing 
yourself  as  soon  as  possible.  You  will  make  better  time 
along  the  farm  road  than  by  going  to  the  north  edge  of  the 
orchard.  The  formation  adopted  is  convenient,  consider- 
ing the  location  of  your  men,  and  serves  your  purpose. 

SITUATION    XI 

You  have  arrived  on  the  main  road  200  yards  north  of 
roadfork  546.  The  tail  of  the  main  body  (combat  train) 
is  approaching  the  bridge  400  yards  north  o£  you.  There 
is  a  squad  marching  on  the  main  road  about  100  yards 
ahead  of  you. 

What  do  you  decide  to  do  ? 


42  THIRD  PROBLEM 

CORPORAL  CLARK'S  SOLUTION 

I  decide  to  overtake  the  last  company  and  report  to 
its  captain. 

DISCUSSION 

Lieutenant  Allen  is  nearly  a  mile  ahead  of  you.  You 
could  not  overtake  him  unless  you  marched  during  two  of 
the  hourly  halt  periods,  or  passed  the  marching  column  at 
a  greatly  increased  gait.  It  would  be  hard  marching  in 
either  case.  Under  the  circumstances  you  are  justified  in 
reporting  to  the  captain  of  the  last  company.  The  one 
thing  you  should  not  do  is  to  straggle  behind,  or  drift  around 
in  the  column,  subject  to  no  one's  orders.  That  would  be 
contrary  to  the  spirit  of  Par.  376  I.  D.  R.,  which  says : 

"Any  officer  or  non-commissioned  officer  who  becomes 
separated  from  his  proper  unit  and  cannot  rejoin  must  at 
once  place  himself  and  his  command  at  the  disposal  of  the 
nearest  higher  commander. 

"Anyone  having  completed  an  assigned  task  must  seek 
to  rejoin  his  proper  command.  Failing  in  this,  he  should 
join  the  nearest  troops  engaged  with  the  enemy." 


Fourth   Problem 

The  Platoon  as  an  Advance  Party 


EXPLANATION 

"The  advance  guard  commander  is  responsible  for  its 
formation  and  conduct.  He  should  bear  in  mind  that  its 
purpose  is  to  facilitate  and  protect  the  march  of  the  main 
body.  Its  own  security  must  be  effected  by  proper  disposi- 
tions and  reconnaissance,  not  by  timid  or  cautious  advance. 
It  must  advance  at  normal  gait  and  search  aggressively  for 
information  of  the  enemy.  Its  action  when  the  enemy  at- 
tempts to  block  it  with  a  large  force  depends  upon  the  situa- 
tion and  plans  of  the  commander  of  the  troops."  (I.  D.  R. 
640). 

"The  support  sends  forward  an  advance  party.  The 
advance  party,  in  turn,  sends  a  patrol,  called  a  point,  still 
farther  to  the  front.  *     *  "  (I.  D.  R.  645) . 

"They  facilitate  the  advance  of  the  main  body  by 
promptly  driving  off  small  bodies  of  the  enemy  who  seek  to 
harass  or  delay  it;  by  removing  obstacles  from  the  line  of 
advance,  by  repairing  roads,  bridges,  etc.,  thus  enabling 
the  main  body  to  advance  uninterruptedly  in  convenient 
marching  formations. 

"They  protect  the  main  body  by  preventing  the  enemy 
from  firing  into  it  when  in  close  formation ;  by  holding  the 
enemy  and  enabling  the  main  body  to  deploy  before  coming 
under  effective  fire;  by  preventing  its  size  and  condition 
from  being  observed  by  the  enemy.  *  *  *  "  (I.  D.  R.  636). 

The  present  problem  is  designed  to  illustrate  how  the 
advance  party  commander  assists  the  advance  guard  in 
facilitating  and  protecting  the  march  and  in  taking  proper 
action  when  the  enemy  is  met. 

SITUATION     I 

A  week  ago  we  marched  south  with  our  division 
through  Biglerville  and  Gettysburg  (Gettysburg  is  2  miles 

43 


44  FOURTH  PROBLEM 

due  south  of  Boyd  S.  H.) .  We  are  in  the  enemy's  country. 
Our  regiment  was  left  back  to  guard  the  railroad  over  which 
our  supplies  come,  while  the  rest  of  the  division  went  ten 
miles  south  of  Gettysburg  and  now  confronts  the  enemy. 

Our  battalion  and  the  machine  gun  company  is  in  Get- 
tysburg, while  the  rest  of  the  regiment  is  scattered  along 
the  railroad  to  the  north,  the  nearest  detachment  being 
Company  E  at  Biglerville. 

At  9-00  o'clock  this  morning  Companies  A,  B,  and  C, 
and  the  maching  gun  company  were  hurriedly  assembled  and 
marched  north  out  of  town ;  Company  A  in  the  lead.  You 
are  1st  Sergeant  Holmes,  Company  A.  The  captain,  who 
is  the  only  officer  with  the  company,  called  the  non-commis- 
sioned officers  to  the  head  of  the  company  during  the  march 
and  said: 

The  enemy  attacked  Company  E  at  Biglerville  this  morning. 
Our  battalion  leaves  Company  D  in  Gettysburg.  The  rest  of  the  bat- 
talion and  the  machine  gun  company  are  going  to  attack  the  enemy 
at  Biglerville.  This  company  will  be  the  advance  guard.  The  main 
body  will  follow  us  at  600  yards.  Sergeant  Holmes,  your  platoon  will 
be  the  advance  party.  The  rest  of  the  company  will  be  the  support 
and  will  follow  you  at  400  yards.  I'll  be  with  the  support  and  will 
send  out  the  flank  patrols.  Here  is  a  map.  Take  this  direct  road  to 
Table  Rock;  then  past  Gainer  to  Biglerville.  When  we  reach  the  out- 
guard,  the  battalion  will  halt  and  the  advance  guard  will  get  its 
distances.     Posts. 

The  battalion  halts  at  the  outguard,  where  the  Texas 
and  Table  Rock  roads  meet,  one  mile  south  of  Boyd  S.  H. 
(500  yards  south  of  edge  of  map),  and  the  captain  orders 
you, 

Move  out  on  this  right  hand  road. 

It  is  September  and  the  corn  is  head  high.  Pieces  are 
loaded. 

What  do  you  do  up  to  the  time  the  advance  party 
marches  ? 

THE  FIRST  SERGEANT'S  SOLUTION 

After  receiving  the  captain's  first  order,  and  before 
reaching  the  outguard,  I  make  sure  that  the  non-commis- 
sioned officers  of  my  platoon  understand  the  situation  as 
stated  by  the  captain.     On  arrival  at  the  outguard,  I  order, 


THE  PLATOON  AS  AN  ADVANCE  PARTY  45 

Sergeant  Hill,  take  four  men  of  the  Second  Squad  out  this  right 
hand  road  as  point.  Precede  the  advance  party  by  250  yards.  At 
crossroads   and   roadforks  look  to  me   for  direction. 

(I  assume  he  takes  the  rear  rank,  Second  Squad). 

When  Sergeant  Hill  has  marched  out,  I  order, 

Butler,  take  Quinn  with  you,  and  follow  the  point  at  100  yards 
as  connecting  file. 

While  the  point  and  connecting  file  are  gaining  dis- 
tance, I  inform  the  platoon  as  follows : 

Company  E  was  attacked  at  Biglerville  this  morning.  Our  bat- 
talion left  Company  D  in  Gettysburg.  The  rest  of  the  battalion  and 
the  machine  gan  company  are  going  to  attack  the  enemy  at  Bigler- 
ville. Our  company  is  the  advance  guard  and  this  platoon  is  the 
advance  pai'ty. 

When  the  connecting  file  has  marched  nearly  150  yards. 
I  command : 

As    skirmishers,    guide    right,    march;    platoon    column,    march, 

and  order, 

Column  of  files  each  side  of  the  road.  Corporal  Koenig,  in 
rear  to  watch  for  signals.     Peterson,  join  First  Squad. 

DISCUSSION 

You  observe  that  the  advance  guard  has  no  reserve. 
It  would  split  up  the  company  into  too  many  parts  if  the 
advance  guard,  in  this  case,  had  a  reserve.  The  company 
is  therefore  divided  in  the  same  manner  that  the  support  of 
an  advance  guard  would  be  divided ;  that  is,  it  has  an  ad- 
vance party  and  a  support  proper.  The  point  belongs  to 
the  advance  party.  You  have  the  point,  the  connecting  file, 
and  the  advance  party  proper,  all  under  your  command. 

Your  non-commissioned  officers  know  the  situation. 
During  the  minute  or  two  that  the  platoon  stands  halted,  it 
is  well  to  inform  your  men  briefly  what  the  situation  is. 

Whenever  possible  you  should  give  your  men  some  idea 
of  the  situation  and  of  the  job  they  are  working  on.  In 
peace-time  exercises  this  policy  increases  the  interest  of  the 
men,  and  in  actual  warfare  it  is  frequently  necessary.  Some 
of  the  men  may  be  called  upon  to  act  independently,  in 
charge  of  the  patrols  or  otherwise,  and  they  cannot  be  ex- 


4*i  FOURTH  PROBLEM 

pected  to  do  good  work  unless  they  know  what  is  going  on. 

An  advance  party  of  two  platoons  might  have  an  officer 
or  sergeant  and  one  squad  as  point,  but  in  the  case  of  a 
single  platoon  it  is  better  to  use  only  a  sergeant  and  a  half 
squad,  unless  there  is  a  mounted  point  in  the  front ;  in  the 
latter  case,  a  squad  would  probably  be  better. 

The  distance  between  the  point  and  advance  party  will 
vary  according  to  the  situation.  In  the  present  case,  the 
country  is  open  and  the  enemy  is  aggressive  (he  has  at- 
tacked Company  E),  and  the  advance  guard  distances  are 
longer  than  would  be  the  case  in  close  country,  or  where 
the  enemy  is  not  aggressive;  as  for  example,  if  he  is  being 
pursued.  We  might  send  the  point  300  yards  in  advance, 
but  certainly  not  less  than  200  yards. 

In  some  regiments  there  is  an  inclination  to  use  more 
connecting  files  than  are  necessary.  In  the  present  case, 
there  are  a  number  of  bends  in  the  road  and  patches  of 
woods  along  both  sides  of  it.  A  connecting  file,  and  one 
only,  is  therefore  necessary,  but  it  is  better  to  give  it  the 
usual  100  yards  distance  from  the  point. 

The  captain  left  to  you  the  selection  of  the  leader  and 
the  size  of  the  point ;  also  the  question  of  distances  and  con- 
necting files.  You  may  be  sure,  however,  that  the  captain 
will  observe  how  you  handle  your  little  problem  and  will 
correct  any  mistake  you  make.  In  the  same  way,  you  will 
watch  Sergeant  Hill  start  his  point,  but  you  will  not  in- 
terfere or  make  suggestions  unless  he  does  something  wrong. 
Where  there  is  only  a  slight  difference  of  opinion  as  to 
minor  points,  the  captain  will  not  interfere  with  you,  and 
you  will  not  interfere  with  Sergeant  Hill. 

The  point  takes  an  inconspicuous  patrol  formation,  but 
the  advance  party  cannot  make  itself  quite  so  inconspicuous. 
If  the  advance  party  consists  of  more  than  one  platoon,  it  is 
probably  better  to  march  it  in  column  of  twos,  the  men 
separating  so  as  to  march  in  double  column  of  files  along 
the  sides  of  the  road.  Where  the  advance  party  is  a  single 
platoon,  there  are  several  advantages  in  deploying  as  skir- 
mishers and  then  marching  as  a  platoon  column,  the  men 
spreading  as  already  mentioned.     There  is  room  between 


THE  PLATOON  AS  AN  ADVANCE  PARTY  47 

the  fences  for  the  original  deployment,  since  the  platoon 
column  soon  relieves  the  crowding.  The  platoon  is  then 
ready  to  jump  into  place  in  an  orderly  skirmish  line  the  in- 
stant you  stretch  your  arms  laterally  to  the  signal:  "As 
skirmishers,  march".  You  should  drill  your  platoon  fre- 
quently in  deploying  from  platoon  column  to  skirmish  line 
to  the  front,  right  front,  left  front,  and  even  to  the  right 
and  left.  You  should  place  yourself  quickly  where  you  wish 
the  center  of  the  line  to  be,  and  extend  your  arms  so  that 
they  mark  the  exact  line  you  wish  to  form. 

The  captain  said  that  he  would  look  out  for  flank  recon- 
naissance. Your  advance  party  is  really  too  small  to  do  so. 
However,  you  will  watch  the  flanks  very  closely,  and  may 
even  send  a  man  to  some  nearby  high  point,  but  only  when 
this  point  is  especially  advantageous  for  observation.  In 
this  connection  compare  Situation  IV,  First  Problem. 

It  might  have  been  better  to  have  assigned  two  platoons 
to  the  advance  party  and  charge  it  with  the  flank  reconnais- 
sance. It  takes  training  and  judgment  to  determine  what 
flank  reconnaissance  is  necessary  and  what  is  unnecessary. 
Possibly,  when  you  have  shown  that  you  possess  good  judg- 
ment in  such  matters,  and  another  case  like  the  present  one 
arises,  the  captain  will  take  advantage  of  your  judgment 
and  make  an  advance  party  strong  enough  to  handle  the 
flank  reconnaissance.  There  is,  of  course,  an  advantage  in 
sending  flank  patrols  out  from  the  subdivisions  farthest  in 
front. 

All  of  Corporal  Koenig's  squad  except  Peterson  and 
the  corporal  himself  have  been  used  in  the  point  and  connect- 
ing file.  The  corporal  is  available  to  march  as  platoon  guide 
temporarily,  but  particularly  to  watch  for  signals  from  the 
rear.  Peterson  should  be  assigned  to  any  squad  that  has 
a  blank  file.  If  no  squad  has  a  blank  file,  he  may  be  as- 
signed to  any  squad  and  will  march  in  the  line  of  file  closers 
when  the  platoon  is  assembled. 

SITUATION     II 

The  advance  party,  marching  at  ordinary  gait,  reached 
roadfork  511  (near  hill  527),  and  is  now  only  75  yards  be- 


48  FOURTH  PROBLEM 

hind  the  connecting  file.     The  connecting  file  appears  to  be 
100  yards  behind  the  point.     It  is  evident  that  the  point  is 
marching  cautiously. 
What  do  you  do? 

THE  FIRST  SERGEANT'S  SOLUTION 

I  order: 

Hagen,  jog  ahead  and  overtake  the  point.  Tell  Sergeant  Hill 
to  march  faster  and  keep  his  distance  of  250  yards. 

DISCUSSION 

In  a  small  column  the  advance  party  is  really  the  pace- 
maker. It  must  push  the  point  ahead.  In  every  case  the 
column  wishes  to  march  at  the  regular  gait.  In  the  present 
case  it  is  very  necessary  that  the  column  be  not  delayed 
through  the  cautiousness  of  the  point.  We  are  still  several 
miles  from  Company  E  and  a  difference  of  five  minutes  in 
the  time  of  our  arrival  may  have  an  important  effect.  In 
this  connection  compare  Situation  III,  First  Problem. 

You  might  hasten  Sergeant  Hill  along  by  signalling. 
"Forward,  march",  or  better  still  by  semaphore  message. 

SITUATION     III 

The  advance  party  arrives  on  the  low  ridge  100  yards 
south  of  608  and  is  fired  upon  from  the  north.  Your  in- 
stinct tells  you  that  the  fire  comes  from  the  vicinity  of  the 
road,  at  a  distance  of  about  a  half  mile.  The  fire  is  a 
ragged  volley,  apparently  a  dozen  rifles. 

What  do  you  do? 

THE  FIRST  SERGEANT'S  SOLUTION 

I  jump  to  the  right  hand  fence,  meanwhile  shouting 
and  signalling, 

As  skirmishers,  march. 

Then  I  drop  down  and  look  for  the  enemy. 


THE  PLATOON  AS  AN  ADVANCE  PARTY  49 

DISCUSSION 

Combined  with  Situation  IV. 

SITUATION     IV 

The  instant  you  lie  down  you  catch  the  movement  of 
men  in  the  edge  of  the  cornfield,  three  fingers  east  of  the 
house  700  yards  to  the  north.  The  tree  tops  in  the  ravine 
200  yards  north  of  you  are  about  5  feet  below  your  line  of 
sight.  After  the  ragged  volley  there  is  a  slight  pause  in  the 
enemy's  fire,  followed  by  "fire  at  will"  at  the  rate  of  about 
one  shot  per  second.  The  fire  seems  to  be  high.  The  point 
is  not  visible. 

What  do  you  do? 

THE  FIRST  SERGEANT'S  SOLUTION 

I  shout, 

Range,  seven  hundred.  Target:  from  the  house  on  the  road, 
3  o'clock;  3  fingers;  edge  of  cornfield.     Fire  at  will, 

and  then  examine  the  target  and  observe  the  fire  with  my 
field  glasses. 

DISCUSSION 

As  you  march  along  the  road  you  observe  from  time  to 
time  positions  in  front  and  on  the  flank  from  which  the 
enemy  might  open  fire.  With  these  positions  in  mind  you 
probably  decide  beforehand,  in  a  general  way,  what  you  will 
do  in  case  you  are  fired  upon.  Probably  all  you  can  do  in 
most  cases  will  be  to  decide  to  which  side  of  the  road  you 
will  jump,  in  case  the  road  itself  is  unsuitable.  The  rest 
may  depend  upon  details  which  you  can  hardly  foresee  or 
count  on.  When  you  arrived  about  175  yards  south  of  608, 
and  almost  a  minute  before  firing  began,  you  could  see  the 
country  to  the  north  for  about  a  half  mile.  Along  the  left 
you  could  see  an  extensive  cornfield  extending  north  from 
608,  and  beyond  that,  near  the  house,  the  edge  of  another 
cornfield.  This  was  your  first  glimpse  of  the  country  im- 
mediately north  of  608.  You  probably  asked  yourself: 
"Which  side  of  the  road  is  best  now,  in  case  we  are  fired 


50  FOURTH   PROBLEM 

upon  from  the  next  ridge?" 

If  you  were  fired  upon  from  the  north  and  jumped  to 
the  left  side  of  the  road  you  would  commit  yourself  to  an 
advance  through  the  large  cornfield.  In  the  cornfield  the 
men  would  be  safe  from  fire,  but  on  the  other  hand  would 
not  be  able  to  fire  on  the  enemy.  Furthermore,  your  pro- 
gress would  be  very  slow  and  patrolling  would  be  difficult. 
If  your  command  were  a  patrol,  compelled  to  force  its  way 
north,  with  no  column  in  rear  depending  upon  it  to  clear 
the  road,  an  advance  through  the  cornfield  would  be  satis- 
factory. In  the  present  case,  however,  it  is  your  duty  to 
drive  away  small  hostile  parties,  and  also  to  get  forward. 
The  best  line  of  advance  for  this  purpose  is  east  of  the  road. 
In  a  very  short  time  you  are  covered  by  trees  of  the  ravine, 
then  by  the  ravine  itself,  and  finally,  when  you  are  again 
visible  to  the  enemy,  you  will  be  so  close  that  he  will  not 
stand  unless  his  force  is  much  larger  than  his  fire  indicated. 
You  will  have  delayed  the  column  very  little,  all  things  con- 
sidered. 

The  advance  party  is  made  strong  enough,  and  is  sent 
far  enough  in  advance  of  the  support,  to  prevent  the  enemy 
from  bringing  an  effective  rifle  fire  on  the  support  until  it 
can  deploy.  But  the  advance  party  is  also  made  strong  in 
order  to  be  able  to  push  small  hostile  patrols  out  of  the  way 
and  thus  save  the  support  the  necessity  of  deploying,  and 
save  the  whole  column  more  than  trifling  delay.  If  you 
estimate  that  the  enemy  in  your  front  is  so  weak  that  you 
can  handle  him  alone  without  assistance  from  the  support, 
your  play  is  to  go  after  him  as  soon  as  you  can  locate  him 
and  give  your  advance  party  a  proper  formation.  In  the 
present  case  you  have  as  yet  no  excuse  for  awaiting  the 
assistance  of  the  support. 

A  road  is  usually  about  60  feet  wide  between  fences. 
This  gives  deploying  room  for  2  squads  only.  Since  the 
advance  party  must  deploy  and  advance,  it  is  best  to  form 
a  good  skirmish  line  first,  even  if  you  lose  a  man  or  two. 

A  small  force  like  your  advance  party  should  not  de- 
ploy in  too  thick  a  line.  You  have  25  rifles  in  your  firing 
line.  In  the  road  there  is  scarcely  room  for  half  of  them. 
It  is  best  for  your  expected  fight,  and  also  is  best  from  a 


THE  PLATOON  AS  AN  ADVANCE  PARTY  51 

disciplinary  standpoint,  to  insist  upon  the  formation  of  a 
proper  line  and  thus  defeat  the  inclination  of  the  men  to 
drop  in  their  tracks.  By  jumping  to  the  right  hand  fence, 
meantime  giving  the  signal  for  deployment,  you  throw  the 
right  half  of  the  platoon  over  the  fence  and  into  the  field  on 
your  right.  The  left  half  of  the  platoon  will  be  in  line 
quickly  in  the  road.  Your  commands  for  firing  can  be 
given  almost  at  once.  The  men  nearest  you  then  open  fire. 
The  others  will  open  fire  upon  arriving  in  good  firing  posi- 
tions, approximately  on  the  line.  The  men  who  are  still 
running  to  their  places  may  not  hear  your  first  orders  as 
to  range  and  target,  but  repetition  will  soon  remedy  this. 

You  may  indicate  the  range  before  the  target  or  the 
target  before  the  range.  In  the  present  case  it  makes  no 
difference. 

In  designating  a  target  which  your  men  will  probably 
have  difficulty  in  seeing  quickly  and  easily,  you  should  al- 
ways follow  a  logical  system.  To  illustrate  what  we  mean, 
we  shall  analyze  your  target  designation  in  the  present 
case.  When  you  shouted  "target,"  your  men  were  warned 
to  listen  attentively  and  look  sharply.  When  you  shouted, 
"from  the  house  on  the  road,"  you  indicated  a  reference  point 
that  the  men  could  pick  up  quickly  and  without  fail.  Your 
next  command  was,  "3  o'clock,".  The  men  then  looked  in 
the  direction  in  which  the  hour  hand  of  the  clock  would 
point  at  3  o'clock,  if  the  house  were  the  center  of  the  clock. 
When  you  commanded  "3  fingers,"  your  men  held  up  three 
fingers  at  right  angles  to  the  hour  hand,  with  the  outer 
edge  of  the  left  finger  against  the  house.  They  knew  then 
that  your  next  command  would  indicate  some  spot  very 
close  to  the  point  where  the  line  of  sight  past  the  outer  edge 
of  the  right  finger  intersected  the  hour  hand  of  the  clock. 
So,  when  you  commanded  "edge  of  corn  field,"  your  men  not 
only  knew  which  corn  field  you  referred  to,  but  they  also 
knew  about  how  far  east  of  the  house  they  should  look  for 
their  target. 

Suppose  now  that  you  had  said,  "target:  edge  of  corn 
field,  3  fingers,  3  o'clock  from  the  house  on  the«road".  By 
the  time  you  had  pointed  out  to  them  the  house  on  the  road, 


52  FOURTH  PROBLEM 

your  men  might  have  forgotten  the  o'clock  and  number  of 
fingers  and  the  particular  spot  that  you  wished  them  to 
look  at.  The  logical  system  therefore,  is  to  warn  the  men 
by  shouting  "target;"  then  indicate  the  point  which  you 
propose  to  use  as  the  center  of  the  clock;  then  indicate  the 
direction  in  which  the  imaginary  hour  hand  is  pointing; 
then  indicate  the  number  of  fingers;  and  finally  indicate 
the  indistinct  point  at  which  you  desire  to  direct  their  at- 
tention. If  you  reverse  this  order,  or  mix  it  up,  or  even 
if  you  give  the  proper  order  too  rapidly,  you  will  find  that 
you  will  have  to  repeat  yourself. 

If  your  men  have  any  difficulty  in  understanding  the 
use  of  the  clock  face,  tell  them  to  imagine  that  they  have 
a  photograph  of  the  country  in  front  of  them,  and  that  the 
house  on  the  road  is  in  the  center  of  the  photograph.  Now, 
if  the  photograph  is  placed  against  a  wall  and  the  hour 
hand  of  the  clock  moves  around  it  with  the  house  as  a  center, 
it  will  be  clear  that  "12  o'clock"  indicates  a  line  extending 
beyond  (north)  of  the  house  as  far  as  they  can  see;  "3 
o'clock"  indicates  a  line  towards  Herrman;  "9  o'clock"  in- 
dicates a  line  towards  Texas ;  and  "6  o'clock"  indicates  a  line 
from  the  house  towards  the  platoon.     The  sketch  on  page 

53  represents  the  country  as  seen  by  your  platoon.  The 
house  is  in  the  center  of  the  sketch.  By  studying  the  radial 
lines  you  will  readily  understand  the  use  of  the  vertical 
clock-face  system  on  ground  which  is  roughly  a  horizontal 
surface.  (This  sketch  has  been  prepared  from  the  map 
only,  and  not  on  the  ground.  Defects  in  the  sketch  might 
be  discovered  by  a  visit  to  the  ground,  but  it  is  probably 
correct  in  the  main,  and  serves  our  purpose.) 


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54  FOURTH  PROBLEM 

When  the  arm  is  extended  full  length,  3  fingers  will 
measure  Ho  of  the  range.  You  know  that  the  range  is  700 
yards  and  you  saw  signs  of  the  enemy  in  the  edge  of  the 
corn  field  70  yards  east  of  the  house.  If  you  had  seen  the 
enemy  100  yards  east  of  the  house,  the  point  would  have 
measured  4  or  4. V  fingers.  But  when  you  are  on  the  ground, 
the  distance  in  fingers  is  determined  directly  by  trial,  and 
not  by  the  arbitary  rule  that  we  have  adopted  here. 

Whenever  possible,  you  should  indicate  the  two  ends  of 
your  target  in  order  that  your  men  may  distribute  their 
fire  over  the  whole  target,  but  in  the  present  case  it  is  im- 
possible to  do  so  and  open  fire  quickly.  The  full  extent  of 
the  target  is  not  yet  determined  and  you  must  trust  to  luck 
in  getting  distribution.  Later,  you  may  be  able  to  correct 
this  defect. 

If  there  had  been  good  cover  near  by  for  the  platoon, 
it  would  have  been  proper  to  break  into  double  time  at  the 
first  volley  and  seize  advantage  of  this  cover,  but  that  is 
not  the  case  here. 

The  fact  that  you  deployed  and  opened  fire  does  not 
mean  that  you  intend  to  stay  here.  By  the  time  the  last 
man  is  in  place  and  ready  for  the  advance,  it  would  be  well 
to  whistle  "suspend  firing,"  and  quickly  judge  your  next 
move. 

SITUATION     V 

After  your  platoon  has  been  firing  about  30  seconds, 
you  whistle,  "suspend  firing."  Only  one  man,  Schafer,  has 
been  wounded.  The  support  appears  to  be  approaching 
the  house  south  of  you,  in  column  of  squads.  The  enemy's 
fire  continues  at  about  the  same  rate  as  before,  but  is  not 
accurate.  The  point  is  in  the  ravine  in  front  of  you.  The 
road  parallel  to  your  front  is  about  10  feet  lower  than  the 
tree  tops  in  the  ravine  north  of  the  road. 

1.  What  do  you  intend  to  do? 

2.  What  are  your  orders? 

THE  FIRST  SERGEANT'S  SOLUTION 

1.     I  intend  to  advance  to  the  road  by  a  rush ;  then  ad- 


THE  PLATOON  AS  AN  ADVANCE  PARTY  55 

vance  in  quick  time  to  the  north  side  of  the  wooded  ravine, 
carefully  watching  both  flanks. 

2.     I  blow  a  short  whistle  blast  and  signal, 

Cease  firing. 

Then  I  shout, 

Get  set. 

When  all  appear  to  be  ready,  I  jump  up,  shout, 

Follow  me. 
and  lead  the  platoon  at  a  run  towards  the  road. 

DISCUSSION 

You  may  run  into  a  larger  Red  force  than  you  antici- 
pated. That  remains  to  be  seen.  If  you  judge  their 
strength  from  the  volume  of  their  fire,  you  are  obliged  in 
this  case  to  advance  almost  at  once.  Your  advance  may 
prove  that  your  guess  as  to  the  hostile  strength  is  wrong. 
On  the  other  hand,  if  you  wait  for  the  support  to  help  you 
out  and  then  find  later  that  8  or  10  Reds  have  held  you  up, 
you  will  be  very  much  disappointed  with  yourself. 

Unless  the  enemy  increases  the  volume  or  effect  of  his 
fire,  you  should  have  no  difficulty  in  reaching  the  road  and 
the  cover  of  the  trees  in  the  ravine.  As  soon  as  the  trees 
screen  you  from  the  enemy,  he  will  have  no  target  to  aim 
at.  From  this  point  you  can  safely  advance  at  a  rapid  walk 
until  you  are  again  exposed  to  the  enemy's  view.  This  will 
be  when  you  have  arrived  some  distance  north  of  the  ravine. 

The  Infantry  Drill  Regulations  teach  that  fire  superi- 
ority is  necessary  to  the  successful  advance  of  an  attack. 
This  is  not  literally  true  in  the  case  of  every  small  detach- 
ment, or  where  a  greatly  superior  force  is  peculiarly  favored 
by  the  ground.  In  the  present  case  the  defender's  fire  is  not 
effective,  and  you  have  good  cover  a  short  distance  in  front 
of  you.  It  would  be  wrong  to  settle  down  into  a  fire  fight 
with  a  view  of  creating  a  powerful  moral  effect  on  the  ene- 
my by  the  use  of  fire,  or  of  matching  your  fire  with  his. 
When  you  have  passed  the  ravine,  and  are  again  exposed 
to  the  enemy's  fire,  the  situation  may  be  different  because 
of  the  open  ground  between  you  and  him. 


56  FOURTH  PROBLEM 

Whether  the  platoon  is  alone  or  deployed  as  part  of 
the  company,  I.  D.  R.  (222)  require  you  to  arrange  care- 
fully the  details  for  a  prompt  and  vigorous  execution  of 
your  proposed  rush.  You  are  told  to  cause  the  men  to 
cease  firing  and  to  hold  themselves  in  readiness  to  spring 
forward  instantly.  No  preparatory  command  or  signal 
is  prescribed,  although  the  signal,  "Cease  firing"  and  the 
caution,  "Get  set"  or  "Ready"  will  be  a  sufficient  indication 
to  trained  men.  Furthermore,  you  will  not  jump  up  and 
lead  the  platoon  forward  until  you  and  your  guide  can  de- 
termine from  the  positions  of  the  men  that  all  are  ready, 
and  understand.  You  should  teach  them  to  draw  up  one 
knee  close  to  the  body,  without  raising  the  body  from  the 
ground. 

When  you  signaled,  "Cease  firing,"  the  men  were  al- 
ready in  the  position  of  "suspend  firing."  The  difference 
between  the  two  is,  that  in  "cease  firing"  the  sights  are 
laid  down,  the  men  are  not  required  to  keep  their  eyes  on 
the  target,  and  they  know  from  experience  that  a  movement 
or  change  in  formation  will  probably  follow. 

The  flanks  of  a  deployed  line  are  vulnerable.  If  there 
are  few  men  in  the  line,  men  cannot  be  spared  for  combat 
patrols.  The  commander  must  watch  his  flanks  very  close- 
ly, and  do  the  best  he  can  without  sending  patrols  to  a  dis- 
tance. The 'situation  also  affects  the  question  of  flank  pro- 
tection. If  your  platoon  were  alone,  with  no  supporting 
troops  near,  you  would  be  obliged  to  detach  men  to  watch 
your  flanks  in  an  attack  over  the  ground  on  which  we  are 
now  working.  In  the  present  case,  the  support  is  behind 
you  and  very  likely  has  patrols  on  the  flanks. 

Unless  Schafer's  wound  is  one  which  requires  imme- 
diate action,  which  is  rarely  the  case,  you  are  obliged  to 
leave  him  by  the  side  of  the  road,  without  an  attendant. 
In  a  short  time  he  will  receive  more  intelligent  care  from 
the  sanitary  personnel.  Under  the  circumstances  it  would 
be  wrong  for  you  to  bother  about  him,  and  the  men  nearest 
to  him  could  do  no  more  than  help  him  to  a  convenient  place, 
unless  he  were  threatened  with  a  heavy  loss  of  blood.  When 
proper  medical  care  is  so  near  at  hand,  it  is  not  well  to 
tinker  with  a  man,  and  it  is  wrong  to  decrease  your  fight- 


THE  PLATOON  AS  AN  ADVANCE  PARTY  57 

ing  strength  because  of  any  undue  regard  for  his  comfort. 

SITUATION     VI 

After  passing  the  608 — Herman  road,  the  whole  platoon 
advanced  east  of  and  parallel  to  the  608 — Table  Rock  road. 

The  platoon  has  now  arrived  400  yards  north  of  cross- 
road 608,  between  the  orchard  and  road.  The  edge  of  the 
corn  field  is  clearly  visible.  There  are  no  signs  of  the  ene- 
my. The  point  is  in  the  edge  of  the  corn  field,  west  of  the 
road,  450  yards  north  of  crossroad  608.  The  connecting 
file  has  joined  the  platoon.  The  support  appears  to  be  be- 
tween crossroad  608  and  the  wooded  ravine,  but  you  can- 
not see  whether  it  is  deployed  or  assembled. 

What  do  you  do? 

THE  FIRST  SERGEANT'S  SOLUTION 

1  order, 

Butler,  tell  the  point  to  continue  the  march  on  the  road ;  then  you 
and  Quinn  follow  again  at  100  yards  as  connecting  file. 

To  Corporal  Clark: 

Your  squad  will  go  50  yards  into  the  cornfield,  about  where  the 
enemy  was,  and  search  for  dead  and  wounded.  Then  join  me  on  the 
road. 

I  lead  the  remainder  of  the  platoon  in  skirmish  line  to- 
wards the  house,  with  the  intention  of  continuing  the  march 
on  the  road  in  platoon  column. 

DISCUSSION 

A  small  body  of  hostile  troops  can  delay  our  column 
by  firing  upon  it,  no  matter  how  aggressively  we  handle  the 
advance  guard  work.  One  of  the  great  advantages  in  hav- 
ing cavalry  attached  to  the  infantry  is  due  to  the  fact  that 
the  cavalry  can  frequently  drive  off  these  small  parties  with- 
out delaying  the  infantry  column.  If  our  battalion  had  had 
even  a  half  troop  of  cavalry  attached  to  it,  there  probably 
would  have  been  no  delay.  The  cavalry  would  have  pre- 
ceded the  infantry  by  considerable  distance,  and,  by  trot- 
ting ahead  after  this  minor  fight,  would  have  regained 


58  FOURTH  PROBLEM 

whatever  time  it  lost  by  reason  of  the  fight. 

You  have  been  delayed  a  few  minutes,  however,  and 
now,  having  compelled  the  enemy  to  withdraw  from  your 
front,  it  is  urgent  that  you  make  the  delay  as  short  as  pos- 
sible. It  does  not  seem  necessary  to  comment  upon  the 
manner  in  which  this  was  done.  You  merely  re-establish 
your  advance  party  on  the  road  and  start  forward.  If  the 
point  were  not  conveniently  located,  you  would  probably 
prefer  to  send  out  a  new  point. 

There  is  a  twofold  reason  for  sending  Corporal  Clark 
into  the  corn  field  in  search  of  dead  and  wounded.  It  may 
be  possible  to  assist  some  men  who  might  otherwise  escape 
discovery  by  the  inhabitants,  and  thus  suffer  unnecessarily. 
A  more  important  reason,  probably,  is  the  fact  that  valuable 
information  may  be  obtained,  not  only  from  the  uniforms 
and  pockets  of  the  dead  and  wounded,  but  also  by  question- 
ing wounded  men  who  are  conscious.  If  it  involved  a  long 
detour,  you  would  not  send  a  patrol  on  such  a  mission,  with 
such  lack  of  evidence  as  to  whether  there  really  were  any 
dead  or  wounded. 

SITUATION     VII 

Corporal  Clark's  squad  has  rejoined.  The  corporal 
reported : 

I  found  a  wounded  cavalryman.  He  said  that  his  squadron  had 
been  sent  to  crt  the  railroad,  and  had  fought  Blue  infantry  this  morn- 
ing. I  brought  him  to  the  road  and  left  Hagen  in  charge,  to  turn 
him  over  to  the  captain. 

From  Table  Rock  S.  H.  you  saw  high  dust  south  of 
Table  Rock,  and  a  moment  later  you  caught  a  glimpse  of  8 
or  10  mounted  men  rapidly  riding  north  into  Table  Rock. 

You  reach  the  first  house  (south  end)  of  Table  Rock. 
On  each  side  of  the  road  there  is  a  broad  ditch  nearly  two 
feet  deep.  A  stiff  volley  comes  from  a  direction  squarely 
to  the  left  of  you,  and  from  a  point  rather  close  to  you.  A 
momentary  pause  follows. 

What  do  you  do? 


THE  PLATOON  AS  AN  ADVANCE  PARTY  59 

THE  FIRST  SERGEANT'S  SOLUTION 

I  face  about,  shout,  "Cover,"  and  jump  into  the  ditch  on  the  west 
side  of  the  road.     Then  I  look  for  the  enemy. 

DISCUSSION 

While  you  were  marching  into  Table  Rock,  the  ditches 
along  side  of  the  road  certainly  attracted  your  attention 
because  of  their  tactical  value.  In  a  former  situation,  we 
said  you  would  study  the  ground  as  you  marched.  Your 
advance  party  is  likely  to  be  fired  upon  from  any  direction. 
The  troops  in  rear  of  you  will  be  saved  from  such  annoyance 
because  of  your  advance  party  marching  in  front,  and  the 
flank  patrols  that  the  support  will  send  out  from  time  to 
time.  In  a  large  command  the  advance  party  itself  will  re- 
ceive better  protection  because  the  command  will  have  cav- 
alry, and  this  cavalry  can  send  patrols  to  the  flanks  ahead 
of  the  advance  party. 

While  approaching  Table  Rock  you  probably  thought 
as  follows : 

If  we  are  fired  upon  from  the  front,  we'll  make  a  break  for  the 
nearest  houses;  if  we  are  fh-ed  upon  from  the  right,  we  will  jump 
into  the  ditch  on  the  right;  if  we  are  fired  upon  from  the  left,  we  will 
jump  into  the  ditch  on  the  left. 

In  other  words,  your  action  was  practically  decided  upon 
before  the  volley  was  fired.  This  is  not  always  possible, 
but  with  practice  in  field  exercises  you  will  find  that  you 
will  rarely  be  caught  unprepared  for  reasonably  quick  ac- 
tion. 

In  a  previous  situation  we  pointed  out  that  you  should 
make  the  platoon  do  exactly  as  you  wished.  You  cannot 
do  so  if  you  are  in  the  habit  of  attempting  impracticable  or 
impossible  things.  Generally,  only  the  simplest  thing  will 
work.  Your  men  look  instinctively  to  you  the  instant  the 
first  shot  is  fired,  unless  their  experience  has  shown  them 
that  you  get  rattled,  and  that  they  have  to  shift  for  them- 
selves until  you  pull  yourself  together.  In  the  present  case, 
if  you  jump  into  the  ditch  and  say  nothing,  the  men  will 
probably  follow  suit.  But  no  matter  how  obvious  may  be 
the  necessity  for  seeking  cover  at  once,  an  order  to  that 


60  FOURTH  PROBLEM 

effect  gives  the  impression  of  quick  thinking  and  decision. 
To  act  properly  even  in  such  a  case  trains  your  men  to  ex- 
pect orders  and  not  to  adopt  their  own  ideas.  Sometimes, 
when  the  natural  inclination  of  your  men  may  be  to  do  one 
thing,  you  may  have  a  very  good  reason  for  wanting  them  to 
do  something  else.  In  such  case,  if  your  men  have  learned 
that  you  never  fail  to  indicate  quickly  what  you  want  done, 
their  eyes  and  ears  will  expect  signals  and  orders,  and  you 
will  have  their  attention  at  once. 

Non-commissioned  officers  of  infantry  and  cavalry  are 
often  suddenly  confronted  by  many  peculiar  and  novel  situ- 
ations requiring  quick  and  decisive  action.  In  such  mo- 
ments, they  need  the  strict  attention  of  their  men,  but  they 
will  not  receive  it  if  the  men  have  discovered  that  it  is  wast- 
ed. 

In  a  sense,  the  enemy  has  surprised  you.  Let  the  men 
get  the  best  cover  available,  while  you  expose  yourself  only 
enough  to  locate  the  enemy,  and  see  what  else  is  going  on. 
One  of  the  disadvantages  of  marching  in  platoon  column  is 
the  mixing  of  the  platoon  which  results  when  the  right  half 
crosses  the  road  and  joins  the  left  half.  This  could  be  a- 
voided  by  signalling,  "As  skirmishers,  march,"  and  facing 
to  the  left,  thus  placing  the  right  half  of  the  platoon  on  the 
right.  However,  the  mixing  which  results  from  the  meth- 
od which  we  have  adopted,  affects  only  two  squads  and 
can  be  straightened  out  quickly.  We  shall  leave  it  this 
way  for  the  purpose  of  the  next  situation. 

If  you  march  along  the  road  and  estimate  that  the 
danger  is  greatest  on  one  or  both  flanks,  a  platoon  may  be 
marched  in  platoon  column,  but  broken  in  such  a  manner 
that  one  squad  leads,  say  on  the  right  side  of  the  road ;  the 
next  squad  follows,  but  on  the  left  of  the  road ;  the  next 
squad  on  the  right,  and  so  on.  Whichever  flank  the  platoon 
faces,  squads  will  be  together  when  formed  in  one  line  and 
there  will  be  no  crowding.  When  you  reach  a  point  on  the 
road  where  the  greatest  danger  is  in  front,  it  will  only  be 
necessary  to  order,  "Close  up,"  and  the  platoon  will  be  ready 
for  a  rapid  deployment  astride  the  road.  If  serious  danger 
is  apprehended,  you  would  change  the  formation  as  the  di- 
rection of  possible  danger  changed. 


THE  PLATOON  AS  AN  ADVANCE  PARTY  61 

You  are  frequently  told  that  it  is  unpardonable  to  be 
surprised.  This  hardly  applies  to  patrols,  or  even  small 
advance  parties.  It  does  apply  to  your  battalion.  The  bat- 
talion uses  the  point,  advance  party,  and  flank  patrols  to 
guard  itself  against  surprise,  but  these  latter  detachments 
cannot  always  avoid  surprise.  By  surprise,  we  mean,  in 
the  present  case,  unforeseen  hostile  fire  at  effective  range. 

SITUATION     VIII 

After  the  volley  the  enemy  fires  at  will.  There  are 
probably  50  rifles  firing  upon  you.  You  soon  realize  that 
the  enemy  is  firing  through  the  tops  of  the  trees  along  the 
creek  northwest  of  you,  and  therefore  not  very  accurately. 
In  a  moment  you  see  between  these  tree  tops  the  move- 
ments of  several  men  who  are  firing  from  the  edge  of  the 
woods  500  yards  away  and  on  line  with  hill  651.  The 
point  has  previously  taken  the  left  hand  road  and  is  not  in 
sight.  The  support,  southwest  of  roadfork  567,  is  starting 
to  deploy  into  the  orchard.  All  this  has  happened  in  a 
half  minute.  It  has  taken  you  this  much  time  to  get  your 
bearings  and  locate  the  enemy. 

What  do  you  do? 

THE  FIRST  SERGEANT'S  SOLUTION 

I  shout, 

Target, 
extend  my  arm  towards  the  woods  and  add, 

Look  sharply  up  the  slope.     Edge  of  woods;  range,  five  hundred. 
Fire  at  will. 

Then  I  resume  my  observation. 

DISCUSSION 

You  have  a  difficult  target  to  describe.  If  we  were  on 
the  ground,  we  might  find  some  conspicuous  object  to  assist 
in  target  designation.  On  the  other  hand,  we  might  see 
as  little  as  we  see  on  the  map,  or  even  less.  The  conditions 
of  our  ordinary  fire  problems  are  generally  too  ideal.     We 


62  FOURTH  PROBLEM 

can  quickly  pick  up  the  limits  of  the  target.  The  view  is 
generally  unobstructed.  In  the  present  case,  we  cannot 
wait  to  make  a  long  examination  and  explanation.  The 
support  is  deploying  with  the  intention  of  attacking.  It  is 
the  duty  of  the  advance  party  to  attract  to  itself  as  much 
of  the  enemy's  attention  and  fire  as  possible.  Hence,  the 
advance  party  should  fire  as  soon  as  it  locates  a  part,  if  not 
all,  of  the  enemy's  force.  All  that  you  can  do  for  the  pres- 
ent is  to  direct  the  attention  of  your  men  to  the  edge  of  the 
woods.  Every  man  must  find  for  himself  an  opening 
through  the  tree  tops,  and  fire  upon  whatever  men  he  sees 
through  his  opening.  Each  man's  view  will  be  different. 
None  will  see  much.  This  is  no  time  to  bother  with  fire 
distribution.  Firing  exercises  teach  sound  principles  of 
command  and  execution.  You  will  apply  these  principles 
whenever  you  can.  When,  in  your  judgment,  the  situation 
makes  it  extremely  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  indicate  the 
limits  and  to  expect  fire  distribution,  do  not  fool  away  val- 
uable time  in  a  useless  effort  to  be  perfect,  but  tackle  your 
job  in  the  simplest  and  most  practical  way  that  occurs  to 
you.  This  advice,  however,  should  not  be  made  an  excuse 
for  failing  to  be  more  definite  and  exact  when  time  and  con- 
ditions permit. 

In  a  previous  situation  the  advance  party  alone  drove 
out  the  enemy.  It  is  evident  it  cannot  do  so  now.  The 
volume  of  the  enemy's  fire  has  caused  the  support  com- 
mandar  to  see  the  situation  in  the  same  light.  The  support 
is  therefore  preparing  to  assist  you  in  driving  the  enemy 
out,  or  in  determining  his  exact  strength  and  position.  The 
most  decisive  results  will  come  from  the  action  of  the  sup- 
port. The  more  you  can  attract  the  enemy  to  the  advance 
party,  the  easier  will  it  be  for  the  support,  when  finally  it 
is  able  to  open  fire  and  push  its  attack. 

You  might  be  tempted  to  advance  at  once  under 
whatever  cover  is  offered  by  the  trees  along  the  creek,  but 
you  will  not  gain  time  by  doing  so,  and  when  the  support 
opens  fire  the  advance  will  be  much  easier. 


THE  PLATOON  AS  AN  ADVANCE  PARTY  63 

SITUATION     IX 

Four  minutes  after  you  opened  fire,  the  right  flank  of 
the  support  appeared  in  the  northwest  corner  of  the  or- 
chard (west  of  roadfork  567).  The  left  flank  seems  to  be 
west  of  the  creek.  The  point  is  north  of  you,  at  the  house 
nearest  the  bridge.  You  have  not  seen  the  main  body.  The 
enemy  has  been  firing  steadily  upon  your  advance  party. 
His  fire,  like  your  own,  has  been  interfered  with  by  the 
trees  along  the  creek.  One  man  on  your  left  seems  to  be 
wounded.  You  are  about  in  the  center  of  the  platoon.  A 
moment  later  the  support  opens  a  vigorous  fire.  Another 
moment,  and  the  fire  upon  your  advance  party  is  reduced 
by  a  half. 

The  field  in  front  of  you  is  flat.  The  brush  along  the 
creek  is  head  high,  but  does  not  reach  the  foliage  of  the 
trees  by  6  feet. 

What  do  you  intend  to  do? 

THE  FIRST  SERGEANT'S  SOLUTION 

I  intend  to  advance  to  the  creek  at  once.  The  platoon 
being  somewhat  mixed,  I  will  send  forward,  first  the  men 
on  my  right,  then  the  men  on  my  left.  ,  If  cover  all  the  way 
to  the  creek  is  not  good,  the  advance  will  be  made  in  two 
"hitches". 

DISCUSSION 

We  have  purposely  thrown  on  you  the  full  responsi- 
bility for  handling  the  platoon.  We  think  that  ordinarily 
you  would  receive  from  the  captain  some  instructions  or 
hints  to  guide  your  actions.  On  the  other  hand  you  will 
often  be  called  upon  to  act  on  your  own  responsibility 
without  any  intimation  as  to  what  the  captain  desires. 
When  this  happens,  you  should  comply  with  the  spirit  of 
Pars.  372  and  373,  Infantry  Drill  Regulations. 

The  attack  by  our  company  or  battalion  will  be  without 
result  unless  we  close  on  the  enemy.  As  soon  as  the  support 
gets  into  action  and  the  effect  of  its  fire  is  felt  by  the  enemy, 
your  waiting  game  ceases.     From  this  point  you  should  not 


64  FOURTH  PROBLEM 

hold  back  unless  an  advance  is  impossible. 

It  is  over  200  yards  to  the  creek.  There  is  a  6-foot 
strip  of  daylight  between  the  brush  and  the  foliage  of  the 
trees.  From  the  road  you  cannot  tell  what  the  effect  of  this 
strip  will  be  on  your  advance.  Your  first  real  halt  will  be 
at  the  creek.  Any  intermediate  halt  that  may  be  necessary 
will  be  made  only  for  the  purpose  of  holding  the  enemy 
under  fire  while  the  platoon  covers  long,  exposed  stretches 
(if  you  find  any)  by  rushes,  or  to  save  the  men  from  the 
fatigue  of  a  long,  continous,  rapid  advance. 

We  would  not  recommend  an  attempt  to  advance  by 
the  road  and  the  two  bridges  north  of  you.  The  men  would 
have  to  slip  to  the  right,  exposed  to  the  enemy's  view  and 
fire.  Unless  the  long  way  around  has  some  special  advan- 
tage, the  short  way  is  the  better. 

Sergeant  Hill,  in  command  of  the  point,  seems  to  under- 
stand that  it  is  necessary  for  him  to  watch  your  right  flank. 
He  appears  to  have  taken  over  the  duties  of  a  combat  patrol. 
As  long  as  his  action  and  movements  are  satisfactory,  it 
will  not  be  necessary  to  give  him  any  orders. 

The  preparation,  orders,  and  signals  for  an  advance  by 
rushes  will  be  considered  more  in  detail  in  another  problem. 

The  next  change  in  the  situation  will  make  your  platoon 
a  combat  patrol.  This  will  be  made  the  subject  of  the  prob- 
lem which  follows. 


Fifth  Problem 

A  Combat  Patrol 


EXPLANATION 

"Reconnaissance  continues  throughout  the  action.  A 
firing  or  skirmish  line  can  take  care  of  its  front,  but  its 
flanks  are  especially  vulnerable  to  modern  firearms.  The 
moral  effect  of  flanking  fire  is  as  great  as  the  physical  effect. 
Hence,  combat  patrols  to  give  warning  or  covering  detach- 
ments to  give  security  are  indispensable  on  exposed  flanks. 
This  is  equally  true  in  attack  or  defense."     (I.  D.  R.  396). 

By  a  careful  reading  of  the  paragraph  quoted,  you  con- 
clude that  if  the  force  sent  out  on  the  exposed  flank  is  so 
small  that  it  can  only  give  warning,  it  is  called  a  combat 
patrol.  If  it  is  large  enough  to  offer  resistance,  it  is  called 
a  covering  detachment.  The  distinction  in  name  is  unim- 
portant. For  convenience,  all  bodies  sent  to  an  exposed 
flank  to  warn  or  resist  are  called  combat  patrols  unless  they 
are  quite  large.  If  a  regiment  is  fighting  alone,  the  colonel 
may  send  a  company  to  an  exposed  flank  and  call  it  the  right 
(or  left)  flank  detachment.  If  a  brigade  is  fighting  alone, 
the  same  company  may  be  sent  to  an  exposed  flank  and  may 
be  called  preferably  a  combat  patrol.  In  practice,  it  is  part- 
ly a  matter  of  relative  size,  and  partly  a  matter  of  taste  and 
convenience.  The  important  thing  is  to  know  that  the  de- 
tachment, whether  it  is  called  a  combat  patrol  or  a  covering 
detachment,  will  resist  if  it  is  strong  enough,  but  in  every 
case  it  will  give  early  warning  and  full  information. 

The  size  of  a  combat  patrol  depends  upon  a  great  many 
things  that  need  not  be  discussed  in  connection  with  the 
present  problem.  It  may  consist  of  only  two  men.  It  is 
conceivable  that  in  some  cases  one  man,  favorably  located 
to  observe  and  signal,  would  make  a  satisfactory  combat 
patrol. 

65 


66  FIFTH  PROBLEM 

SITUATION     I 

This  is  a  continuation  of  the  last  situation  of  the  pre- 
ceding problem. 

Your  advance  party  is  now  on  the  north  side  of  the 
creek,  200  yards  west  of  the  bridge.  The  support  is  on  your 
left,  250  yards  away,  but  moving  north  towards  the  woods. 
Firing  has  ceased.  The  enemy  has  disappeared,  evidently 
having  mounted  up  behind  the  woods  and  galloped  towards 
632.  The  point  is  on  the  bridge.  Your  former  connecting 
file  is  with  the  platoon.  As  you  start  to  move  forward,  the 
battalion  adjutant  arrives  and  says  to  you, 

Red  cavalry  has  driven  Company  E  a  mile  north  of  Biglerville, 
but  Company  E  is  still  fighting.  Most  of  the  Red  cavalry  seems  to  be 
between  here  and  Biglerville,  probably  in  position  one  rmle  northwest 
of  us.  The  battalion  is  going  to  attack  at  once  in  the  direction  of 
Biglerville.  Take  your  platoon  to  the  top  of  that  hill  (pointing  to 
hill  646)  as  a  combat  patrol. 

1.  What  do  you  think? 

2.  What  do  you  intend  to  do? 

3.  What  orders  do  you  give  up  to  the  time  you  reach 
the  vicinity  of  553,  assuming  no  change  in  the  situation? 

THE  FIRST  SERGEANT'S  SOLUTION 

1.  Combat  patrol  on  that  hill.  I  may  have  to  fight 
to  get  the  hill.  My  left  flank  is  secure  enough.  As  I  march 
to  the  hill  I  shall  need  a  patrol  in  front  and  another  on  the 
right  flank.  Better  keep  off  the  road  and  be  ready  to  de- 
ploy. 

2.  I  intend  to  march  by  the  right  flank  to  the  road ;  to 
send  the  original  point  forward  by  the  shortest  route  to  the 
top  of  the  spur  250  yards  northeast  of  roadfork  553,  and 
thence  along  the  crest  to  hill  646 ;  to  send  another  patrol  of 
three  men  northeast  towards  the  east  base  of  the  spur,  and 
thence  to  the  top  of  the  spur,  to  a  point  probably  300  yards 
northeast  of  roadfork  553,  from  which  the  patrol  can  ob- 
serve the  country  to  the  east  and  northeast  and  at  the  same 
time  signal  to  me.  Then  I  intend  to  restore  the  organiza- 
tion of  the  platoon  and  march  on  the  right  of  the  road  and 
parallel  to  it. 

3.  I  command, 


A  COMBAT  PATROL  67 

By  the  right  flank,  march, 

and  march  at  the  head  of  the  column  towards  the  sharp 
turn  in  the  road. 

I  signal  the  point  to  join  me  and  then  give  the  follow- 
ing order  to  Sergeant  Hill  and  Corporal  Koenig: 

Company  E  is  still  fighting  somewhere  north  of  Biglerville,  in 
that  cLrect-on  (pointing).  The  enemy  will  probably  put  up  a  fight 
a  mile  from  here  on  that  high  ground  (pointing  to  the  northwest) 
between  here  and  Biglerville.  Our  battalion  will  attack  at  once  to- 
wards Biglerville.  This  platoon  is  the  combat  patrol  on  the  right 
flank.  We  are  go.ng  to  that  hill  (646).  Sergeant  Hill, 
march  your  point  at  once  to  the  top  of  that  spur  (pointing  to  the 
spur  northeast  of  roadfork  553),  then  along  the  spur  to  the  top  of 
the  hill.  Corporal  Koenig,  take  two  men  and  patrol  through  those 
woods  (point.ng  to  the  woods  southeast  of  roadfork  553).  Make  a 
loop  to  the  north  and  west  so  as  to  see  the  country  to  the  northeast 
and  then  halt  on  the  top  of  the  spur  where  you  can  see  the  country 
to  the  east  and  northeast  and  at  the  same  time  see  me.  The  platoon 
will  march  in  the  fields  along  the  right  of  the  road. 

Then  I  march  to  the  first  house  north  of  the  bridge,  as- 
semble the  platoon,  restore  its  organization,  and  give  the 
following  ordsrs : 

The  enemy  is  probably  on  that  high  ground  and  a  mile  northwest 
of  here.  Company  E  is  fighting  farther  north.  Our  battalion  is 
going  to  attack.  Our  platoon  is  the  combat  patrol  on  the  right  flank 
of  the  battalion.  We  are  going  to  that  hill.  Corporal  Clark,  platoon 
guide.  Towney,  fall  out  and  march  so  as  to  be  able  to  see  me  and 
at  the  same  t.me  see  the  battalion,  if  possible,  but  keep  within  100 
yards  of  the  platoon.  As  skirmishers,  march.  Platoon  column, 
march." 

I  lead  the  platoon  through  the  corn  field,  marching 
about  30  yards  from  the  fence  and  keeping  about  150  yards 
in  rear  of  the  point. 


DISCUSSION 

Our  purpose  in  asking,  "What  do  you  think?"  is  to 
encourage  you  to  settle  clearly  in  your  mind,  when  time 
permits,  the  salient  points  that  will  influence  your  inten- 
tions and  ordsrs,  before  taking  action  and  issuing  orders. 

The  enemy  is  not  likely  to  leave  such  an  excellent  ob- 
servation point  as  hill  646  without  a  patrol  on  it.  This  is 
particularly  true  when  the  enemy's  force  consists  of  cav- 
alry, as  in  this  case.  Because  of  its  mobility,  cavalry  sends 
patrols  longer  distances  from  its  main  body.     Therefore, 


68  FIFTH  PROBLEM 

you  may  be  obliged  to  fight  for  possession  of  hill  646.  It 
is  possible  that  you  may  find  the  hostile  force  on  the  hill 
too  strong  for  you,  but  this  fact,  if  you  find  it  to  be  a  fact, 
becomes  very  important  information  for  our  battalion  com- 
mander. The  attack  of  the  battalion,  as  planned,  might 
then  become  impracticable.  Therefore,  your  conclusion 
must  be  that  it  is  your  duty  to  attack  any  force  that  you  rind 
near  hill  646,  in  order  to  drive  it  out  quickly,  if  possible,  or 
failing  in  this,  then  to  fight  vigorously  enough  to  learn  its 
strength  and  position. 

A  march  in  skirmish  line  would  cause  unnecessary  fa- 
tigue and  disorder.  Even  if  such  a  formation  were  a  justi- 
fiable excuse  for  dispensing  with  a  point,  which  is  doubtful 
in  this  case,  it  would  still  necessitate  the  flank  patrol.  Under 
the  circumstances,  it  is  better  to  march  in  a  platoon  column 
with  proper  protection. 

All  bodies  of  troops  marching  in  the  actual  or  prob- 
able presence  of  an  enemy  must  protect  themselves  from 
surprise.  The  number  and  strength  of  these  covering  de- 
tachments, or  patrols,  as  the  case  may  be,  vary  according  to 
the  strength  of  the  whole  force,  the  imminence  and  nature 
of  the  danger,  and  the  ground.  A  detachment  sent  out  to 
cover  (protect)  a  force  will  generally  have  its  own  covering 
detachments.  For  example,  your  platoon  is  a  covering  de- 
tachment (combat  patrol)  for  the  battalion,  but  you  also 
must  have  your  own  covering  detachments.  Therefore, 
you  have  a  point  and  a  right  flank  patrol,  not  counting 
Towney,  who  is  merely  to  keep  you  in  communication  with 
the  battalion  if  possible.  Furthermore,  Sergeant  Hill  will 
probably  march  with  one  man  in  front  of  him  and  one  man 
on  his  right,  while  he  and  another  man  form  what  might 
be  called  the  main  body  of  the  point. 

In  view  of  the  short  distance  to  your  destination,  it 
would  be  unwise  to  march  on  the  road.  There  is  an  even 
chance  that  you  will  draw  fire  from  the  vicinity  of  hill  616. 
By  marching  in  the  fields  your  men  can  deploy  quickly  with- 
out running  into  fences.  Furthermore,  as  you  approach 
hill  646,  you  will  naturally  want  to  reach  the  higher  ground 
east  of  the  road  so  as  to  be  on  fairly  even  terms  with  your 
enemy,  if  you  meet  one. 


A  COMBAT  PATROL  69 

You  did  not  prescribe  a  distance  between  the  point  and 
the  platoon.  The  reason  for  this  is  that  the  point  would 
take  a  route  somewhat  different  from  your  own.  It  is  ne- 
cessary for  Sergeant  Hill  to  reach  the  top  of  the  spur  quick- 
ly and  march  along  the  crest,  in  order  to  see  towards  the 
northeast.  The  platoon,  on  the  other  hand,  should  march 
under  cover  of  this  spur,  but  close  enough  to  the  crest  to 
occupy  it  in  case  of  necessity.  Furthermore,  you  are  now 
guiding  on  the  point  (not  vice  versa,  as  in  the  Fourth  Prob- 
lem) and  may  vary  your  distance  from  time  to  time. 

The  platoon  should  be  checked  up  and  organization 
should  be  restored  as  often  as  necessary  and  possible,  but  it 
is  best  to  do  so  under  safe  cover,  as,  for  example,  the  house 
selected.  The  house  has  the  probable  further  advantage 
of  a  water  supply  for  your  men.  However,  you  would  lose 
time  if  you  attended  to  this  matter  first.  Hence,  you  would 
first  send  out  the  necessary  patrols,  and  as  they  are  gaining 
their  distances  you  would  assemble  the  platoon  and  prepare 
for  the  forward  movement. 

For  reasons  of  your  own  you  have  again  sent  the  pla- 
toon guide  in  command  of  the  point.  The  senior  corporal 
should  be  designated  as  platoon  guide  for  that  part  of  the 
platoon  which  remains  directly  under  your  command.  In 
this  connection,  you  may  be  curious  to  know  why  the  Infan- 
try Drill  Regulations  give  the  platoon  leader  an  assistant 
who  is  second  in  command,  while  the  captain  has  none. 
When  a  company  deploys,  the  captain  gives  his  commands, 
orders,  and  signals  to  platoon  leaders  only.  If  he  passed 
over  these  leaders  and  tried  to  handle  15  or  16  squads  in 
battle,  his  control  would  fail  oftener  than  it  would  succeed. 
If  he  tried  to  handle  every  man  directly,  matters  would  be 
still  worse;  the  line  is  too  long  and  the  excitement  and 
noise  are  too  great.  A  platoon  is  small  enough  to  permit 
the  observation  and  control  of  individuals;  hence,  all  com- 
mands, orders,  and  signals,  intended  for  individuals,  or 
squads,  or  the  platoon  as  a  whole,  are  given  by  the  platoon 
leader.  Only  the  general  movements  and  actions  of  the 
platoon  are  indicated  by  the  captain  to  the  platoon  leader. 
This  throws  on  the  platoon  leader  the  necessity  for  watch- 
ing to  the  front  and  rear,  and  sometimes  the  flank,  and 


70  FIFTH   PROBLEM 

studying  the  situation  with  a  view  to  planning  future  action. 
Someone  must  observe  the  men  in  the  line  in  order  to  pre- 
serve control,  discipline,  and  steadiness.  The  platoon  lead- 
er cannot  do  both.  The  guide,  or  second  in  command,  is 
the  watchman  and  disciplinarian.  If  the  company  is  so 
small  that  the  captain  chooses  to  handle  it  as  a  single  platoon 
(I.  D.  R.  166),  the  function  of  watchman  and  disciplinarian 
passes  to  the  lieutenants  and  first  sergeant.  There  will 
always  be  a  first  sergeant  or  acting  first  sergeant  availa- 
ble. To  follow  out  the  principles  explained  above,  the 
platoon,  whether  with  the  company  or  acting  alone,  must 
always  have  a  platoon  guide.  In  battle  or  skirmish  you  will 
quickly  see  the  advantage  of  this  firm  control,  an  advan- 
tage that  may  not  be  so  apparent  in  peacetime  exercises. 

SITUATION     II 

When  you  restored  the  organization  of  the  platoon 
(that  is,  re-formed  the  squads  and  checked  up  your  men) 
you  found  that  Schafer,  Stone,  and  Wilson  were  missing. 
Schafer  was  wounded  in  the  first  skirmish.  Their  squad 
leaders  tell  you  that  Stone  and  Wilson  were  wounded  in  the 
skirmish  just  ended. 

You  are  now 'at  the  head  of  the  platoon  column  and 
150  yards  north  of  roadfork  553.  You  can  see  only  the 
chimney  of  the  house  on  hill  646.  The  point  is  about  150 
yards  north  of  you  and  100  yards  east  of  the  road,  but  is 
momentarily  lost  to  view.  You  see  a  few  Blues  about  200 
yards  south  of  hill  651,  but  there  is  no  firing  in  that  direc- 
tion. Five  or  six  rifles  open  fire  from  the  vicinity  of  hill 
646 ;  a  moment  later  you  hear  your  point  open  fire. 

What  do  you  do? 

THE  FIRST  SERGEANT'S  SOLUTION 

I  command  and  signal, 
As  skirmishers,  two  paces,  march, 

and  continue  the  advance  at  a  fast  walk,  preceding  the  pla- 
toon so  as  to  get  an  early  view  of  the  ground  around  hill 
646. 


A  COMBAT  PATROL  71 

DISCUSSION 

You  have  some  yards  to  go  before  you  reach  the  se- 
condary ridge  which  the  road  crosses  about  200  yards  north 
of  roadfork  553.  When  you  reach  the  crest  of  this  ridge 
you  may  be  fired  upon,  but  more  important  than  this,  you 
will  be  able  to  return  the  fire  and  start  an  attack.  Skir- 
mish line  should  therefore  be  formed  before  the  platoon  is 
exposed. 

You  have  now  only  20  men  in  your  skirmish  line.  At 
2  paces  interval  these  men  will  form  a  line  about  45  yards 
long.  The  normal  firing  line  should  hold  about  one  man 
to  each  yard  of  front.  But  this  applies  to  firing  lines  of 
larger  forces,  where  there  is  only  a  certain  amount  of  front 
available  or  usable,  and  it  is  necessary  to  place  along  that 
front  as  many  rifles  as  possible.  When  we  deal  with  a 
platoon  or  less,  and  sometimes  a  company  or  more,  there 
is  an  advantage  in  making  a  line  longer  and  thinner  (that 
is,  less  than  one  man  per  yard).  It  may  sometimes  reduce 
the  vulnerability  of  our  line,  considered  as  a  target,  and 
permit  better  cover  for  individuals.  It  may  enable  us  to 
point  more  rifles  on  our  own  target,  particularly  where 
the  ground  is  broken,  or  the  enemy  has  good  cover  and  is 
shifting  a  great  deal.  But  when  you  intentionally  make 
your  firing  line  longer,  you  must  adhere  strictly  to  two 
principles :  First,  the  line  must  not  be  too  long  for  easy  con- 
trol. Second,  the  line  must  not  be  made  so  long  that  the 
end  rifles  cannot  get  on  your  target. 

When  the  platoon  is  in  skirmish  line  your  post  is  in 
front  during  a  rush  or  charge ;  otherwise,  it  is  in  rear  of 
the  center,  unless  you  have  a  reason  for  going  elsewhere. 
In  the  present  case,  you  precede  the  platoon,  if  only  by  a  few 
yards,  in  order  to  be  the  first  to  see  over  the  ridge.  In  this 
connection  see  I.  D.  R.  369,  second  section. 

SITUATION     III 

After  a  short,  sharp  fire  fight,  you  drove  a  hostile  pa- 
trol away  from  hill  646,  and  reached  the  farmyard  in  skir- 
mish line.*     Apparently,  two  of  our  companies  are  in  skir- 


*In  this  and  following  problems,  it  will  be  necessary  to  pass  over 


72  FIFTH  PROBLEM 

mish  line,  halted  astride  the  road  between  Gainer  and  cross- 
road 632.  A  moment  ago  some  one  near  Gainer  took  your 
semaphore  message  reporting  progress.  The  same  person 
signalled, 

Enemy  in  position  half  mile  west  of  here. 

One  man  of  Corporal  Koenig's  patrol  is  in  sight,  halted 
about  300  yards  northeast  of  roadfork  553.  Sergeant  Hill's 
point  joined  the  platoon  during  the  advance,  the  high  corn 
offering  sufficient  temporary  right  flank  protection.  There 
has  been  no  firing  anywhere  since  you  ceased  firing.  There 
seems  to  be  a  Red  patrol  near  647.  (Walinski  was  wound- 
ed when  the  point  was  first  fired  upon,  but  he  was  able  to 
walk.  You  sent  him  to  Hirst,  alone). 
How  do  you  post  the  combat  patrol? 

THE  FIRST  SERGEANT'S  SOLUTION 

I  place  3  men  at  the  646  farmhouse  or  barn,  to  post 
themselves  high  enough  to  see  the  647  ridge,  to  see  the  Ben- 
ders Church  ridge  beyond  the  cornfield,  to  see  Corporal 
Koenig's  signalman,  and  to  signal  towards  Gainer.  I  send 
2  men  to  the  bend  in  the  road  300  yards  southwest  of  cross- 
road 600.  The  rest  of  the  platoon  marches  into  the  field 
west  of  hill  646,  concealed  by  the  corn,  and  advances  towards 
600  until  a  line  facing  600  is  shortened  to  about  30  yards 
by  the  fences  along  the  roads.  The  corn  in  front,  as  far  as 
the  fences,  is  trampled  down  so  as  to  give  firing  positions 
for  the  platoon  to  fire  upon  hill  647  and  the  fields  southwest 
of  it.  The  platoon  then  conceals  itself  by  falling  back  about 
5  yards  into  the  standing  corn.  A  man  on  the  left  flank  is 
detailed  to  watch  towards  the  patrol  southwest  of  crossroad 
600  and  along  the  road  to  Benders  Church.  A  man  on  the 
right  flank  is  detailed  to  watch  the  patrol  at  hill  646.  I  re- 
main near  the  edge  of  the  standing  corn  so  as  to  observe  the 
647  ridge  and  to  the  northwest  and  west. 


many  important  and  interesting  phases  in  this  manner,  in  order  to 
avoid  a  multiplicity  of  situations  more  or  less  alike.  The  object  of 
these  problems  is  to  present  a  variety  of  situations  rather  than  all 
the  situations  confronting  a  particular  command.  Naturally,  company 
commanders  will  use  the  method  that  best  suits  their  purpose. 


A  COMBAT  PATROL  73 

DISCUSSION 

It  is  difficult  to  post  a  small  command  with  the  aid  of 
a  map  only.  A  visit  to  the  ground  may  prove  that  your 
solution  is  by  no  means  the  best.  A  map  does  not  show  the 
minor  accidents  of  ground  and  cultivation  that  are  most 
useful  to  a  small  force.  However,  the  solution  will  serve 
our  purpose,  which  is  to  show  the  relation  of  the  combat 
patrol  to  the  battalion  and  what  the  patrol  should  be  pre- 
pared to  do. 

Apparently,  the  battalion  is  making  careful  prepara- 
tions for  its  attack.  The  enemy  is  very  likely  along  the 
edge  of  the  corn  field  about  600  yards  west  of  crossroad 
632.  Firing  may  begin  while  you  are  still  making  the  dis- 
positions mentioned  in  the  solution.  Eventually,  the  right 
flank  of  the  battalion  may  reach  the  patch  of  woods  north  of 
crossroad  632.  You  can  see  that  this  flank  of  the  battalion 
is  exposed  to  attack  from  the  ridge  that  extends  from  hill 
647  southwest  to  the  corn  field  600  yards  west  of  cross- 
roads 600.  A  counter-attack  from  this  direction  is  espe- 
cially to  be  provided  against  in  the  present  case  since  the 
enemy's  force  consists  of  cavalry.  Your  task  then,  is  to 
protect  this  flank,  by  defensive  action  if  possible,  but  by 
ample  warning  at  all  events.  This  is  the  most  important 
area  to  be  watched.  Other  areas  that  require  watching 
are  the  ravine  between  the  647  ridge  and  the  600 — Benders 
Church  road,  the  Benders  Church  ridge,  and  (particularly 
since  the  hostile  force  consists  of  cavalry)  the  various 
roads  about  three-quarters  of  a  mile  east  of  hill  646. 

Your  patrol  of  three  men  on  hill  646  can  see  the  Guern- 
sey— 610 — Biglerville  road,  from  hill  647,  south  of  Guern- 
sey, as  far  as  the  orchard  700  yards  southwest  of  roadfork 
610,  and  much  of  the  intervening  ground.  This  patrol  is 
almost  certain  to  see  any  large  force  that  may  enter  the 
ravine  between  the  two  647  hills.  It  can  see  almost  a  mile 
along  the  Benders  Church  ridge.  It  can  receive  and  trans- 
mit signals  from  and  to  Corporal  Koenig  and  the  battalion 
commander.  It  can  also  see  the  632 — 626 — Biglerville  road 
almost  to  Biglerville.  Corporal  Koenig's  patrol  can  see 
almost  a  mile  to  the  northeast,  east,  and  southeast.  Your 
patrol  of  two  men,  300  yards  west  of  crossroads  600,  is 


74  FIFTH  PROBLEM 

less  important,  but  is  desirable  on  account  of  the  small  area 
north  of  the  600 — 632  road  not  otherwise  visible,  and  be- 
cause you  may  not  otherwise  maintain  connection  with  the 
right  flank  of  the  battalion  firing  line.  Personally,  you  can 
see  the  ridge  from  which  a  counter-attack  is  most  to  be 
feared. 

The  platoon  is  posted  so  as  to  open  fire  quickly  on  the 
ridge  just  mentioned.  From  its  present  position,  it  can 
also  stop  an  advance  by  way  of  the  ravine  southeast  of  647 
ridge,  although  the  men,  in  this  case,  may  have  to  change 
their  firing  positions.  The  platoon  is  not  in  position  to  stop 
an  advance  along  the  Benders  Church  ridge.  It  cannot 
be  in  two  places  at  the  same  time  without  being  divided.  It 
is  better  to  place  the  whole  platoon  to  cover  the  most  prob- 
able area  of  danger,  while  other  areas  are  closely  watched 
so  that  the  platoon  may  be  shifted  in  time  if  need  be. 

If  well  posted,  the  20  rifles  now  immediately  under 
your  command  can  stop  at  least  a  troop  of  cavalry,  and  pos- 
sibly more,  in  a  mounted  or  dismounted  attack  against  the 
flank  of  the  battalion.  The  firing  line  position  that  you 
selected  is  10  or  15  feet  higher  than  the  crossroads  at  600. 
Therefore,  the  corn  field  which  is  west  of  the  crossroads 
presents  little  or  no  obstacle  to  effective  fire  towards  the 
ridge.  The  obstruction  due  to  the  houses  can  only  be  over- 
come by  posting  the  men  on  the  ground.  The  details  are 
too  minute  to  be  indicated  on  the  map. 

You  are  not  likely  to  remain  long  in  your  present  posi- 
tion. A  combat  patrol  must  conform  in  a  general  way  to 
the  movements  of  the  force  it  protects.  Until  our  battalion 
approaches  the  house  300  yards  northwest  of  632,  you  can- 
not improve  your  present  location.  It  is  too  early  to  decide 
upon  your  next  move.  You  may  get  orders  on  the  subject, 
or  the  attack  may  assume  an  unforeseen  course  or  exten- 
sion. 

There  is  no  present  necessity  for  firing  on  the  Red  pa- 
trol near  647  ridge.  It  is  enough  to  report  its  presence  to 
the  battalion  commander.  Neither  is  it  advisable  to  drive 
the  patrol  off  by  an  attack.  A  few  men  might  not  be  able 
to  do  so,  and  the  whole  platoon  has  more  important  work 
elsewhere. 


A  COMBAT  PATROL  75 

The  dispositions  of  your  platoon  are  probably  not  as 
simple  as  would  be  the  case  in  an  average  combat  patrol 
situation.  This  is  partly  due  to  the  corn  field  and  the  con- 
formation of  the  ground,  and  partly  to  the  fact  that  the  hos- 
tile force  consists  of  cavalry. 

SITUATION     IV 

It  turned  out  that  there  were  very  few  Reds  in  the  edge 
of  the  corn  field  600  yards  west  of  crossroads  632.  Before 
the  firing  line  of  the  battalion  advanced,  reconnaissance 
disclosed  the  fact  that  the  enemy's  main  force  was  conceal- 
ed in  the  high  corn  600  yards  west  of  crossroads  600,  and 
would  probably  defend  the  edge  of  that  field.  At  least  that 
is  what  a  mounted  orderly  told  you  when  he  arrived  and 
handed  you  the  following  message  : 

gainer  farmhouse, 

4  Sept.  11-50  P.  M. 
Sgt.  Holmes, 

Battalion  attacks  corn  field  west  of  your  hill.  Move  patrol  half 
mile  north  to  high  ground. 

Crosby, 

Major. 

1.  What  orders  do  you  give? 

2.  Indicate  your  route  to  the  new  position. 

THE  FIRST  SERGEANT'S  SOLUTION 

1.     To  the  nearest  corporal : 

Adams,  the  platoon  is  going  to  that  hill  (647)  by  way  of  its  east 
slope  and  close  to  the  road.  Take  three  men  as  point  and  go  to  that 
barn  (west  side  of  the  road).  March  so  as  to  observe  to  the  north 
and  west. 

To  the  man  on  the  left  flank  of  the  platoon : 
Signal,  "assemble"  to  the  patrol  on  your  flank. 
I  write  the  following  on  a  piece  of  paper  • 

Corporal  Koenig, 

Platoon  goes  600  yards  north.  Move  your  patrol  600  yards  due 
north  to  top  of  ridge.     Watch  road  as  before. 

Holmes, 

1st  Sgt. 

To  the  platoon : 

By  the  right  flank,  march. 


76  FIFTH  PROBLEM 

To  Willis,  while  the  platoon  is  crossing  the  road : 

Go  to  that  house  and  find  Kelley.  Tell  him  to  join  me  with  his 
patrol.  Then  go  to  Corporal  Koenig  and  give  him  this.  Stay  with 
his  patrol.     Repeat. 

2.  East  across  the  road ;  then  north  in  platoon  column, 
marching  just  far  enough  down  the  slope  of  the  647  ridge 
to  escape  observation  from  the  west. 

DISCUSSION 

You  must  not  expect  every  message  to  be  exact  in  its 
reference  to  places.  Referring  to  Major  Crosby's  mes- 
sage, you  find  that  there  are  two  corn  fields  west  of  cross- 
roads 600.  One  of  them  is  just  across  the  road  from  your 
position.  The  major  must  mean  the  other  one.  Also,  if 
you  look  due  north  from  "your  hill"  and  measure  one-half 
mile  by  eye,  you  will  not  find  suitable  high  ground  there. 
Your  common  sense,  however,  tells  you  that  the  major  has 
in  mind  the  high  ground  at  647  ridge.  Messages  should  be 
as  exact  as  it  is  possible  to  make  them;  but  in  interpret- 
ing a  message,  allowance  must  be  made  for  the  impossibili- 
ty of  always  making  them  exact. 

The  only  other  new  point  that  comes  up  in  this  situa- 
tion is  the  sending  of  the  message  to  Corporal  Koenig.  This 
message  is  too  long  to  be  given  verbally  by  messenger.  If 
you  sent  it  to  Corporal  Koenig  by  semaphore,  you  would 
either  have  to  leave  the  platoon  for  awhile  and  go  to  the 
farmhouse  to  send  it,  or  write  the  message  and  send  it  to  the 
farmhouse  to  be  semaphored  to  Corporal  Koenig.  You 
cannot  leave  the  platoon ;  therefore,  you  must  write  the 
message,  no  matter  how  you  transmit  it.  Having  written 
it,  it  is  just  as  simple  and  much  surer  to  send  it  to  the  cor- 
poral by  messenger. 

You  will  never  know  whether  your  messenger  under- 
stands what  you  want  him  to  do  unless  you  make  him  re- 
peat his  instructions.  Even  then  you  will  not  let  him  go 
unless  or  until  he  repeats  these  instructions  in  a  manner 
which  convinces  you  that  he  understands. 

It  is  better  to  have  Willis  remain  with  the  patrol  than 


A  COMBAT  PATROL  77 

to  have  him  wandering  around  looking  for  the  platoon. 
Later,  when  you  are  in  signal  communication  with  Corporal 
Koenig  across  the  ravine,  you  can  recall  Willis  if  it  is  de- 
sirable to  do  so. 

You  may  be  surprised  to  see  two  hostile  forces  moving 
about  so  near  each  other  without  being  warmly  engaged. 
The  terrain  fully  accounts  for  this  condition. 


Sixth  Problem 

A  Picket 


EXPLANATION 

"The  outpost  is  a  covering  detachment  detailed  to 
secure  the  camp  or  bivouac  against  surprise  and  to  prevent 
an  attack  upon  it  before  the  troops  can  prepare  to  resist." 
(I.  D.  R.  678). 

When  troops  are  in  camp  or  bivouac  in  the  presence  of 
the  enemy,  the  amount  of  rest  and  security  that  can  be 
given  depends  upon  an  outpost  arrangement.  The  number 
of  men  actually  on  their  feet  on  outpost  is  relatively  not 
great. 

A  comparison  with  the  advance  guard  problems  will 
show  that  the  same  principle  of  distribution  applies  to  an 
outpost. 

"Patrols  or  sentinels  must  be  the  first  troops  which  the 
enemy  meets,  and  each  body  in  rear  must  have  time  to  pre- 
pare for  the  blow.  These  bodies  cause  as  much  delay  as 
possible  without  sacrificing  themselves,  and  gradually  re- 
tire to  the  line  where  the  outpost  is  to  make  its  resistance." 
(I.  D.  R.  695). 

The  bodies  of  troops  nearest  the  enemy  are  very  small. 
We  find  that  the  various  parts  of  an  outpost,  as  in  an  ad- 
vance guard,  increase  in  size  as  we  go  back  towards  the 
main  camp.  An  advance  guard  is  a  moving  body  and  is  on 
one  road.  An  outpost  is  a  stationary  body  and  is  divided 
so  that  a  part  of  it  is  on  each  road  that  the  enemy  is  likely 
to  use  if  he  marches  towards  our  main  camp. 

Besides  allowing  the  troops  to  rest,  an  outpost  attempts 
to  prevent  the  enemy  from  observing  our  camp  and,  in  case 
of  attack,  gives  warning  or  resists  so  that  the  main  body 
can  have  time  to  prepare  for  whatever  may  be  the  proper 
action  under  the  circumstances.  An  outpost  also  recon- 
noiters  to  the  front  for  information  of  the  enemy  or  the 
ground,  or  both.  Thus,  the  duties  of  the  outpost  are  obser- 
78 


A  PICKET  79 

vation,  resistance,  and  reconnaissance. 

For  convenience,  the  parts  of  an  outpost  are  given 
appropriate  names  as  follows:  Reserve,  support,  outguard 
(an  outguard  may  be  either  a  picket,  a  sentry  squad,  or  a 
cossack  post)  sentinel  post,  patrol,  detached  post.  These 
names,  and  the  purpose  of  the  parts  which  they  designate, 
should  be  clearly  understood.     See  I.  D.  R.  683-697. 

Usually,  the  commander  selects  a  defensive  line  on 
which  he  proposes  to  fight  if  the  enemy  attacks.  The  sup- 
ports are  ordinarily  located  at  points  on  this  line  where 
roads  cross  it.  These  points  define  what  is  called  the  "line 
of  supports."  In  front  of  this  line  are  the  outguards. 
Their  duties  are  to  observe  and  reconnoiter  so  as  to  give 
warning.  In  case  of  attack  they  offer  what  resistance  they 
can,  and  eventually  fall  back  to  the  line  of  supports.  In 
rear  of  the  line  of  supports  is  the  outpost  reserve,  con- 
veniently located  to  re-inf  orce  whichever  support  is  attacked. 
Behind  the  outpost  reserve  is  the  main  camp. 

The  present  problem  deals  with  an  outguard  which, 
because  of  its  size  and  purpose,  is  called  a  picket  as  distin- 
guished from  a  sentry  squad  or  cossack  post. 

SITUATION     I 

(This  problem,  and  the  seven  problems  that  follow  it, 
are  all  based  on  the  same  original  situation.  It  is  recom- 
mended, therefore,  that  you  mark  locations  carefully  with 
pins  and  small  tags,  and  preserve  your  map  thus  "staked 
out"  until  you  have  reached  the  end  of  the  Thirteenth  Prob- 
lem.) 

Our  brigade  has  been  marching  northeast  from  Get- 
tysburg, on  the  McElheny — Plainview — Heidlersburg  road, 
in  the  enemy's  country.  It  has  been  reported  that  the 
enemy  is  several  miles  to  the  northeast,  and  that  our  brigade 
will  halt  south  of  the  Conewago  Creek  until  tomorrow  or  the 
day  after,  to  await  reinforcements. 

The  Conewago  is  reported  to  be  fordable  only  at  the 
fords  shown  on  the  map.  It  is  November  1st,  and  the  corn 
is  in  shock. 

Our  battalion  has  been  the  advance  guard  and  is  now 


80  SIXTH  PROBLEM 

(2  P.  M.)  halted  as  follows: 

The  reserve  (Companies  A  and  B)  at  crossroads  616, 
southwest  of  Plain  view.  The  support  (Companies  C  and 
D)  near  the  house  400  yards  northeast  of  616,  with  its  ad- 
vance party  on  the  ridge  800  yards  northeast  of  616  as 
march  outpost.  Later,  Captain  Rowen  marched  our  com- 
pany (A)  within  100  yards  of  the  advance  party,  halted, 
assembled  the  non-commissioned  officers,  and  said : 

Conewago  Creek  swings  around  this  ridge,  a  half  mile  north  and 
a  half  mile  east  of  here.  The  enemy  is  reported  to  be  in  camp  on  this 
road  four  miles  northeast  of  here.  Our  brigade  is  going  into  camp 
on  this  road,  a  mile  and  a  half  to  the  southwest,  with  our  battalion 
as  outpost.  Companies  C  and  D  will  be  in  reserve  at  the  cross  roads 
where  we  halted  a  few  minutes  ago.  Company  B,  as  support  No.  2, 
on  that  ridge,  and  about  a  half  mile  west  of  here.  This  company,  as 
support  No.  1,  will  be  in  this  vicinity,  near  the  road.  The  exact 
location  of  the  company  will  be  fixed  later.  Sergeant  Crane,  take 
the  Second  Platoon  down  that  farm  road  to  the  east  and  place  out- 
guard  No.  1  to  cover  the  ford  where  the  road  crosses  the  Conewago. 
Sergeant  Holmes,  take  the  First  Platoon  ahead  on  this  main  road  and 
establish  outguard  No.  2  covering  the  bridge  across  the  Conewago. 
Posts. 

You  are  Sergeant  Crane,  commanding  Second  Platoon. 

1.  Where  do  you  place  your  picket? 

2.  What  further  dispositions  do  you  intend  to  make 
immediately  upon  arrival  ? 

SERGEANT  CRANE'S  SOLUTION 

1.  I  place  the  picket  in  the  patch  of  woods  450  yards 
west  of  the  ford. 

2.  I  place  a  double  sentinel  behind  a  corn  shock,  select- 
ing one  which  will  enable  the  sentinels  to  see  the  ford,  the 
fields  along  the  fence  which  runs  to  the  southeast,  and  the 
field  to  the  northwest  as  far  as  the  wooded  spur  held  by  out- 
guard No.  2.  I  send  a  patrol  of  three  men  across  the  Cone- 
wago, by  way  of  the  ford,  to  patrol  a  half  mile  beyond  the 
ford  and  then  return.  I  send  another  patrol  of  two  men  a 
half  mile  to  the  southeast  to  patrol  the  woods  and,  on  the 
return  trip,  to  examine  the  Conewago  for  possible  fording 
places.  I  send  another  patrol  of  two  men  to  locate  outguard 
No.  2  and,  on  the  return  trip,  to  examine  the  Conewago  for 
possible  fording  places.  Along  the  east  edge  of  the  woods, 
I  begin  the  digging  of  a  fire  trench  to  command  the  ford,  and 


A  PICKET  81 

send  a  few  men  to  level  whatever  corn  shocks  I  find  in  my 
proposed  field  of  fire,  except  the  one  used  by  the  sentinels. 

DISCUSSION 

In  the  Seventh  Problem,  which  deals  with  the  First 
Platoon  as  Outguard  No.  2,  we  shall  consider  more  in  detail 
the  orders  and  instructions  actually  given  to  an  outguard 
and  its  detachments. 

There  are  several  interesting  points  in  connection  with 
the  outguard  established  by  the  Second  Platoon.  When  you 
study  the  Seventh  Problem,  you  will  observe  that  the  dis- 
positions of  the  two  outguards  are  somewhat  different.  At 
first  glance  the  two  seem  to  be  alike  in  every  detail.  Both 
are  of  the  same  size ;  both  are  sent  out  from  the  same  sup- 
port, and  each  covers  a  Conewago  crossing  and  an  important 
approach  towards  the  troops  that  are  to  be  protected. 
Still,  there  is  enough  contrast  between  the  two  outguards  to 
demonstrate  the  truth  of  the  statement  that  no  two  situa- 
tions are  alike,  and,  therefore,  an  outguard  disposition* 
which  fits  one  case  may  be  wholly  wrong,  or  only  partly 
right,  in  another. 

Until  the  commander  of  the  support  has  reconnoitered 
the  sector  assigned  to  him,  and  particularly  the  road  as- 
signed to  your  outguard,  he  is  obliged  to  leave  to  you  the 
first  selection  of  the  position  for  the  outguard  and  the  first 
dispositions  as  to  sentinels,  patrols,  etc.  As  soon  as  the 
captain  is  able  to  do  so,  he  will  visit  your  outguard,  learn 
what  you  have  done,  reconnoiter  the  vicinity,  give  you  more 
detailed  information  as  to  the  location  and  responsibilities 
of  the  various  parts  of  the  outpost,  correct  your  dispositions, 
if  he  so  desires,  instruct  you  as  to  the  changes  to  be  made  at 
dark,  and  tell  you  the  arrangements  for  messing  and  ration 
supply. 

Naturally,  you  hope  to  arrange  the  picket  so  advan- 
tageously that  the  captain  will  not  be  induced  to  order 
changes.  In  the  present  case,  you  have  so  obviously  the 
proper  place  for  the  main  body  of  the  picket  that  you  need 
not  hesitate  to  entrench  at  once. 

The  map  indicates  that  there  is  no  underbrush  among 
the  trees  in  the  vicinity  of  the  ford.     If  it  were  otherwise, 


82  SIXTH   PROBLEM 

you  would  do  well  to  cut  out  the  underbrush  so  as  to  have 
a  clear  field  of  fire,  at  least  as  far  as  the  island. 

Technically,  a  picket  is  only  an  outguard.  An  out- 
guard  ordinarily  observes  and  warns,  but  does  not  expect 
to  offer  serious  resistance.  However,  when  the  outguard  is 
so  large  that  we  give  it  the  convenient  name  of  picket,  and 
when  in  addition  it  finds  a  favorable  position  covering  an 
important  approach,  it  should  entrench  and  prepare  to 
offer  resistance.  Another  reason  for  entrenching,  in  the 
present  case,  is  the  fact  that  the  support  is  not  between  the 
ford  and  the  outpost  reserve.  In  this  respect,  the  situation 
d.ffers  radically  from  the  one  which  confronts  Outguard 
No.  2. 

A  single  sentinel  behind  a  corn  shock  might  be  enough, 
and  would  certainly  be  correct  if  the  outguard  were  only  a 
sentry  squad.  But  you  have  an  entire  platoon,  and  the  sen- 
tinel post  is  an  important  one,  charged  with  the  duty  of  ob- 
serving for  long  distances  and  in  many  directions.  You 
•might  prefer,  also,  to  post  a  lookout  in  the  immediate  vici- 
nity of  the  picket  itself,  to  keep  its  eye  on  the  sentinel  post. 
This  would  surely  not  be  wrong.  On  the  contrary,  it  would 
be  necessary  if  you  found  that  the  sentinel  post  was  not 
easily  seen  by  most  of  the  men  of  the  picket. 

As  soon  as  an  outguard  reaches  its  post,  a  commander 
must  acquaint  himself  with  the  conditions  in  his  vicinity. 
He  can  do  this  by  a  careful  observation  of  the  ground  if  the 
area  that  falls  to  him  is  limited,  or  if  an  extensive  view  of 
his  area  can  be  had.  Where  the  area  is  quite  large  and  the 
view  restricted,  as  in  the  present  case,  and  when,  in  addition, 
the  outguard  has  enough  men,  the  quickest  and  surest 
means  is  to  send  out  patrols  in  various  important  directions. 
But  these  patrols  should  not  go  far.  Your  immediate 
vicinity  is  your  first  concern.  Later,  when  you  are  well 
established  and  familiar  with  the  immediate  vicinity,  you 
can  plan  more  carefully  the  changes  and  patrolling  that  may 
be  necessary. 

If  one  of  your  non-commissioned  officers  has  some  skill 
in  making  a  topographic  sketch,  it  would  be  well  to  have  him 
start  at  once  a  sketch  showing  the  road  you  are  on,  the 
woods  that  you  occupy  and  the  other  important  features  to 


A  PICKET  83 

the  right,  left,  and  front.  Ordinarily,  the  support  com- 
mander, or  some  one  detailed  by  him,  makes  an  outpost 
sketch  for  the  entire  support.  You  can  assist  materially 
in  the  rapid  completion  of  a  more  accurate  sketch  if  you 
turn  over  at  least  a  diagram  showing  directions  and  dis- 
tances to  various  important  features. 

SITUATION     II 

Your  three  patrols  return  and  report  that  they  have 
discovered  nothing,  except  as  follows:  From  the  bend  in 
the  road  400  yards  north  of  the  picket  there  is  a  foot  trail 
to  the  east  through  the  woods.  The  trail  crosses  the  Cone- 
wago  by  a  fair  ford  and  appears  to  follow  the  wire  fence 
to  the  road  bend  300  yards  west-southwest  of  544. 

What  further  dispositions,  if  any,  do  you  intend  to 
make? 

SERGEANT  CRANE'S  SOLUTION 

I  intend  to  place  a  cossack  post  on  the  trail  mentioned, 
on  the  west  bank  of  the  Conewago. 

DISCUSSION 

The  cossack  post  would  not  be  necessary  in  daytime  if 
your  sentinel  could  see  the  ford  and  the  trail  east  of  it,  but 
there  happens  to  be  a  patch  of  woods  150  yards  square 
(almost  two  city  blocks)  which  conceals  the  trail  and  the 
ford.  The  trail  towards  544  is  also  concealed  by  the  trees 
which  fringe  the  Conewago. 

We  have  here  a  case  of  an  outguard  sending  out  a 
minor  outguard.  This  is  frequently  necessary  in  the  case 
of  a  strong  picket  assigned  to  watch  an  important  road. 
If  your  outguard  consisted  of  a  squad  only,  you  would  mere- 
ly report  to  the  support  commander  the  existence  of  the 
trail  and  ford  that  your  patrol  discovered.  A  cossack 
post  would  then  be  sent  directly  from  the  support. 

SITUATION     III 

Ten  minutes  after  your  arrival  at  your  present  posi- 


84  SIXTH  PROBLEM 

tion,  two  mounted  orderlies  of  the  regiment  turned  over 
to  you  a  telephone  connected  with  Support  No.  1  and  the 
outpost  reserve.*  Presently  the  captain  arrived.  He  ap- 
proved all  that  you  had  done.  He  informed  you  as  follows : 
If  you  are  driven  back,  you  are  authorized. to  fall  back  on 
the  reserve.  The  outpost  has  been  reinforced  by  a  platoon 
of  cavalry,  which  now  forms  a  detached  post  where  the 
road  crosses  the  Conewago,  1500  yards  southeast  of  your 
picket.  The  second  fence  500  yards  south  of  your  picket, 
and  the  north  edge  of  woods  from  the  end  of  the  same 
fence  to  the  Conewago,  mark  the  right  of  the  sector  of  our 
support  (Company  A).  The  support  will  send  supper  to 
the  picket  at  5-30  P.  M.,  and  breakfast  at  an  hour  to  be 
announced  later.  The  changes  for  the  night,  as  far  as  they 
relate  to  your  picket,  will  be  as  follows:  The  picket  will 
move  forward  to  the  water's  edge  at  the  ford.  Hourly 
patrols,  on  the  even  hour,  to  the  cavalry  detached  post  and 
to  outguard  No.  2.  No.  2  will  be  at  the  bridge  during  the 
night.  The  opposite  side  of  the  Conewago  also  will  be 
patrolled.     Night  signal : 

Twenty-three,  forty-one. 

What  preparations  do  you  make,  during  daylight,  to 
carry  out  the  captain's  order  for  night  changes? 

SERGEANT  CRANE'S  SOLUTION 

I  cross  the  ford  with  two  corporals,  in  patrol  forma- 
tion, leaving  the  platoon  guide  in  charge  of  the  picket. 
Having  decided  to  place  a  sentry  squad  at  the  east  end  of 
the  ford,  I  point  out  its  location  to  the  corporal  of  the  squad 
selected.  To  both  corporals  I  point  out  the  houses  500 
yards  east  and  500  yards  north,  as  guides  for  night  patrol- 
ling. Then  we  return  to  the  picket  and  I  prepare  a  roster 
as  follows: 

Cossack  post  (already  established),  1  corporal  and  3 
privates. 


♦Although  at  present  infantry  resriments  have  no  telephone  equipment,  it  is 
inconceivable  that  we  shall  be  without  it  in  war.  In  fact,  it  is  understood  that  a 
proper   equipment   is   being   designed. 


A  PICKET  85 

One  squad  for  sentry  squad. 

A  guard  for  the  bivouac  of  the  picket;  three  reliefs  of 
one  private  each,  with  a  corporal  in  charge;  one  hour  on. 
two  hours  off. 

For  patrolling  the  roads  300  yards  beyond  the  houses 
mentioned  above  (every  hour,  day  and  night),  two  reliefs 
of  four  men  each  (one  squad ;  the  corporal  and  No.  2  as 
leaders). 

For  a  visiting  patrol  to  the  cavalry  detached  post,  two 
reliefs  of  two  privates  each. 

For  a  visiting  patrol  to  Outguard  No.  2,  two  reliefs  of 
two  privates  each. 

The  leaders  of  these  patrols  are  then  sent  in  pairs  to 
examine  their  routes  by  daylight. 

The  patrol  to  the  cavalry  detached  post  is  given  the 
following  route :  From  the  west  end  of  the  ford  (proposed 
bivouac)  go  southwest  along  the  fence  200  yards  to  the 
fence  corner ;  thence  1000  yards  to  the  southeast  along  the 
fence  to  the  fence  corner;  thence  east  to  the  road;  thence 
to  the  cavalry  post;  thence  return  along  the  west  bank  of 
the  Conewago. 

The  patrol  to  Outguard  No.  2  is  given  the  following 
route :  Follow  the  farm  road  to  the  bend  600  yards  north- 
west of  the  ford ;  thence  east  to  the  cossack  post ;  thence 
along  the  Conewago  to  Outguard  No.  2;  thence  return  by 
the  same  route  to  the  cossack  post;  thence  along  the  Cone- 
wago to  the  ford. 

I  inform  all  members  of  the  patrol  that  the  night  sig- 
nal is  twenty-three,  forty-one. 

DISCUSSION 

It  is  merely  a  coincidence  that  your  roster  utilizes  ex- 
actly every  corporal  and  private  in  the  platoon.  If  your 
first  draft  of  a  roster  did  not  require  the  services  of  every 
man  in  the  platoon,  you  would  not,  on  that  account,  in- 
crease the  size  of  any  of  the  groups.  If  your  first  draft 
summed  up  more  than  the  total  number  of  corporals  and 
privates  available,  you  would  have  to  reduce  some  of  the 
groups   if   possible;   otherwise,    inform   the   captain.     The 


SIXTH    PROBLEM 

platoon  guide  could  be  put  in  charge  of  the  bivouac  guard, 
thus  saving  one  corporal.  The  sentry  squad  could  spare  one 
private  and  still  have  three  reliefs  of  double  sentinels. 
The  patrols  to  the  east  side  of  the  Conewago  could  be  re- 
duced to  three  men  each,  etc. 

Although  every  man  is  on  your  roster  for  some  duly 
during  the  night,  you  will  always  have  twenty-two  men, 
including  yourself,  in  the  bivouac  of  the  picket  if  you  send 
the  four-man  patrol  out  when  the  visiting  patrols  return. 
If  all  patrols  are  out  at  the  same  time,  there  will  still  be 
eighteen  men  in  your  bivouac. 

At  night,  your  trench  is  of  no  value.  The  ford  is  a 
defile.  To  oppose  an  enemy  it  is  necessary  to  place  your- 
self at  the  defile.  The  captain  has  wisely  decided  that  you 
should  be  at  the  west  end  of  the  defile.  Very  likely  he  also 
would  have  ordered  the  sending  of  a  sentry  squad  to  the 
east  end,  but  for  our  own  reasons  we  purposely  caused 
him  to  omit  this.  It  is  nearly  300  yards  to  the  east  end  of 
the  ford.  This  is  too  far  for  a  double  sentinel  post  sent 
out  directly  from  the  picket.  There  are  two  alternatives: 
Either  send  sentinels  directly  from  the  picket  to  the  island. 
or  send  a  sentry  squad  to  the  east  bank  of  the  Conewago. 
If  it  were  not  for  the  dense  woods  which  cover  the  island 
and  line  the  west  bank  of  the  Conewago,  a  double  sentinel 
post  on  the  island,  sent  from  the  picket,  would  probably 
serve  our  purpose. 

If  the  other  demands  on  the  platoon  were  not  so  great, 
it  would  be  well  to  change  the  cossack  post  to  a  sentry 
squad  during  the  night. 

The  patrol  to  the  east  side  of  the  Conewago  should  make 
its  rounds  in  daytime  as  well  as  at  night,  on  account  of  the 
restricted  view  of  your  sentinels.  The  last  patrol  before 
dark  should  carefully  cut  all  telephone  wires  so  as  to  isolate 
the  houses  in  your  front.  You  are  in  the  enemy's  country, 
and  by  cutting  these  wires  before  you  make  your  changes 
for  the  night,  you  may  prevent  detailed  information  from 
reaching  the  enemy,  or  at  least  delay  the  transmission  of 
it. 

A  cossack  post  or  sentry  squad  is  not  strong  enough  to 
send  out  patrols,  except  for  the  necessary  examination  of 


A  PICKET  87 

its  surroundings  when  it  first  reaches  its  position.  A  pick- 
et, on  the  other  hand,  is  frequently  a  small  support  and,  if 
strong  enough,  must  take  over  reconnaissance  to  adjoin- 
ing parts  of  the  outpost.  Such  patrolling  is  very  easy  in 
day  time,  and  is  frequently  unnecessary,  as  in  this  case. 
At  night  a  patrol  can  easily  get  lost  even  if  it  has  covered 
its  route  by  daylight.  This  possibility  generally  can  be 
avoided  by  fixing  routes  that  are  easily  followed  at  night. 
Fences,  roads,  streams,  and  clearly  defined  ridges,  or  ed- 
ges of  woods,  are  very  useful  guides  and  should  be  used 
whenever  possible. 

In  daytime,  your  sentinels,  together  with  the  sentinels 
of  the  cavalry  detached  post  and  Outguard  No.  2,  can  see 
all  the  ground  which  you  propose  to  cover  with  visiting  pa- 
trols during  the  night.  We  hardly  ever  patrol  ground  that 
can  be  seen  by  sentinels.  At  night,  however,  the  inter- 
vening ground  must  be  examined  from  time  to  time.  We 
must  keep  in  touch  with  adjoining  posts  and  exchange  in- 
formation, even  if  it  amounts  to  no  more  than  an  assurance 
that  everything  is  quiet.  Your  cossack  post  is  visited 
twice  each  hour.  Your  four-man  patrol  passes  through 
the  sentry  squad  twice  each  hour.  Even  though  you  have 
telephone  connection,  a  patrol  from  the  support  will  prob- 
ably visit  you  occasionally. 

The  reason  for  starting  your  visiting  patrols  on  the 
even  hour  will  be  apparent  when  you  study  the  Seventh 
Problem. 

If  you  study  the  final  arrangements  along  the  entire 
front  of  our  support,  you  will  realize  how  difficult  it  would 
be  for  the  enemy  to  pierce  our  line  unobserved  tvith  a  suffi- 
cient force  to  be  dangerous.  It  is  a  mistake  to  suppose  that 
an  outpost  is  not  good  merely  because  a  patrol  can  pene- 
trate it.  A  hostile  patrol  is  not  dangerous  except  in  the 
infrequent  case  where  it  is  imperatively  necessary  to  pre- 
vent the  enemy  from  getting  any  information  whatever. 
Such  cases  are  rare. 

"In  posting  his  command  the  support  commander  must 
seek  to  cover  his  sector  in  such  manner  that  the  enemy  can 
not  reach,  in  dangerous  numbers  and  unobserved,  the  posi- 
tion of  the  support  or  pass  by  it  within  the  sector  intrusted 


SIXTH    PROBLK.M 

to  the  support.  On  the  other  hand,  he  must  economize 
men  on  observation  and  patrol  duty,  for  these  duties  are 
unusually  fatiguing.  He  must  practice  the  greatest  econo- 
my of  men  consistent  with  the  requirements  of  practical 
security."      (I.  D.  R.  704). 

No  doubt  you  understand  why  the  captain  authorized 
you  to  fall  back  on  the  reserve  in  case  you  are  attacked  and 
forced  to  retire.  The  attack  might  come  from  the  front, 
supported  by  rifle  fire  from  troops  posted  along  the  east 
bank  of  the  Conewago,  north  of  the  ford. 

Whenever  possible,  a  non-commissioned'  officer  should 
be  awake  and  on  the  alert  at  all  hours  of  the  night.  Pa- 
trols must  be  sent  periodically,  and  the  bivouac  guard  must 
be  relieved  hourly.  A  satisfactory  arrangement  in  the  pre- 
sent case  would  be  as  follows:  You  remain  on  this  duty 
until  9  P.  M. ;  the  platoon  guide  until  1  A.  M. ;  and  the  cor- 
poral in  charge  of  the  guard  from  1  A.  M.  until  a  half  hour 
before  daylight,  at  which  time  the  entire  picket  should  be 
awakened. 

The  method  of  night  signalling  prescribed  by  the  sup- 
port commander  will  not  be  found  in  any  of  our  regula- 
tions. It  would  not  be  wise  to  have  a  uniform  system 
throughout  the  army.  It  would  be  better  if  every  regi- 
ment practiced  two  or  three  systems  and  changed  them  from 
time  to  time.  In  the  present  case,  it  is  intended  that  the 
signals  shall  be  given  by  tapping  the  butt  of  the  rifle  with 
the  knuckles,  or  a  stick  or  stone,  depending  upon  the  still- 
ness of  the  night.  The  one  who  calls,  strikes  the  butt  of 
his  rifle  twice,  then  after  a  short  pause,  he  strikes  it  three 
times ;  thus,  tap,  tap, — tap,  tap,  tap,  making  the  signal  twen- 
ty-three. If  he  hears  an  answering  signal  "forty-one"  he 
is  reasonably  sure  that  he  can  move  in  the  direction  of  the 
answer  and  meet  a  member  of  the  outpost.  Or,  any  one 
hearing  the  signal  "twenty-three"  will  signal  back  "forty- 
one,"  and  be  reasonably  sure  that  whoever  approaches  is  a 
friend.  Such  signals  are  particularly  useful  to  night  pa- 
trols approaching  sentinels  or  outguards.  On  a  still  night 
a  tap  on  the  rifle  butt  can  be  heard  a  considerable  distance 
and  readily  attracts  attention.  We  give  it  as  one  of  many 
systems  that  can  be  devised,  but  we  should  by  no  means 
favor  the  uniform  use  of  this  particular  system. 


Seventh   Problem 

Another  Picket 


SITUATION     I 

The  situation  is  the  same  as  Situation  I,  Sixth  Prob- 
lem, to  include  the  support  commander's  orders. 

You  are  First  Sergeant  Holmes,  commanding  First 
Platoon. 

What  do  you  do.  up  to  the  time  you  leave  the  support". 

THE  FIRST  SERGEANT'S  SOLUTION 

I  signal. 

Attention  to  orders, 
and  call  out: 

First  Platoon,  we  are  going  out  this  road  to  establish  an  out- 
guard.  Corporal  Adams,  take  three  men  and  precede  us  by  200 
yards.     March  out. 

When  the  point  has  gained  its  distance,  I  signal, 

Right  by  twos,  march.     Column  of  files  on  each  side  of  road. 

DISCUSSION 

In  connection  with  the  present  problem  it  is  our  pur- 
pose to  show  the  successive  steps  by  which  an  outpost  is 
established.  On  a  map,  it  is  simple  enough  to  indicate 
with  pins  a  complete  outpost  disposition,  but  in  the  field 
we  are  likely  to  fumble  around  a  great  deal  before  the  out- 
post is  finally  established.  At  the  end  of  a  march,  men  are 
tired  and  irritated,  and  it  is  a  sign  of  good  leadership  if 
the  troops  detailed  for  outpost  duty  go  smoothly  and 
promptly  to  their  proper  places,  thus  getting  the  men  off 
their  feet  and  relieved  of  their  equipment  as  soon  as  pos- 
sible. 

You  note  that  the  companies  of  the  advance  guard  re- 

89 


90  SEVENTH  PROBLEM 

serve  (Companies  A  and  B)  are  to  constitute  the  outpost 
supports,  while  the  advance  guard  support  (Companies  C 
and  D)  retires  to  616  and  becomes  the  outpost  reserve. 
The  hardest  work  on  the  march  falls  naturally  to  the  ad- 
vance guard  support.  When  Major  Crosby  was  ordered 
to  establish  the  outpost  of  the  brigade,  he  did  not  waste 
any  time  in  a  preliminary  reconnaissance  of  the  outpost 
line.  On  the  contrary,  he  immediately  sent  out  Companies 
A  and  B,  each  on  a  road  towards  the  enemy,  and  left  the 
completion  of  the  job  to  the  company  commanders  and  sub- 
sequent inspection  by  himself.  Thus,  in  a  very  few  min- 
utes Companies  C  and  D  will  be  in  bivouac. 

For  the  same  reasons,  Captain  Rowen  halted  Company 
A  near  the  Plainview  roadfork  and,  without  wasting  time 
or  unnecessary  words,  sent  a  picket  out  on  each  road,  leav- 
ing the  details  as  to  exact  location,  sentinels,  patrols,  etc., 
to  the  picket  commanders  and  subsequent  inspection  by  him- 
self. 

To  conform  to  this  principle,  you  marched  off  with  your 
command  as  soon  as  possible.  For  the  present,  it  is  not 
necessary  that  your  men  should  know  much  about  their 
future  duties.  Whatever  you  may  have  to  say  to  them 
can  be  said  better  when  they  reach  the  place  where  they 
are  going  to  work. 

"The  supports  march  to  their  posts,  using  the  neces- 
sary covering  detachments  when  in  advance  of  the  march 
outpost."       (I.  D.  R.  703). 

"Each  out  guard  is  marched  by  its  commander  to  its 
assigned  station,  and,  especially  in  the  case  of  a  picket,  is 
covered  by  the  necessary  patrolling  to  prevent  surprise." 
(I.  D.  R.  706). 

Captain  Rowen  did  not  place  a  point  in  front  of  the 
company  because  he  was  still  behind  the  march  outpost. 
But  in  a  minute  or  two  you  will  pass  the  march  outpost 
and  will  march  towards  the  enemy,  and  through  country 
that  has  not  yet  been  reconnoitered. 

SITUATION     n 

No*  change.  Corporal  Adams  has  taken  Willis,  Bush 
and  Schmidt  with  him. 


ANOTHER  PICKET  91 

1.  Where  do  you  intend  to  post  the  picket  and  its  sen- 
tinel posts? 

2.  What  orders  or  instructions  do  you  give  on  arrival 
at  the  place  selected,  and  before  the  captain  arrives  to  in- 
spect? 

THE  FIRST  SERGEANT'S  SOLUTION 

1.  I  intend  to  place  the  picket  near  the  edge  of  the 
woods  on  the  right  hand  side  of  the  road,  about  200  yards 
southwest  of  the  nearest  bridge,  with  a  sentinel  posted  so 
as  to  observe  to  the  east  and  along  the  road  to  the  northeast. 
I  intend  to  place  a  cossack  post  on  the  island  between  the 
two  bridges.  Meantime,  Corporal  Adams  will  patrol 
through  the  woods  to  the  west  from  the  first  bridge,  and 
then  south  and  return  to  the  picket. 

2.  Upon  arriving  in  the  road  opposite  the  point  se- 
lected for  the  outguard,  I  give  the  command : 

Follow  me, 

climb  through  the  fence,  and  find  cover  for  the  outguard, 
as  near  as  possible  to  the  road  and  the  northeast  edge  of 
the  woods.  Here  I  re-form  the  outguard  in  column  of 
squads  and  give  the  following  orders : 

The  enemy  is  supposed  to  be  in  camp  several  miles  northeast  of 
here,  on  this  road.  The  village  where  we  left  the  company  is  called 
Plainview.  That  stream  is  called  the  Conewago.  This  is  the  Har- 
risburg  road.  A  mile  and  a  half  northeast  of  here,  on  this  road,  is 
the  town  of  Heidlersburg.  Our  brigade  will  camp  on  this  road  about 
a  mile  and  a  half  to  the  southwest,  with  our  battalion  as  outpost. 
Companies  C  and  D  will  be  the  reserve,  at  the  crossroads  where  we 
left  the  major.  Company  B  will  be  Support  No.  2  on  another  road 
about  a  half  mile  from  here,  in  that  direction  (pointing  west).  Our 
company  will  be  support  No.  1  on  the  road  about  where  we  left  the 
company.  Sergeant  Crane,  with  outguard  No.  1,  a  picket  of  one 
platoon,  is  on  a  trail  south  of  here.  We  shall  locate  him  later. 
We  are  outguard  No.  2.  Later  we  will  locate  Company  B  on  our 
left.  Bring  to  me  every  person  who  attempts  to  cross  our  outpost 
line  in  either  direction,  or  who  is  picked  up  by  patrols,  except  mem- 
bers of  our  company,  patrols  from  Company  B,  and  officers  whom 
you  are  sure  you  know.  No  fires.  Pieces  will  not  be  stacked. 
Equipment  may  be  removed,  except  belts  and  bayonets.  Hook  your 
bayonet  scabbards  to  your  belts.     Miller,  come  with  me. 

I  take  Miller  to  the  point  selected  (near  the  fence 
along  the  road)  for  the  picket  sentinel  and  say  to  him, 

This  is  your  post.     You  can  see  up  and  down  the  road  and  to  the 


92  SEVENTH  PROBLEM 

east;  also,  for  some  distance  into  those  woods  (pointing  north  and 
west).  Be  particularly  careful  to  observe  the  road  to  the  northeast 
and  the  country  to  the  east. 

I  then  step  into  the  road,  get  Corporal  Adams'  atten- 
tion and  semaphore  him, 

Patrol  500  yards  west  along  the  creek  and  return  here  through 
.voods. 

Then  I  return  to  the  outguard. 

Towney,  take  Bennett  with  you  and  patrol  south  until  you  find 
a  trail.  Follow  the  trail  towards  the  Conewago  until  you  find  Out- 
guard No.  1.  Locate  it  carefully  so  that  you  can  point  out  its  posi- 
tion to  me.  On  the  return  trip,  examine  the  Conewago  as  far  as  the 
bridge  for  possible  crossings.     Repeat. 

I  satisfy  myself  that  Towney  understands. 

Corporal  Nelson,  take  three  men  of  your  squad  and  follow  me. 
Sergeant  Hill,  while  I  am  gone,  locate  the  trace  of  a  fire  trench 
covering  the  bridge.     Remainder  of  platoon,  fall  out. 

I  lead  Corporal  Nelson  and  his  men  to  the  bridges. 
After  an  examination,  I  order  him  as  follows : 

Place  your  cossack  post  here  (off  the  road,  near  the  south  end  of 
the  second  bridge).  Place  your  sentinel  about  here  (indicating  a 
covered  position  at  the  edge  of  the  road  near  the  bridge),  where  he 
can  see  the  roads  across  the  creek  and  at  the  same  time  be  seen  by 
the  picket  sentinel.  Send  two  men  at  once  to  cut  all  the  telephone 
and  telegraph  wires  at  those  crossroads  (502)  and  any  that  leads  to 
those  houses  (200  yards  east).  Also  bring  in  the  occupants  of  the 
houses. 

Upon  my  return  to  the  picket,  I  send  Butler  on  patrol 
with  the  following  instructions : 

Take  two  men  of  your  squad  for  a  patrol.     Go  first  to  Corporal 
Nelson's   cossack   post   at  the   second   bridge.     North   of   the   bridge 
there  are  some  woods,  probably  50   acres.     Patrol   the   woods   thor 
•mghly  and  return  here  in  one  hour.     Repeat. 

Then  I  examine  the  trace  selected  by  Sergeant  Hill 
and  having  adopted  or  modified  it,  as  the  case  may  be,  1 
put  the  men  of  the  picket  at  work  entrenching. 


DISCUSSION 

The  position  selected  for  the  picket  has  a  clear  field  of 
fire  to  the  first  bridge. 

The  reasons  for  entrenching  are  about  the  same  as 
those  given  in  the  Sixth  Problem.     In  your  case,  however. 


ANOTHER  PICKET  93 

the  support  is  in  rear  of  you  and  not  on  your  flank.  But 
the  support  probably  will  not  have  a  good  field  of  fire  in  the 
woods  on  the  hill.  Your  picket  may  be  called  upon  to  offer 
stubborn  resistance.  We  think  you  will  find  that  in  al- 
most every  case  of  a  strong  picket  on  a  main  road,  en- 
trenching is  either  necessary  or  very  desirable  for  some  rea- 
son or  other. 

There  is  no  underbrush  among  the  trees  on  our  side  of 
the  Conewago.  Whether  it  would  be  worth  while  to  clear 
out  the  brush  on  the  island  is  a  matter  that  cannot  be  de- 
cided by  reference  to  the  map. 

The  duties  of  the  sentinel  at  your  picket  are  more  im- 
portant than  in  the  usual  case.  Ordinarily,  a  picket  sen- 
tinel has  little  to  do  except  to  watch  the  immediate  vicinity 
of  the  picket  and  to  maintain  visual  communication  with 
such  parts  of  the  outpost  as  can  be  seen.  Your  sentinel, 
however,  must  also  watch  the  road  to  the  northeast  and  the 
country  to  the  east,  on  account  of  the  fact  that  the  cossack 
post  is  in  a  less  favorable  position  to  do  so.  The  cossack 
post  can  see  the  road  only  as  far  as  the  ridge  600  yards 
northeast  of  the  island.  The  picket  sentinel  can  see  the 
ridge  1,000  yards  beyond  the  island;  also,  part  of  the  road 
1,200  yards  east  of  the  island,  unless  the  trees  that  fringe 
the  Conewago  are  denser  than  is  shown  on  the  map. 

There  are  two  reasons  for  placing  a  'cossack  post  on  the 
island  at  the  south  end  of  the  second  bridge;  First,  the 
roads  along  the  east  bank  of  the  Conewago  could  not  other- 
wise be  observed.  Second,  we  must  prevent  Red  patrols 
from  destroying  the  bridges  by  explosives  or  otherwise. 
It  would  not  answer  our  purpose  to  send  a  sentinel  from 
the  picket.  The  distance  is  too  great  (see  I.  D.  R.  692) 
and  four  rifles  may  be  none  too  many  to  prevent  a  swift 
attempt  to  destroy  either  or  both  of  the  bridges. 

If  the  cossack  post  were  placed  at  the  first  bridge,  it 
could  not  see  the  roads  on  the  east  bank  of  the  Conewago, 
and  it  might  not  discover,  until  too  late:;  attempts  against 
the  second  bridge. 

You  may  prefer  to  place  a  sentry  squad,  instead  of  a 
cossack  post,  at  the  bridge;  that  would  certainly  not  be 
wrong. 


<>4  SEVENTH   PROBLEM 

After  reading  I.  D.  R.  706,  your  first  impression  might 
be  that  a  roster  should  be  prepared  at  once.  As  a  matter 
of  fact,  you  would  not  make  up  your  roster  until  the  sup- 
port commander  had  made  his  inspection.  Until  then,  you 
will  not  have  complete  information  as  to  what  the  picket 
must  do,  and  whatever  dispositions  you  have  made 
may  not,  in  every  detail,  meet  with  the  approval  of  the  cap- 
tain. When  you  finally  make  a  roster,  it  should  be  based 
as  nearly  as  practicable  on  the  duties  already  performed 
by  members  of  the  platoon. 

We  recommend  that  you  study  carefully  the  general 
instructions  given  the  platoon  (page  91).  You  will  note 
the  following : 

1.  Information  as  to  the  direction  of  the  enemy. 

2.  Information  as  to  local  geography. 

3.  Information  as  to  other  outpost  units  and  the  main 
camp. 

4.  Orders  for  the  disposition  of  strangers  met. 

5.  Orders  for' preparedness  for  action. 

Naturally,  the  first  three  subjects  (information)  will 
be  different  each  time  you  are  on  outpost.  The  last  two 
(orders)  are  practically  alike  in  every  outguard,  but  you 
should  not,  on  that  account,  Omit  them  on  the  assumption 
that  your  men  understand.  When  giving  general  instruc- 
tions, remember  the  outline :  Enemy.  Geography.  Outpost 
and  camp.     Strangers.     Preparedness. 

You  may  have  to  repeat  the  information  several  times. 
Be  sure  that  the  men  understand! 

SITUATION     IV 

The  picket  has  been  equipped  with  telephone  connec- 
tion to  the  support  and  to  the  reserve.  The  captain  ar- 
rived and  informed  you  as  follows:  Your  dispositions 
are  satisfactory.  The  outpost  has  been  reinforced  by  a  pla- 
toon of  cavalry,  which  now  forms  a  detached  post  where 
the  road  crosses  the  Conewago,  a  mile  and  a  half  below  your 
cossack  post.  The  west  edge  of  the  woods  that  Corporal 
Adams  patrolled  is  a  clearly  defined  line,  and  marks  the 
left  of  the  sector  of  our  support  (a  line  drawn  from  the 
letter  "1"  in  "Plainview"  to  the  center  of  the  orchard  east 


ANOTHER  PICKET  95 

of  Hershey  Mill  passes  along  the  edge  of  woods  referred 
to).  Support  No.  2  is  near  the  farmhouse  midway  be- 
tween 616  and  Hershey  Mill.  It  has  a  picket  on  the  road 
500  yards  south  of  Hershey  Mill.  This  picket  has  a  cos- 
sack  post  near  Hershey  Mill,  where  a  ford  and  trail  have 
been  found.  Our  support  will  send  supper  to  the  picket 
at  5-30  P.  M.,  and  breakfast  at  an  hour  to  be  announced 
later.  The  changes  for  the  night,  as  far  as  they  relate  to 
your  picket,  will  be  as  follows :  The  picket  will  move  for- 
ward to  the  first  bridge.  Both  bridges  will  be  barricaded. 
You  will  send  hourly  patrols,  on  the  half  hour,  to  the  near- 
est outguards  on  your  right  and  left.  The  opposite  side  of 
the  Conewago  also  will  be  patrolled.     Night  signal: 

Twenty-three,  forty-one. 

1.  What  are  your  plans  with  reference  to  barricad- 
ing the  bridges? 

2.  Prepare  your  roster. 

THE  FIRST  SERGEANT'S  SOLUTION 

1.  While  there  is  still  daylight,  I  shall  gather  mater- 
ial for  the  barricades  (planks,  poles,  rails,  wire,  etc.)  and 
place  part  of  the  same  in  the  woods  west  of  the  first  bridge, 
and  another  part  in  the  woods  near  the  cossack  post. 
When  the  picket  moves  to  the  bridge  at  dark,  a  barricade 
will  be  built  at  the  south  end  of  the  first  bridge  and  another 
at  the  north  end  of  the  second  bridge,  an  opening  being 
left  in  each  barricade,  only  wide  enough  to  permit  horse- 
men to  pass  through  singly.  On  each  bridge  part  of  the 
planking  will  be  removed  and  piled  near  by.  The  gap  will 
be  bridged  for  men  on  foot. 

2.  Cossack  post  (sentry  squad  at  night)  : 

Corporal  Nelson's  squad. 

Patrol  across  Conewago  (2  reliefs,  4  men  each)  : 
First  relief: 
Butler,  Peterson,  Pickett,  Carter. 

Second  relief : 

Koenig,  Quinn,  Morgan,  Walinski. 

Visiting  patrol,  south  (2  reliefs,  2  men  each)  : 
First  relief : 


SEVENTH  PROBLEM 

Towney,  Willie. 

Second  relief: 
Kelley.  Miller. 

Visiting  patrol,  west  (2  reliefs,  2  men  each)  : 
First  relief: 
\dams.  Bush. 

Second  relief : 

Bennett.  Schmidt. 

Picket  guard  (3  reliefs,  I  man  each,  and  1  in  '-ha  rye)  : 
•  lark.    Ames    (1).    Hagen    (2),   Stone    f3). 

Reserve : 
Hill.  Blown.  Pint-.  McGowan,  Schafer. 

DISCUSSION 

To  avoid  repetition,  we  have  omitted  matters  that  were 
brought  out  in  the  Sixth  Problem. 

The  barricades  will  have  no  particular  value  in  day- 
time. If  you  constructed  them  at  once,  your  working  party 
.might  be  observed  by  hostile  patrols  or  inhabitants  at  a  con- 
siderable distance,  and  you  would  thus  unnecessarily  give 
information  as  to  your  location  or  plans.  At  night  an  at- 
tack will  generally  be  a  rush  with  little  or  no  warning. 
Your  fire  will  not  be  effective  beyond  a  few  yards  on  ac- 
count of  the  inability  to  see.  Whether  a  rush  attack  is 
made  by  cavalry,  mounted,  or  by  infantry,  it  would  be  seri- 
ously checked  by  the  two  barricades  and  gaps,  and  thus 
give  you  time  to  arouse  and  form  the  picket. 

On  each  bridge  the  planking  should  be  removed  to 
form  a  ten  or  twelve-foot  gap.  Two  or  three  of  the  planks 
should  «be  placed  lengthwise  across  the  gap  and  near  the 
truss,  for  the  use  of  members  of  the  outpost.  If  Corporal 
Nelson's  squad  is  driven  back,  the  last  man  to  cross  on 
these  planks  should  kick  them  into  the  creek.  The  other 
planks  should  be  piled  near  the  south  end  of  the  gap  so 
that  the  gap  can  be  covered  quickly  if  it  becomes  neces- 
sary for  mounted  officers  or  men  to  use  the  bridge.  If 
our  enemy  knows  that  we  are  in  the  habit  of  taking  pre- 
cautions such  as  yours,  we  need  have  little  fear  of  rush 
attacks  across  bridges  at  night. 


\NOTHKR   PICKET  i»T 

The  cavalry  platoon  southeast  of  Plainview  will  prob- 
ably furnish  all  the  patrols  to  be  sent  towards,  or  beyond, 
Heidlersburg.  Whenever  possible,  a  small  cavalry  force  is 
added  to  an  outpost  for  distant  reconnaissance.  In  such 
case,  the  infantry  is  rarely  called  upon  to  patrol  very  far 
beyond  its  farthest  sentinels.  Your  periodical  patrols  a- 
cross  the  Conewago  might  be  given  a  route  as  follows: 
From  crossroads  502,  go  southeast  600  yards  to  the  bend 
in  the  road,  then  by  way  of  crossroads  502  to  the  crest  of 
the  ridge  500  yards  northeast  of  the  crossroads,  then  by 
way  of  crossroads  502  to  the  road  bend  600  yards  north  of 
the  crossroad,  then  return  to  the  picket. 

Your  visiting  patrols  will  have  shorter  routes  than 
Sergeant  Crane's  (Sixth  Problem) .  The  patrol  to  the  south 
need  go  only  far  enough  to  gain  contact  with  Outguard  No. 
1;  that  is,  to  the  cossack  post  of  Outguard  No.  1,  which 
you  will  find,  later,  on  the  banks  of  the  Conewago,  600  yards 
southeast  of  your  picket.  Your  patrol  to  the  west  need  go 
only  as  far  as  the  cossack  post  500  yards  east-southeast 
of  Hershey  Mill. 

Captain  Rowen  has  ordered  Sergeant  Crane's  visiting 
patrols  to  leave  on  the  even  hour,  and  yours  to  leave  on  the 
half  hour.  His  object  was  to  have  almost  continuous  pa- 
trolling. Perhaps  he  will  make  an  arrangement  with  the 
commanding  officer  of  Company  B,  whereby  the  patrols 
which  visit  you  from  the  picket  of  Support  No.  2  will  leave 
on  the  even  hour,  thus  dovetailing  with  your  patrol  in 
that  direction. 

In  the  second  situation,  when  you  sent  Corporal  Adams 
to  reconnoiter  the  creek  and  woods  west  of  the  bridge,  you 
naturally  selected  men  from  his  squad  to  make  the  first  pa- 
trol towards  Outguard  No.  1.  Therefore,  this  squad  is 
used  for  visiting  patrols. 

You  placed  Miller  on  post  as  picket  sentinel  when  the 
picket  arrived  in  its  position,  but  when  you  finally  make 
out  your  roster  you  will  find  it  better  to  relieve  Miller  at 
once,  so  that  when  Corporal  Clark  takes  over  the  picket 
guard,  he  will  have  under  him  men  of  his  own  squad.  Four- 
men  of  Corporal  Koenig's  squad  are  now  across  the  Cone- 
wago and  presumably  familiarizing  themselves  with  the 


98  SEVENTH  PROBLEM 

nearby  roads  and  woods.  Since  the  two  reliefs  of  this  pa- 
trol require  eight  men,  you  naturally  assigned  Corporal 
Koenig's  squad,  making  the  corporal  and  the  No.  2  man 
(Butler)  the  patrol  leaders. 

You  may  be  called  upon  for  extra  patrolling,  or  may 
need  men  for  miscellaneous  purposes.  It  is  well  therefore 
to  write  down  the  names  of  all  men  not  assigned  to  regular 
duties  in  order  that  you  may  see  at  a  glance  what  men  are 
available  without  disarranging  your  roster.  In  the  Sixth 
Problem,  there  were  no  unassigned  men.  If  Sergeant 
Crane  required  any  for  special  use,  he  would  be  obliged  to 
make  a  temporary  readjustment  of  his  roster. 

You  might  be  tempted  to  place  Sergeant  Hill  in  com- 
mand at  the  second  bridge  when  the  post  is  increased  for 
the  night  to  a  sentry  squad.  Your  decision  will  depend  very 
largely  upon  your  confidence  in  Corporal  Nelson.  The  post 
is  not  very  far  from  the  picket,  and  if  Corporal  Nelson  is  a 
reliable  man,  it  should  not  be  necessary  to  place  a  sergeant 
over  him.  If,  for  good  reasons,  you  decide  to  place  a  ser- 
geant in  command  of  an  important  sentry  squad,  and  if  you 
are,  at  the  same  time,  rather  short  of  men,  you  could  re- 
tain the  corporal  and  one  private  with  the  picket.  Ordinar- 
ily, you  will  get  better  results  if  you  arrange  your  roster 
with  a  view  to  keeping  squads  or  half  squads  together. 

SITUATION     V 

No  change. 

How  do  you  intend  to  post  Corporal  Nelson's  sentry 
squad  after  dark? 

THE  FIRST  SERGEANT'S  SOLUTION 

I  intend  that  the  squad  shall  be  concealed  on  the  second 
bridge,  behind  the  barricade  and  gap,  with  a  double  senti- 
nel in  a  suitable  position  at  the  502  crossroads. 

DISCUSSION 

The  two  men  actually  on  observation  (a  double  sen- 
tinel) should  be  concealed  at  the  502  crossroads  in  order  to 
give  suitable  warning  of  the  approach  of  any  hostile  force  on 


ANOTHER  PICKET  99 

the  converging  roads.  The  distance  from  the  bivouac  of 
the  picket  to  the  502  crossroads  is  about  200  yards.  This 
distance  is  too  great  to  permit  the  sending  of  sentinels  di- 
rectly from  the  picket.  Sentinels  should  be  conveniently 
near  their  reliefs.  This  is  only  another  way  of  saying  that 
Corporal  Nelson's  squad  should  be  conveniently  near  the 
sentinels.  A  suitable  post  for  the  sentinels  is  the  impor- 
tant thing.  In  the  present  case,  the  sentry  squad,  if  it  re- 
mains quietly  behind  the  barricade,  will  not  be  seen  or  at- 
tract attention  at  night.  In  case  of  attack,  Corporal  Nelson 
should  have  little  difficulty  in  falling  back  on  the  picket, 
without  interfering  with  the  efforts  of  the  picket  to  repel 
the  enemy. 

SITUATION     VI 

It  is  8  P.  M.  All  parts  of  the  outpost  have  taken  up 
their  night  positions. 

Stake  out  on  the  map,  with  pins,  the  following  bodies 
of  troops : 

(a)  The  brigade,  in  camp  between  561  and  D.  Wirt. 

(b)  Companies  C  and  D  of  our  battalion,  at  616. 

(c)  Company  A,  on  the  ridge  between  your  picket 
and  Plainview. 

(d)  Company  B,  on  the  road  midway  between  616 
and  Hershey  Mill. 

(e)  A  platoon  of  cavalry,  at  the  Conewago  crossing 
1^  miles  southeast  of  Plainview ;  sent  out  by  Major  Crosby 
from   (b). 

(f )  1  squad  in  observation  1  mile  east  of  616,  on  the 
bank  of  Conewago  creek,  at  the  east  end  of  the  ford;  sent 
out  by  (g). 

(g)  Second  Platoon  (Sergeant  Crane),  Company  A, 
on  the  bank  of  the  Conewago,  at  the  west  end  of  the  ford 
mentioned  in  (f)  •;  sent  out  by  (c). 

(h)  A  half  squad  in  observation  on  the  west  bank  of 
the  Conewago,  about  half  way  between  (g)  and  (j)  ;  sent 
out  by  (g). 

(i)      Corporal  Nelson's  squad,  near  502. 

(j)  Your  picket,  in  its  night  position,  south  end  of 
first  bridge. 


100  SEVENTH  PROBLEM 

(k)  A  half  squad  in  observation  on  the  south  bank 
of  the  Conewago,  500  yards  east  of  Hershev  Mill ;  sent  out 
by  (1). 

(1)  A  platoon  of  Company  B.  at  the  Hershey  Mill 
roadfork  ;  sent  out  by  (d). 

(m)  A  squad  in  observation  at  the  bridge  50  yards 
north  of  Hershey  Mill;  sent  out  by  (1). 

(n)  A  squad  in  observation  at  the  bend  in  the  road, 
500  yards  southwest  of  Hershey  Mill;  sent  out  directly 
from  (d). 

(0)  A  platoon  of  infantry,  on  the  road  somewhere  be- 
tween hill  712  and  Bridge  S.  H. ;  sent  out  by  the  brigade 
commander  and  not  under  Major  Crosby's  orders. 

Referring  to  the  various  situations  in  the  Sixth  and 
Seventh  Problems  for  further  details  if  necessary,  give 
the  correct  names  and  numbering  of  the  various  bodies  of 
troops  enumerated  above. 

THE  FIRST  SERGEANT'S  SOLUTION 

(a)  Main  body. 

(b)  Outpost  reserve. 

(c)  Support  No.  1. 

(d)  Support  No.  2. 

(e)  Detached  post. 

(f)  Sentinel  post  No.  1,  Outguard  No.  1,  Support  No. 
1   (a  sentry  squad). 

(g)  Outguard  No.  1,  Support  No.  1  (a  picket). 

(h)      Sentinel  post  No.  2,  Outguard  No.  1,  Support  No. 

1  (a  cossack  post). 

(i)  Sentinel  post,  Outguard  No.  2,  Support  No.  1 
(a  sentry  squad). 

(j)      Outguard  No.  2,  Support  No.  1  (a  picket). 

(k)      Sentinel  post  No.  1,  Outguard  No.  1,  Support  No. 

2  (a  cossack  post). 

(1)  Outguard  No.  1,  Support  No.  2  (a  picket). 

(m)  Sentinel  post  No.  2,  Outguard  No.  1,  Support  No. 
2  (a  sentry  squad). 

(n)     Outguard  No.  2,  Support  No.  2  (a  sentry  squad), 
(o)      Detached  post. 


ANOTHER  PICKET  101 

DISCUSSION 

I.  D.  R.  685,  687,  and  693  govern  the  numbering  of  the 
supports,  outguards,  and  sentinel  posts. 

(c)  and  (d)  form  the  line  of  supports,  (g),  (j). 
(1),  and  (n)  form  the  line  of  outguards,  sometimes  called 
the  line  of  observation.  The  latter  term,  however,  is  not 
strictly  correct,  since  three  of  the  outguards  have  sent  out 
squads,  or  half  squads,  to  form  the  real  observation  groups, 
(f),  (h),  (i),  (k),  and  (m)  would  be  called  outguards  if 
they  had  been  sent  out  directly  from  a  support,  but  in  the 
present  case,  they  are  merely  sentinel  posts,  and  differ  from 
the  other  kind  of  sentinel  posts  only  in  that  the  reliefs  off 
duty  are  resting  near  the  sentinel  position,  and  not  at  the 
position  of  the  outguard.  If  your  picket  had  a  double  sen- 
tinel in  the  woods  50  or  75  yards  north  of  your  bivouac, 
to  watch  an  important  trail,  that  sentinel  position  would  be 
called  Sentinel  Post  No.  2,  Outguard  No.  2,  Support  No.  1. 
The  only  difference  between  it  and  Corporal  Nelson's  post 
would  be  that  the  reliefs  for  the  former  remain  with  the 
outguard,  whereas,  on  account  of  distance,  the  reliefs  for 
Corporal  Nelson's  post  are  detached  from  the  outguard  and 
remain  near  the  sentinel  post.  Also,  in  this  case,  Corporal 
Nelson's  post  would  be  numbered  (No.  1).  If  an  outguard 
has  only  one  sentinel  post,  it  need  not  be  numbered. 

You  will  observe  that  neither  size  nor  location  will  de- 
termine the  correct  name  of  the  outpost  parts.  The  de- 
termining factor  is  the  relation  of  the  unit  to  the  line  of 
outguards  and  to  the  line  of  supports,  (n)  is  no  larger 
than  (f),  (i),  or  (m),  but  it  is  called  an  outguard,  never- 
theless, because,  in  its  allotted  front,  it  provides  the  senti- 
nels for  observation,  and  is  the  only  body  of  troops  between 
the  enemy  and  Support  No.  2.  It  is  one  of  the  units  in  the 
line  of  outguards. 

In  spite  of  many  efforts  to  simplify  the  nomenclature 
and  numbering  of  the  outpost  parts,  the  matter  still  re- 
mains complicated,  as  you  have  seen.  The  reason  for  this 
is  that  we  cannot  make  an  outpost  fit  a  diagram.  It  must 
fit  the  terrain,  and  the  conditions  with  respect  to  the  enemy 
and  our  own  troops. 

A  non-commissioned  officer  must  familiarize  himself 


SEVENTH  PROBLEM 

with  the  various  names,  and  what  they  and  the  numbering 
system  signify,  because  one  of  the  duties  of  a  non-commis- 
sioned officer  is  to  explain  to  his  outguard,  or  sentinel  post, 
or  patrol,  how  the  outpost  lies  with  respect  to  the  ground  on 
which  his  own  men  are  to  operate. 

While  your  pins  are  still  in  place  on  the  map,  and  the 
whole  situation  with  reference  to  the  main  body  and  the 
outpost  is  fresh  in  your  mind,  we  advise  you  to  note  care- 
fully the  position  of  the  detached  post  between  hill  712  and 
Bridge  S.  H.,  and  the  relation  of  that  post  to  the  rest  of  the 
brigade.     The  Eleventh  Problem  will  deal  with  that  post. 

SITUATION     VII 

The  preceding  situation  was  purposely  placed  out  of 
its  proper  sequence,  as  to.  time  of  day,  in  order  to  give  you 
a  clearer  picture  of  the  whole  outpost. 

It  is  now  3-20  P.  M.  The  first  patrols  that  you  sent 
out  have  returned,  and  your  roster  is  ready.  The  Cone- 
wago  appears  to  be  unfordable  along  your  front. 

What  orders  do  you  give  to  Towney  and  Kelley?  (See 
roster) . 

THE  FIRST  SERGEANT'S  SOLUTION 

I  give  orders  as  follows : 

You  two  men  are  leaders  of  the  visiting  patrol  to  the  south. 
Towney  and  Willis,  first  relief.  Kelley  and  Miller,  second  relief.  I 
will  show  you  the  route  (I  point  it  out  while  we  stand  at  the  south- 
east end  of  the  trench).  Tonight  our  picket  will  be  at  that  bridge. 
Your  patrol  will  leave  the  bridge,  go  south  along  the  bank  of  the 
Conewago  a  short  half  mile,  to  a  cossack  post  called  sentinel  post  No. 
2,  Outguard  No.  1,  of  our  support;  then  along  the  Conewago  until 
you  find  that  fence  (the  one  nearest  the  trench)  ;  then  along  the 
fence  about  to  this  trench;  then  along  the  road  to  the  picket.  Tow- 
ney, repeat  that. 

I  cause  each  of  the  men  to  repeat  these  instructions 
until  I  am  satisfied  that  they  understand,  then  add : 

Now,  Towney,  take  Kelley  with  you  to  the  bridge  and  go  over  the 
route. 

DISCUSSION 

We  have  already  said  that  your  visiting  patrol  needs 
to  go  only  as  far  as  the  cossack  post;  that  makes  contact 


ANOTHER  PICKET  103 

with  the  next  outguard.  It  would  not  be  wrong  to  have  the 
patrol  merely  go  back  and  forth  along  the  creek,  but  we 
prefer  the  route  given  in  the  solution  because  it  is  short, 
and  easy  to  follow,  and  covers  more  ground.  The  watch- 
ing of  the  front  along  the  Conewago  does  not  demand  ex- 
treme vigilance  on  your  part.  It  is  not  fordable  between 
the  bridge  and  the  cossack  post;  but  even  so,  a  Red  patrol, 
of  the  kind  we  shall  study  in  the  Eleventh  Problem,  may 
be  lurking  in  rear  of  our  picket. 

Even  in  deciding  a  question  apparently  so  trivial  as 
whether  the  patrol  shall  go  clockwise  or  contra-clockwise, 
there  is  frequently  a  chance  to  display  judgment.  There 
are  three  reasons  for  sending  the  patrol  clockwise ;  that  is, 
to  leave  by  the  Conewago  and  return  by  the  road.  First, 
a  patrol  returning  by  the  road  is  less  likely  to  compel  a 
challenge  from  the  picket  sentinel,  or  to  alarm  him.  Se- 
cond, the  fence  seems  to  end  in  the  woods;  it  is  easier  to 
find  the  road  from  the  fence  than  to  find  the  fence  from  the 
road.  Third,  if,  during  the  night,  a  Red  patrol  gains  the 
rear  of  our  picket  (not  as  probable  a  situation  in  the  pre- 
sent case  as  in  some  other),  its  attention  will  be  directed 
chiefly  towards  the  picket,  and,  therefore,  it  will  be  less 
watchful  towards  the  southwest  than  towards  the  north- 
east. 

SITUATION     VIII 

At  3-30  P.  M.  you  receive  from  Captain  Kowen  a  writ- 
ten message  as  follows : 

Send  patrol  at  once  to  see  if  Heidlersburg  is  occupied  by  the  ene- 
my. A  cavalry  patrol  from  the  cavalry  detached  post  is  going  out 
on  the  side  roads  east  of  Heidlersburg,  for  the  same  purpose. 

What  do  you  do? 

THE  FIRST  SERGEANT'S  SOLUTION 
I  give  the  following  orders  to  Sergeant  Hill: 

Sergeant  Hill,  take  Brown  and  McGowan  with  you  on  patrol. 
You  are  to  go  to  Heidlersburg  to  see  if  the  town  is  occupied  by  the 
enemy.  I  have  no  map  to  give  you,  but  Heidlersburg  is  on  that  main 
road,  and  a  mile  and  a  half  northeast  of  here.  Go  out  by  way  of 
our  sentinel  post  at  the  bridge.     North  of  the  sentinel  post  there  is 


KM  SEVENTH    PROBLEM 

a  large  area  of  -woods.  Go  into  those  woods,  and  then  use  the  wooded 
ravines  west  of  the  main  road,  guiding  roughly  by  the  main  road. 
You  remember  the  last  information  we  had,  was  to  the  effect  that 
the  enemy  is  four  miles  northeast  of  here,  on  the  Harrisburg  road, 
the  same  road  that  Heidlersburg  is  on.  You  know,  too,  that  while 
you  are  out  you  may  meet  up  with  Corporal  Koenig's  or  Butler's  pa- 
trol, somewhere  north  of  our  sentinel  post.  I  know  of  no  other  Blue 
patrol  or  troops  that  you  are  likely  to  meet,  but  the  cavalry  detached 
post,  southeast  of  here,  is  sending  out  a  patrol  on  the  side  roads  east 
of  Heidlersburg.  Come  back  when  you  learn  that  Heidlersburg  is 
not  occupied;  or  when  you  find  that  the  Reds,  if  there  are  any  around 
Heidlersburg,  are  halted  for  the  night,  or  are  on  the  march.  You 
have  field  glasses*  and  a  compass.  Have  you  a  note  book  and  pencil? 
A  watch?  Hen-  are  some  field  message  blanks.  Repeat  your  in- 
structions. 

When  I  am  certain  that  Sergeant  Hill  understands,  I 
tell  him  to  go  ahead,  but  T  watch  his  preparations  and  his 
departure. 


DISCUSSION 

The  conduct  of  this  patrol  is  the  subject  of  the  Ninth 
Problem. 

It  would  have  been  more  consistent,  probably,  if  Cap- 
tain Rowen  had  sent  the  patrol  directly  from  the  support. 
Patrols  of  this  character  are  usually  sent  from  the  support 
unless  the  picket  has  more  men  than  it  requires  for  senti- 
nels, sentinel  posts,  and  local  patrol  duty.  In  any  event,  it 
is  well  to  know  how  to  send  out  a  reconnoitering  patrol  of 
the  kind  ordered  by  the  captain. 

"The  commander  must  have  clearly  in  mind  the  purpose 
for  which  the  patrol  is  to  be  used  in  order  that  he  may  de- 
termine its  proper  strength,  select  its  leader,  and  give  the 
latter  proper  instructions."      (I.  D.  R.  606). 

"If  the  purpose  is  to  gain  information  only,  a  small 
patrol  is  better  than  a  large  one.  The  former  conceals 
itself  more  readily  and  moves  less  conspicuously.*** 

"If  messages  are  to  be  sent  back,  the  patrol  must  be 
strong  enough  to  furnish  the  proper  number  of  messengers 
without  reducing  the  patrol  to  less  than  two  men.  If  hos- 
tile patrols  are  likely  to  be  met  and  must  be  driven  off,  the 
patrol  must  be  strong. 

"In  friendly  territory,  a  weaker  patrol  may  be  used 


*The  remark  coneernirtK  telephone  equipment    (footnote,  page  84)    applies  equally 
:•<  the  issue  of  field  glasses   to  sergeants. 


ANOTHER   PICKET  L05 

than  would  be  used  for  the  corresponding  purpose  in  hostile 
territory."      (I.  D.  R.  607). 

If  Sergeant  Hill  finds  Heidlersburg  occupied,  but  finds 
also  that  conditions  are  such  that  he  ought  to  remain  for  a 
while  in  observation,  he  will,  very  likely,  send  back  a  mes- 
sage. It  is  not  likely  that  he  will  be  obliged  to  send  back 
two  messages.  He  can  bring  back  in  person  the  second 
important  item  of  information,  if  there  is  a  second  item, 
and  we  have  no  reason  to  suspect  that  his  patrol  will  make 
more  than  two  important  discoveries.  The  smallest  number 
of  men  that  we  would  consider  for  this  patrol  is,  therefore, 
three. 

Sergeant  Hill's  patrol  is  not  of  the  kind  that  is  justi- 
tied  in  fighting  in  order  to  get  forward;  therefore,  it  need 
not  be  made  strong  in  order  to  give  it  fighting  strength'. 
Although  we  are  in  hostile  territory,  the  ground  over  which 
the  patrol  will  probably  pass  is  quite  free  from  houses 
and  appears  to  offer  good  cover.  Hence,  there  would  ap- 
pear to  be  no  urgent  necessity  for  making  the  patrol  strong- 
er. In  spite  of  these  arguments  against  increasing  the  size 
of  the  patrol,  we  would,  on  general  principles,  make  a  little 
allowance  and  favor  a  patrol  of  four  men  if  the  roster  of 
the  platoon  had  not  used  up  so  many  men.  If  the  patrol 
had  been  sent  from  the  support,  we  should  favor  four  men ; 
three  is  the  irreducible  minimum  and  possibly  too  few. 

A  patrol  such  as  the  one  you  are  now  sending  out,  is 
the  most  important  and  the  hardest  to  lead  of  any  that  falls 
to  infantry,  except,  perhaps,  the  kind  you  will  meet  in  the 
Thirteenth  Problem.  The  necessity  for  giving  complete  in- 
structions must  be  apparent.  You  will  do  wTell,  therefore, 
to  study  carefully  I.  D.  R.  608  and  609  while  this  situa- 
tion is  fresh  in  your  mind.  Assuming  that  you  will  do  so, 
a  discussion  of  the  detailed  instructions  given  to  Sergeant 
Hill  is  unnecessary. 

SITUATION     IX 

For  the  purpose  of  the  present  situation  we  shall  as- 
sume that  you  are  Sergeant  Hill,  the  platoon  guide. 

It  is  after  midnight,  and  you  are  awake  and  on  watch  at 
the  picket.     First  Sergeant  Holmes  and  the  commander  of 


106  SEVENTH   PROBLEM 

the  picket  guard  are  asleep.  At  12-40  A.  M.  you  hear  four 
shots,  apparently  fired  by  Corporal  Nelson's  sentinel  post  at 
crossroads  502.  You  awaken  Sergeant  Holmes  and  inform 
him  of  the  occurrence.  He  listens  a  few  moments,  but  all  is 
quiet.  He  then  tells  you  to  take  Schafer  with  you  and  in- 
vestigate. Going  forward  with  Schafer,  you  find  Corporal 
Nelson  with  his  sentinels,  and  you  are  informed  as  follows : 
There  is  no  patrol  in  front  at  present.  The  sentinels  saw 
moving  figures  in  the  edge  of  the  road  75  yards  to  the  south- 
east. One  of  the  sentinels  signalled  twenty -three,  but  there 
was  no  response.  He  then  called,  "Halt  who  is  there?"  but 
still  there  was  no  response.  Each  sentinel  then  fired 
two  shots.  Then  they  heard  a  scampering,  and  the  figures 
disappeared. 

What  do  you  intend  to  do? 

SERGEANT  HILL'S  SOLUTION 

I  intend  to  take  with  me  Schafer  and  one  of  Corporal 
Nelson's  men  and  go  east  into  the  cornfield ;  then  south 
very  carefully,  just  close  enough  to  the  read  to  see  what  is 
on  it,  exercising  great  caution  when  I  pass  the  farm  build- 
ings. When  I  have  gone  south  about  400  yards,  I  intend  to 
cross  the  road  and  return  by  way  of  the  strip  of  land  be- 
tween the  road  and  the  Conewago. 

SITUATION     X 

Just  before  you  reach  the  first  house,  a  slight  noise  on 
the  road  attracts  your  attention.  Approaching  very  care- 
fully, you  discern  the  outline  of  several  cows.  On  arriving 
in  the  road  you  find  there  are  three  of  them. 

What  do  you  intend  to  do  ? 

SERGEANT  HILL'S  SOLUTION 

I  intend  to  drive  the  cows  to  the  crossroads  and  tie 
them  to  a  fence  near  the  sentinel  post,  using  wire  for  this 
purpose  if  nothing  better  can  be  found.  Then  I  intend  to 
return  to  the  picket  and  report. 


ANOTHER  PICKET  107 

DISCUSSION 

Many  things  occur  to  alarm  sentinels  on  outpost. 
Since  firearms  were  invented,  it  is  probable  that  sentinels 
on  outpost  at  night  have  fired  more  shots  at  animals  than  at 
human  beings.  Apparently,  such  occurrences  cannot  be 
avoided.  In  campaign,  soldiers  soon  learn  that  every  alarm 
at  night  does  not  signify  that  the  enemy  is  coming,  or  that 
any  particular  danger  exists.  But  no  matter  how  fre- 
quently these  minor  alarms  occur,  the  occasion  for  them 
must  be  investigated.  In  the  long  run,  you  will  become 
irritated  rather  than  alarmed  when  you  hear  shots  fired  at 
night.  If  it  seems  probable  that  the  men  of  your  particu- 
lar outpost  unit  are  responsible  for  the  alarm,  you  will  prob- 
ably say  to  yourself,  "The  chances  are  that  it  does  not 
amount  to  a  hill  of  beans,"  but  even  so  the  matter  must  be 
investigated. 

Although  Corporal  Nelson  has  a  squad  on  the  spot,  the 
picket  cannot  omit  the  investigation  on  the  supposition  that 
Corporal  Nelson  has  enough  men  to  enable  him  to  look  into 
the  matter.  As  far  as  the  picket  knows,  Corporal  Nelson 
and  his  entire  squad  may  have  been  surprised  and  captured. 
Captain  Rowen  can  quickly  determine  by  telephone  whether 
the  alarm  was  raised  at  the  picket  itself,  but  a  picket  can 
seldom  be  in  telephonic  communication  with  a  sentinel 
post,  particularly  at  night.  If  Corporal  Nelson  attempted 
to  telephone  at  night,  it  would  be  hard  for  him  to  prevent 
his  voice  from  being  heard  at  a  great  distance. 

While  you  are  patrolling  away  from  the  sentinel  post, 
it  is  better  to  be  on  the  safe  side  of  the  road.  The  safe 
side  is  the  one  which  enables  you  to  make  a  run  in  any  di- 
rection. If  you  find  the  wagon  road  clear  for  several 
hundred  yards,  there  is  relatively  little  danger  in  return- 
ing by  the  route  mentioned  in  the  solution.  You  may  then 
be  reasonably  sure  that  whatever  alarmed  the  sentinel 
post  is  no  longer  in  the  immediate  vicinity.  In  any  event, 
considering  the  time  that  has  elapsed  since  the  sentinels 
fired,  you  will  probably  find,  if  you  find  anything  at  all, 
either  stray  animals  or  a  small  Red  patrol  that  has  been 
sent  out  to  locate  and  fasten  itself  to  one  of  the  elements 
of  our  outpost. 


108  SEVENTH  PROBLEM 

If  a  part  of  the  bridge  planking  had  not  been  removed, 
you  would,  of  course,  have  driven  the  cattle  back  as  far  as 
the  support.  It  would  not  be  wise  to  arouse  a  detail  of 
men  to  re-lay  the  planking  at  this  time  of  night. 

There  are  two  good  reasons  for  taking  possession  of 
the  cattle.  First,  they  will  not  disturb  the  outpost  any 
more.  Second,  they  are  strays,  and  fresh  beef  is  good  for 
the  soldier. 

Sentinels  who  mistake  cattle  for  an  enemy,  and  open 
tire,  justly  deserve  rebuke,  even  though  we  recognize  that 
such  occurrences  must  be  expected.  The  form  of  the  re- 
buke depends  upon  what  kind  of  men  the  sentinels  are. 
Ordinarily,  it  will  suffice  to  let  the  company  know  what  has 
happened.  During  the  ensuing  day  or  two,  the  company 
will  attend  to  the  rest,  in  a  manner  that  will  not  be  wanting 
in  effectiveness. 

One  other  point  deserves  mention.  The  first  sergeant 
sent  you  to  investigate.  It  would  be  wrong  for  him  to  in- 
vestigate in  person,  even  if  he  happened  to  be  on  watch  at 
the  time.  He  commands  the  picket  and  belongs  with  it. 
Inexperienced  commanders  are  inclined  to  wander  off  on 
side  issues  and  in  consequence,  are  frequently  in  the  wrong 
place  when  a  crisis  occurs.  Side  issues  must  be  left  to  sub- 
ordinates. 


There  are  other  details  connected  with  an  outguard 
which  might  be  made  subject  of  additional  situations  in  this 
problem.  To  summarize  in  particular  some  of  the  precau- 
tions that  would  be  taken,  we  may  say  that  the  men  should 
sleep  with  their  belts  and  bayonets  on,  and  their  rifles  along- 
side. The  bivouac  should  be  close  to  the  barricade;  fairly 
comfortable  ground  for  sleeping  being  necessary.  The  men 
should  be  told  how  to  form  up  in  case  of  alarm,  and  the  for- 
mation should  be  drilled  two  or  three  times  after  dark  and 
before  the  men  are  allowed  to  go  to  sleep ;  otherwise  confu- 
sion can  hardly  be  avoided.  It  is  better  to  keep  the  bayonets 
in  the  scabbards  and  later  fix  them  to  the  rifles  as  the  men 
run  to  their  positions,  particularly  if  the  bivouac  and  the 
position  to  be  held  in  case  of  alarm  are  cramped. 


•   Eighth  Problem 

A  Cossack  Post  and  A  Sentry  Squad 


EXPLANATION 

In  previous  problems  the  nature  and  purpose  of  cossack 
posts  and  sentry  squads  have  been  made  fairly  clear.  We 
might  add  that  their  first  duty  is  to  observe  and  give  warn- 
ing. Their  secondary  duties  include  the  obligation  to  re- 
main concealed  from  view,  and  to  intercept  all  strangers  in 
the  vicinity  in  such  manner  as  to  prevent  their  escape. 

A  cossack  post  consists  of  four  men  and  posts  a  single 
sentinel.  A  sentry  squad  consists  of  seven,  eight,  or  pos- 
sibly nine  men,  and  posts  a  double  sentinel ;  that  is,  two 
men,  generally  within  whispering  distance  of  each  other.  In 
day  time  a  single  sentinel  is  frequently  sufficient.  At 
night  a  double  sentinel  is  nearly  always  necessary.  We 
have  already  explained  that  a  cossack  post  or  a  sentry  squad 
may  be  either  an  outguard,  or  simply  a  sentinel  post  of  an 
outguard.  (See  Situation  VI,  Seventh  Problem,  and  I.  D.  R. 
693).  It  may  happen  that  a  sentry  squad  will  be  assigned 
to  an  outguard  position  of  such  importance  and  difficulty 
as  to  require  the  detail  of  an  officer  to  command  it. 

SITUATION     I 

Based  on  Situation  II,  Seventh  Problem. 

You  are  Corporal  Nelson.  Read  First  Sergeant 
Holmes'  orders  to  the  entire  platoon  (page  91)  and  his 
orders  to  you  (page  92). 

What  arrangements  do  you  make  under  those  orders? 

CORPORAL  NELSON'S  SOLUTION 

I  make  sure  that  the  men  understand  the  information 
given  as  to  the  direction  of  the  enemy,  the  local  geography 
and  the  location  of  the  other  outpost  units  and  of  the  main 
camp.  I  repeat  the  orders  concerning  the  disposition  of 
strangers  and  readiness  for  action.     I  then  announce  the 

109 


110  KIGHTH   PROBLEM 

three  reliefs  of  one  man  each  and  state  that  each  sentinel 
will  be  one  hour  on  duty  and  two  hours  off.  I  then  post 
the  first  relief,  tell  him  to  observe  particularly  the  three 
roads  that  converge  at  502,  and  I  see  to  it  that  he  uses 
properly  the  covered  position  assigned  to  him.  The  other 
men  are  shown  their  position  when  not  on  post.  Then  I 
send  the  men  of  the  second  and  third  reliefs  to  cut  the  wires 
and  bring  in  the  inhabitants  of  the  two  houses,  as  ordered 
by  the  First  Sergeant. 

DISCUSSION 

It  is  impossible  to  locate  on  a  map  the  exact  position  of 
a  body  of  troops  as  small  as  a  cossack  post.  A  little  ex- 
perience will  soon  teach  you  how  much  in  the  way  of  brush, 
or  other  features,  is  required  for  suitable  cover,  and  the  pro- 
per way  to  use  the  cover  that  you  find.  One  reason  for 
remaining  as  well  concealed  as  possible  is  the  safety  of  the 
men ;  another  is  the  prevention  of  definite  information  being 
received  by  the  enemy ;  another  is  the  advantage  that  cover 
gives  you  in  handling  situations  like  the  one  that  follows. 

SITUATION     II 

The  men  sent  to  cut  wires  have  returned.  At  4-15 
P.  M.  the  sentinel  points  up  the  road  to  the  northeast  and 

says, 

Red  patrol  cominj?. 

Looking  cautiously  up  the  road,  you  -see,  400  yards 
away,  a  single  Red  cavalryman  trotting  rapidly  towards 
you.  About  100  yards  in  rear  of  him,  and  slightly  in 
rear  of  the  crest  of  the  ridge,  you  see  the  upper  part  of 
another  horse  and  rider,  halted,  the  rider  apparently  look- 
ing in  your  direction. 

What  do  you  do  during  the  next  30  seconds,  assuming 
that  at  the  end  of  that  time  the  Reds  advance  with  two  men 
riding  about  150  yards  in  rear  of  the  first  man? 

CORPORAL  NELSON'S  SOLUTION 

1  order  the  men  : 


A  COSSACK  POST  AND  A  SENTRY  SQUAD  111 

Get  ready  under  cover.  A  Red  patrol  is  coming.  When  I  com- 
mand "fire"  jump  into  the  road  and  fire.  I  will  take  the  first  man. 
The  rest  of  you  take  the  others. 

DISCUSSION 

In  order  to  decide  intelligently  the  proper  thing  to  do, 
it  is  advantageous  to  know  how  a  cavalry  patrol  generally 
operates.  To  cover  ground  rapidly,  it  is  practically  con- 
fined to  the  use  of  roads,  but  it  does  not  rush  blindly  along 
these  roads.  Let  us  try  to  figure  out  how  the  patrol  now  in 
your  front  is  working.  We  will  suppose  that  the  patrol 
consists  of  four  men.  They  know  that  we  are  on,  or  very 
near,  the  Harrisburg  road,  and  they  have  been  sent  out  to 
discover  and  report  our  progress  or  location.  One  or  two 
men  usually  lead  the  way.  Let  us  assume  that  one  man 
rides  100  or  200  yards,  or  even  more,  ahead  of  the  patrol 
leader.  This  lead-off  man  rides  rapidly  through  Heidlers- 
burg  and  reaches  the  favorable  observation  point  near  road- 
fork  545  and  halts  there.  The  patrol  leader  and  the  one 
man  who  is  riding  with  him,  advance  to  the  observation 
point,  and  the  leader,  using  his  field  glasses,  examines  care- 
fully the  country  to  his  front.  The  fourth  man  of  the 
patrol  remains  100  yards  or  more  in  rear  of  the  leader. 
The  patrol  leader  finds  no  trace  of  his  enemy  and  sees  no 
suspicious  signs.  He  then  sends  the  lead-off  man  at  a  fast 
trot  to  the  next  ridge,  a  half  mile  northeast  of  crossroads 
502,  and  follows  him  a  moment  later.  On  the  ridge  an- 
other halt  is  made,  the  country  is  again  carefully  examined, 
and  the  lead-off  man  is  again  sent  forward.  Before  coming 
to  a  final  decision  to  cross  the  Conewago  and  to  reach  the 
high  ground  where  Company  A  now  happens  to  be,  the  cav- 
alry patrol,  in  the  manner  described,  makes  one  more  halt 
on  the  ridge  450  yards  northeast  of  crossroads  502.  From 
this  ridge  the  patrol  can  see  the  road  nearly  to  Plainview. 
Apparently,  the  Reds  think  the  road  is  clear,  and  the  lead- 
off  man  is  trotting  rapidly  forward,  while  the  patrol  leader, 
who  is  no  longer  required  to  be  cautious  about  exposing 
himself,  halts  where  he  can  get  a  better  view  while  the  lead- 
off  man  is  getting  his  distance.  We  know  that  our  picket 
is  entrenching  its  position.     Apparently,  the   Red  patrol 


112  EIGHTH   PROBLEM 

cannot  see  this  on  account  of  the  trees  on  the  island  and 
along  the  west  bank  of  the  Conewago.  If  the  patrol  in- 
tends to  go  to  Plain  view,  the  lead-off  man  will  probably 
halt  a  moment  at  crossroads  502,  look  to  the  right  and  left, 
and  then  start  to  cross  the  bridge.  He  may  pass  the  cos- 
sack  post  without  seeing  it.  Meantime,  the  remainder  of 
the  patrol  will  be  coming  along  at  various  distances.  From 
head  to  rear,  the  patrol  may  be  800  yards  or  more  in 
length. 

With  this  general  idea  of  cavalry  patrolling  clearly  in 
your  mind,  you  understand  why  one  man  was  seen  halted, 
while  the  other  was  advancing.  If  the  man  who  halted  saw 
anything  suspicious,  he  would  probably  whistle  to  the  lead- 
off  man  and  call  him  back.  Until  you  see  this  done,  you 
may  be  sure  that  the  man  who  halted  was  merely  waiting 
for  the  other  to  gain  his  distance  to  the  front.  It  would  be 
premature,  therefore,  to  open  fire  at  once.  You  might  "get" 
one  man,  but  the  others  would  quickly  disappear  and,  there- 
after moving  very  cautiously,  they  might  learn  much.  On 
the  other  hand,  if  you  can  break  up  practically  the  whole 
patrol  by  "getting"  several  horses  and  men,  the  one  or  two 
survivors,  if  there  be  survivors,  will  be  obliged  to  give  up 
patrolling  and  return  with  scant  information.  A  fresh 
patrol,  sent  to  clear  up  the  situation  developed  by  the  first 
one,  might  be  stopped  elsewhere  (for  example,  near  Heid- 
lersburg)  by  one  of  our  cavalry  patrols,  or  by  Corporal 
Koenig's  or  Butler's  patrol  if  they  happen  to  be  northeast 
of  crossroads  502.  In  any  event,  whatever  information 
the  enemy  finally  receives  would  either  be  late  or  very  in- 
definite. You  should  attempt,  therefore,  to  hurt  the  Red 
patrol  enough  to  make  it  stop  patrolling. 

SITUATION     III 

The  lead-off  man  trotted  past  you  and  reached  the 
north  end  of  the  bridge  nearest  Plainview,  and  then  sud- 
denly turned  about  and  galloped  back,  meantime  signalling 
"halt."  Two  men  of  the  patrol  are  50  yards,  and  another 
man  200  yards,  northeast  of  crossroads  502.     They  halt. 

What  do  you  do? 


A    COSSACK   POST   AND   A   SENTRY  SQUAD  113 

CORPORAL   NELSON'S   SOLUTION 

1  command. 

Fire  at  will. 
I  fire  on  the  horse  of  the  lead-off  man. 

DISCUSSION 

It  is  very  evident  that  the  lead-off  man  saw  the  picket 
at  work  in  its  trench.  The  time  has  come  for  you  to  spring 
the  trap.  If  you  can  disable  the  horse  that  you  fired  at. 
there  is  little  probability  that  the  rider  can  escape.  An 
examination  of  the  rider  may  result  in  giving  us  valuable 
information.  All  parts  of  an  outpost  seek  information  of 
the  enemy.  Very  frequently  information  can  be  obtained 
by  examining  equipment  and  clothing.  For  this  purpose. 
a  dead  man  is  as  good  as  a  live  man,  but  a  live  man  may  be 
willing  to  talk.  If  there  had  been  a  fair  chance  that  the 
man  would  escape,  the  situation  would  have  been  different. 

SITUATION     I> 

You  disabled  the  horse  that  you  fired  at.  The  rider 
fell  with  the  horse,  but  immediately  arose  and  surrendered. 
Looking  in  the  other  direction,  you  see  two  horses  and  one 
man  lying  in  the  road,  motionless.  One  of  the  men  nearest 
the  crossroads  is  just  disappearing  into  the  woods  west  of 
the  road,  while  the  fourth  man  gallops  over  the  ridge  and 
disappears,  apparently  unhurt. 

What  do  you  do? 

CORPORAL   NELSON'S   SOLUTION 

1  order. 
Barry,  disarm  that  prisoner  and  bring  him  to  me. 
1  put  all  the  men  and  the  prisoner  back  in  our  former  con- 
cealment. 

DISCUSSION 

Although  it  is  likely  that  you  have  seen  only  an  inde- 


114  EIGHTH  PROBLEM 

pendent  patrol,  it  is  possible  that  these  men  constitute  the 
point  of  an  advance  guard.  We  can  never  tell  from  the 
size  of  the  first  body  of  hostile  troops'  we  meet  how  large 
the  force  behind  it  may  be.  In  the  present  case,  there  may 
be  nothing  in  rear,  or  there  may  be  a  platoon  of  cavalry,  or 
a  troop,  or  a  squadron.  In  fact,  the  four  men  may  be  (but 
probably  are  not)  the  leading  element  of  a  large  mixed 
force  of  all  arms.  If  there  is  anything  behind  the  patrol, 
other  troops  will  soon  appear  on  the  ridge ;  if  not  to  attack, 
at  least  to  investigate.  It  is  best,  therefore,  to  wait  with 
all  your  men  concealed.  If  the  enemy  appears  in  strength, 
you  will  warn  the  outpost  by  opening  fire. 

The  outguard  will  undoubtedly  send  a  patrol  to  in- 
vestigate. When  that  patrol  arrives,  we  can  consider  the 
matter  of  searching  for  the  man  who  disappeared,  and  can 
examine  the  man  lying  in  the  road.  Also,  the  patrol  can 
take  over  the  prisoner  and  carry  back  your  verbal  report, 
if  First  Sergeant  Holmes  .does  not  appear  in  person.  If. 
at  the  end  of  several  minutes,  no  enemy  appears,  the  mat- 
ters mentioned  can  be  attended  to,  including  an  examination 
of  the  ground  for  a  clue  as  to  whether  the  man  who  disap- 
peared was  wounded. 

SITUATION     V 

For  the  purpose  of  comparison,  we  shall  assume  that, 
instead  of  crossing  the  bridge,  the  lead-off  man  turned 
southeast  at  the  crossroads,  apparently  without  seeing  any 
signs  of  Blue  troops  on  the  road  towards  Plainview.  Also, 
that  there  is  little  doubt  that  the  entire  patrol  will  take  the 
same  route. 

What  would  be  your  plan? 

CORPORAL  NELSON'S  SOLUTION 

To  open  fire  when  the  whole  patrol  offered  the  best  tar- 
get. 

DISCUSSION 

This  question  is  harder  to  answer  than  the  former  one 
(Situation  IV).  If  you  are  quite  sure  that  the  hostile  pa- 
trol is  riding  away  from  the  Blue  outpost  without  having 


A  COSSACK  POST  AND  A  SENTRY  SQUAD  115 

obtained  any  information,  and  that  its  future  route,  until 
it  returns  to  its  main  body,  will  not  put  it  in  the  way  of  ob- 
taining information,  it  would  be  best  to  remain  concealed 
and  let  the  patrol  pass.  But  it  is  not  possible  that  our 
brigade  can  be  so  close  to  its  enemy,  and  in  the  enemy's 
country,  without  the  enemy  knowing  our  approximate  lo- 
cation. We  have  been  marching  today,  but  even  so,  the 
commander  of  the  Red  force  in  front  of  us  probably  would 
not  be  five  miles  off  in  his  estimate  of  our  present  location. 
It  is  almost  impossible  to  conceal  our  movements  in  the  en- 
emy's country,  when  that  country  is  so  populous  and  so  gen- 
erally equipped  with  telephones  as  the  country  around  Hun- 
terstown  and  Heidlersburg.  We  can  only  hope  to  conceal 
the  details  as  to  our  strength  and  position. 

The  Red  patrol  in  our  front  may  not  see  your  cossack 
post,  but  the  patrol  leader  may  have  decided  that  he  is  now 
getting  so  close  to  where  our  brigade  is  supposed  to  be  that 
it  is  time  for  him  to  get  off  the  main  road,  and  hereafter 
use  the  side  roads.  In  other  words,  it  is  only  a  question  of 
a  few  minutes  before  this  patrol  is  going  to  run  into  our 
outpost,  or  be  told  by  farmers  that  Blue  troops  have  ap- 
peared at  various  places  along  the  Conewago  within  the 
last  hour  or  two.  We  may  seriously  doubt  that  any  other 
part  of  the  outpost  will  have  as  good  an  opportunity  as  you 
to  break  up  this  patrol  and  make  it  stop  patrolling. 

The  killing,  wounding,  or  capturing,  of  four  men  will 
have  no  effect  whatever  upon  the  outcome  of  the  war;  the 
object  in  firing  is  primarily  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  ob- 
taining information,  and  secondarily  for  us  to  obtain  in- 
formation of  the  enemy  from  the  clothing,  or  equipment,  or 
talk  of  the  members  of  the  Red  patrol.  The  information 
we  would  thus  deny  to  the  enemy  and  obtain  for  ourselves 
may  have  some  influence  on  the  campaign. 

SITUATION     VI 

At  dark  the  remaining  four  men  of  your  squad  arrived. 
You  had  previously  been  ordered  to  construct  a  barricade 
and  post  a  sentry  squad  for  the  night,  as  mentioned  in  Situa- 
tion IV,  Seventh  Problem. 


116  EIGHTH    PROBLEM 

How  will  you  divide  up  the  squad  for  its  duties  during: 
the  night? 

CORPORAL  NELSON'S  SOLUTION 

For  double  sentinel:  six  men  (three  reliefs  of  two  men 
each,  one  hour  on  and  two  hours  off).  One  man  (Hum- 
phrey), second  in  command.  I  will  remain  awake  until 
one  o'clock,  and  Humphrey  will  remain  awake  from  that 
time  until  a  half  hour  before  daylight,  when  everybody  will 
be  awakened. 

DISCUSSION 

A  sentry  squad  has  several  advantages  over  a  cossack 
post.  Of  course,  it  has  twice  as  much  fighting  strength, 
but  aside  from  this  it  has  a  distinct  advantage  in  having 
men  to  perform  sentinel  duty  in  pairs.  Two  men  hear  more 
and  see  more,  and,  on  account  of  increased  confidence,  are 
less  likely  to  alarm  the  troops  on  slight  provocation.  Fur- 
thermore, the  squad  leader  and  the  second  in  command  can 
divide  the  night,  and  thus  there  will  be  always  one  man 
awake  at  the  bivouac  of  the  squad.  It  is  very  difficult  for 
one  man  to  remain  awake  the  entire  night.  In  a  cossack 
post,  the  commander  generally  goes  to  sleep  some  time  dur- 
ing the  night  and  the  sentinel  calls  him  when  it  is  time  for 
the  next  relief  to  be  posted.  This  is  not  a  satisfactory 
arrangement. 

In  garrison  or  camp  guard  it  is  customary  for  a  man 
to  walk  his  post  two  hours,  and  then  have  four  hours  off. 
The  men  of  a  cossack  post  or  sentry  squad  get  very  little 
continuous  sleep  in  any  event,  and  it  is  no  particular  hard- 
ship to  limit  each  period  of  rest  to  two  hours.  It  is  a  hard- 
ship, however,  to  require  a  man  to  stand  two  hours  as  a 
sentinel.  The  strain  on  eyes,  ears,  and  nerves,  and  the  dis- 
comfort of  the  concealed  position,  are  far  greater  than  in 
the  case  of  a  sentinel  in  a  garrison  or  camp  guard.  All 
things  considered,  therefore,  the  most  satisfactory  arrange- 
ment is  "one  hour  on,  two  hours  off." 


Ninth    Problem 

A  Reeomioiteriiig  Patrol 


EXPLANATION 

"Reconnaissance  is  the  military  term  used  to  desig- 
nate the  work  of  troops  or  individuals  when  gathering  in- 
formation in  the  field  *  *  *  ".  (F.  S.  R.  11.) 

"The  chief  duty  of  reconnoitering  patrols  is  to  gather 
information.  They  habitually  seek  safety  in  concealment 
or  flight,  fighting  only  when  their  mission  demands  it.  The 
most  skillful  patrolling  is  where  patrols  accomplish  their 
mission  and  return  without  being  discovered  by  the  enemy/' 
(F.  S.  R.  23.) 

The  periodical  patrols  that  have  been  mentioned  in  the 
Sixth  and  Seventh  Problems  are  strictly  local,  and  are  in- 
tended to  make  the  outpost  line  effective.  These  patrols 
are  covering  detachments  in  the  sense  that  they  assist  in 
preventing  an  attack  without  due  warning,  and  in  prevent- 
ing the  enemy  from  obtaining  information.  A  reconnoiter- 
ing patrol,  on  the  other  hand,  is  in  no  sense  a  covering  de- 
tachment. When  sent  from  an  outpost,  it  generally  goes 
a  considerable  distance  beyond  the  outpost  line,  and  for  the 
purpose  of  obtaining  some  desired  information.  If  cavalry 
is  available,  an  infantry  reconnoitering  patrol  will  rarely 
have  occasion  to  go  more  than  two  miles  beyond  the  outpost 
line. 

The  following  paragraphs  should  be  studied  in  con- 
nection with  patrols  sent  on  reconnaissance:  F.  S.  R.  23 
to  29  inclusive.     I.  D.  R.  604  to  622  inclusive. 

SITUATION     I 

1  Based  on  Situation  VIII,  Seventh  Problem.  You  will 
remember  that  the  Conewago  is  not  fordable  along  the 
front  of  our  outguard. 

You  are  Sergeant  Hill,  and  have  received  instructions 

117 


lis  NINTH   PROBLEM 

as  given  in  the  First  Sergeant's  solution  (page  103).  It  is 
assumed  that  you  have,  or  have  received,  the  special  arti- 
cles of  equipment  mentioned  by  him. 

What  do  you  do.  up  to  the  time  you  reach  the  bridge 
nearest  Plainview? 

SERGEANT  HILL'S  SOLUTION 

1  order: 

Brown,  McGowan,  unhook  your  bayonets  and  hook  on  your  can- 
teens. Lay  aside  all  but  40  rounds  of  ammunition  and  get  ready  for 
patrolling;  then  fall  in  here  for  inspection. 

While  they  make  these  preparations,  I  do  likewise  and 
inspect  my  rifle.  When  they  fall  in,  I  inspect  them  and 
their  rifles  and  equipment,  and  order: 

Empty  your  pockets. 

I  take  from  them  whatever  letters  or  other  articles 
they  may  have  of  a  nature  that  would  give  information  to 
the  enemy  and,  with  like  articles  of  my  own,  turn  them 
over  to  First  Sergeant  Holmes.  I  then  give  the  following 
instructions : 

We  are  going  to  Heidlersburg  to  see  if  the  town  is  occupied  by 
the  enemy.  Heidlersburg  is  on  this  main  road,  and  a  mile  and  a 
half  northeast  of  here.  The  last  information  we  had  was  to  the  effect 
that  the  enemy  is  four  miles  northeast  of  here,  on  the  Harrisburg 
road,  the  same  road  that  Heidlersburg  is  on.  I  will  tell  you  more 
about  our  route  when  we  reach  the  sentinel  post.  We  come  back- 
as  soon  as  we  learn  whether  Heidlersburg  is  occupied,  or,  if  we  find 
Reds,  we  come  back  when  we  learn  whether  they  are  halted  for  the 
night  or  are  still  on  the  march.  Brown  is  second  in  command.  Do 
both  of  you  understand?     With  ball  cartridges,  load.     Follow  me. 

DISCUSSION 

The  preliminary  measures  taken  by  you  are  quite  dif- 
ferent from  those  of  the  flank  patrol  in  Situation  I,  Third 
Problem.  The  reason  for  this  difference  must  be  apparent. 
No  one's  progress  is  dependent  upon  the  time  you  take  for 
your  preparations,  and  it  is  most  important  that  the  patrol 
should  start  in  good  physical  condition  and  properly  equip- 
ped. 

The  mission  of  a  patrol  will  determine  its  equipment. 
You  will  return  before  dark.     You  will  not  fight  except  in 


A  RECONNOITERING  PATROL  11V» 

self-defense.  Therefore,  any  articles  of  equipment  except 
the  rifle,  canteen  of  water,  and  a  few  rounds  of  ammunition 
would  be  superfluous  and  an  unnecessary  burden.  You 
would  be  given  a  map  if  one  were  available.  Apparently, 
the  First  Sergeant  had  none  even  for  himself,  else  he  would 
have  given  it  to  you  for  a  few  minutes,  to  enable  you  to 
make  a  sketch  copy  of  so  much  of  the  country  as  related 
to  your  patrol. 

A  reconnoitering  patrol  should  leave  the  outpost  line 
without  being  seen  if  possible.  But  the  Conewago  is  un- 
fordable,  and  you  are  obliged  to  cross  at  the  bridges.  This 
will  enable  you  to  ask  the  cossack  post  for  late  information, 
and  from  the  vicinity  of  the  cossack  post  you  can  describe 
better  your  proposed  route ;  but  from  that  point  the  patrol 
must  lose  itself  as  quickly  as  possible,  and  thereafter  avoid 
exposure.  If  the  Conewago  were  fordable,  you  would  go 
immediately  into  the  woods  west  of  the  picket,  cross  the 
island  at  some  point  west  of  the  bridges,  slip  cautiously 
across  the  road  west  of  crossroads  502,  and  then  go  into 
the  big  woods. 

SITUATION     II 

At  the  cossack  post  you  learn  nothing  new.  You  tell 
Corporal  Nelson  the  direction  and  purpose  of  your  patrol. 
You  explain  to  Brown  and  McGowan  that,  after  passing 
through  the  big  woods  to  the  north,  you  expect  to  find 
wooded  ravines  leading  towards  Heidlersburg  and  parallel- 
ing the  main  road.  Also,  that  you  know  of  no  Blue  troops 
or  patrols  in  your  front  except  a  cavalry  patrol  on  the  side 
roads  east  of  Heidlersburg.  Also,  that  Corporal  Koenig's 
or  Butler's  patrol  may  be  encountered  within  a  few  hundred 
yards  of  the  cossack  post.     It  is  now  3-55  P.  M. 

What  do  you  do  up  to  the  time  the  patrol  has  advanced 
another  half  mile  ? 

SERGEANT  HILL'S  SOLUTION 

I  order : 

Brown,  march  out  the  left  hand  road,  along  the  right  hand  side 
of  the  road.  I  will  follow  at  25  yards.  McGowan.  follow  me  at 
"25  yards. 


120  NINTH    PROBLEM 

When  we  have  advanced  about  400  yards,  I  order : 
By   the   right  flank,   march.     McGowan,  follow   me   at  25   yards. 

I  try  to  march  parallel  to  the  Heidlersburg  road,  the 
interval  between  myself  and  the  other  men  depending  upon 
the  density  of  the  brush. 


DISCUSSION 

Even  while  going  from  the  picket  to  the  cossack  post, 
you  would  not  expose  your  patrol  any  more  than  necessary, 
and,  while  talking  with  Corporal  Nelson,  you  would  avoid 
revealing  his  position  to  a  possible  Red  observer,  military 
or  civilian.  This  you  could  do  best,  probably,  by  remain- 
ing in  the  road,  and  apparently  talking  to  your  own  men 
while  actually  talking  to  the  corporal. 

As  we  have  stated,  the  patrol  was  compelled  to  expose 
itself  while  crossing  the  bridge.  You  would  not  have 
gained  anything  if  you  had  made  a  detour  and  had  crossed 
the  Conewago  by  the  ford  800  yards  south  of  crossroads 
502,  or  the  ford  1000  yards  west  of  crossroads  502.  The 
woods  north  of  crossroads  502  give  you  an  opportunity  to 
conceal  yourself,  and  to  deceive  any  Reds  or  inhabitants 
who  may  have  seen  you  cross  the  bridges.  If  you  had  en- 
tered the  woods  at  the  crossroads,  any  one  who  had  observed 
you  from  the  high  ground  to  the  northeast  or  east  would 
be  on  the  alert  for  your  reappearance  somewhere  along 
the  Heidlersburg  road.  By  marching  rather  openly  to  the 
west,  you  may  escape  further  curiosity  on  the  part  of  such 
observers.  If  you  are  observed  from  the  high  ground  to 
the  west,  your  disappearance  into  the  woods  might  lead 
an  observer  to  look  for  your  re-appearance  somewhere 
along  the  road  towards  crossroads  609.  At  any  rate, 
whether  your  ruse  is  successful  or  not,  you  have  lost  very 
little  time,  and  you  have  observed  the  principle  that,  if  the 
patrol  must  expose  itself,  it  should  throw  possible  observers 
off  the  trail  as  soon  thereafter  as  practicable. 

The  formation  used  while  marching  on  the  road  has 
been  discussed  in  previous  problems.  The  formation  used 
while  passing  through  woods  is  quite  similar  to  one  which 
will  be  discussed  in  Situation  IV  of  the  present  problem. 


A    RECONNOITERING  PATROL  121 

SITUATION     III 

At  4-12  P.  M.  you  reach  the  east  edge  of  the  woods 
near  the  west  end  of  the  wire  fence  600  yards  north  of 
crossroads  502.  You  see  two  Red  cavalrymen  and  an  extra 
horse  on  the  north  slope  of  the  ridge  500  yards  northeast 
of  crossroads  502,  apparently  far  enough  down  the  slope  to 
be  concealed  from  Corporal  Nelson's  cossack  post.  A  third 
man  is  walking  from  the  crest  of  the  ridge  towards  the 
horses.  The  corn  is  cut  and  in  shock,  but  the  Reds  do  not 
appear  to  be  looking  in  your  direction. 

What  do  you  decide  to  do? 

SERGEANT  HILL'S  SOLUTION 

I  decide  to  remain  concealed  and  in  observation  long 
enough  to  determine  whether  the  Reds  seem  to  be  a  patrol, 
a  point,  or  a  march  outpost. 

DISCUSSION 

Naturally,  you  would  not  open  fire.  You  were  sent 
out  to  get  information,  and  must  under  no  circumstances 
reveal  your  location,  or  even  your  existence.  You  remain 
in  observation,  not  necessarily  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining 
information  to  be  sent  back  at  once  to  the  picket,  but  for  in- 
formation that  will  guide  your  own  further  movements. 
If  the  Reds  remain  halted,  they  may  be  a  march  outpost. 
or  even  a  standing  patrol  well  in  advance  of  an  outpost. 
Their  arrangements  will  probably  indicate  their  character. 
If  they  show  little  curiosity  as  to  the  woods  that  you  are 
in,  you  may  be  quite  sure  that  they  have  not  been  in  their 
present  position  very  long,  else  they  would  have  seen  you 
cross  the  bridge.  If  the  Reds  move  and  nothing  else  is 
in  rear  of  them,  you  may  take  it  for  granted  that  they  are 
on  patrol.  It  is  possible,  of  course,  that  they  will  prove 
to  be  the  point  of  a  marching  column.  Even  so,  you  would 
not  make  the  discovery  much  earlier  than  the  outpost  it- 
self. No  matter,  therefore,  what  developes  within  the  next 
few  minutes,  you  have  as  yet  seen  nothing  to  warrant  the 
sending  of  a  report  by  messenger. 


L22  N'lXTH   PROKLKM 

SITUATION     IV 

The  dismounted  Red  soldier  mounted  the  extra  horse 
and,  about  a  minute  later,  one  Red  trotted  towards  cross- 
roads 502,  followed  at  about  200  yards  by  the  other  two. 
About  the  same  distance  in  rear,  a  fourth  man  appeared. 
You  decided  to  await  the  impending  clash  with  Corporal 
Nelson's  cossack  post.  A  few  moments  later,  brisk  firing 
began,  and  presently  you  saw  one  Red  cavalryman  gallop- 
ing towards  Heidlersburg.  Firing  ceased  and,  after  a 
pause,  you  were  convinced  that  the  other  Reds  had  either 
been  killed  or  captured,  or  had  escaped  by  some  other  route. 
You  proceeded  north  under  cover  of  the  woods,  and  present- 
ly saw  two  wooded  ravines  leading  northeast  towards  Heid- 
lersburg. You  chose  the  one  farthest  from  crossroads  502, 
and  finally  arrived  400  yards  west  of  roadfork  545,  at  the 
point  where  the  east  edge  of  the  rectangular  patch  of  woods 
meets  the  ravine.  About  a  half  mile  to  the  northeast  you 
see  several  house  tops.  The  houses  in  the  west  end  of  Heid- 
lersburg are  seen  quite  clearly.  300  yards  north  of  your 
present  position  there  appears  to  be  the  crest  of  a  ridge 
which  extends  towards  Heidlersburg.  You  see  no  signs  of 
Red  soldiers  or  civilians. 

What  do  you  do? 

SKKGEANT  HIIJAS  SOLUTION 

I  order : 

Brown.    If)    yards   on    my    left.      McGowan,    25    yards    in    rear   of 
Brown. 

With  the  patrol  in  this  formation  and  guiding  on  me. 
I  advance  north,  as  deep  in  the  woods  as  possible,  while 
still  close  enough  to  the  edge  to  observe  the  open  country 
to  the  east. 

DISCUSSION 

Sergeant  Hill  told  you  to  go  to  Heidlersburg.  This 
must  not  be  taken  too  literally.  It  means  simply  that  you 
should  go  close  enough  to  the  village  to  determine  with  cer- 
tainty whether  there  are  any  Reds  in  Heidlersburg.     The 


A    RECONNOITERING   PATROL  123 

village  is  very  small  and  it  is  not  at  all  improbable  that 
you  will  be  able  to  find  a  point  from  which  you  can  ex- 
amine every  street  and  the  fields  immediately  about  the 
village. 

The  ravine  to  the  northeast  will  lead  you  to  low  ground 
close  to  Heidlersburg.  The  narrow  strip  of  cover  in  the 
ravine  may  be  insufficient  cover  for  the  patrol.  The  woods 
to  the  north,  on  the  other  hand,  give  you  excellent  cover  to 
the  ridge  that  extends  southwest  from  roadfork  578.  From 
the  edge  of  the  woods  on  this  ridge,  you  may  be  able  to  see 
the  village  streets  very  clearly.  Failing  in  this,  you  would 
have  to  decide  where  to  go  next. 

You  probably  remember  that  in  a  previous  problem 
we  recommended  a  skirmish  line  with  wide  intervals  as  a 
suitable  formation  for  an  advance  guard  flank  patrol  pas- 
sing through  woods.  There  is  a  good  reason  for  a  differ- 
ent formation  in  the  present  case.  An  advance  guard 
flank  patrol  seeks  to  cover  as  much  of  the  woods  as  pos- 
sible, in  order  to  determine  whether  the  woods  are  occupied 
by  a  hostile  force  strong  enough  to  be  dangerous  to  the  main 
column.  While  the  escape  of  one  or  more  men  of  such  a 
patrol  is  desirable,  it  is  relatively  less  important.  But  a 
reconnoitering  patrol  uses  woods  merely  as  a  covered  way 
for  getting  forward.  It  seeks  to  avoid  the  enemy.  In  your 
present  formation,  you  personally  march  so  as  to  observe 
towards  Heidlersburg.  Brown  marches  on  your  left  so 
as  to  prevent  the  patrol  from  being  surprised  from  the  north 
or  west.  Finally,  McGowan  is  as  far  in  rear  as  easy  com- 
munication and  the  density  of  the  brush  permit,  and  he  is 
in  the  position  to  escape.  If  the  patrol  is  surprised  and 
you  and  Brown  are  unable  to  get  back  to  the  outpost,  the 
advantage  of  McGowan's  escape  lies  in  the  fact  that  the 
fate  of  the  patrol  will  become  known  and  whatever  infor- 
mation you  have  already  gained  will  be  reported.  There 
is  also  a  reason  wrhy  McGowan  should  follow  Brown  instead 
of  you.  You  are  obliged  to  exercise  skill  and  judgment  in 
estimating  how  deep  into  the  woods  you  must  go  to  escape 
observation,  and,  at  the  same  time,  to  be  close  enough  to 
the  edge  to  observe  the  open  country.     If  McGowan  fol- 


124  NINTH   PROBLEM 

lowed  you.  he  might  be  less  skillful  or  more  careless,  and 
thus  expose  the  patrol. 

SITUATION     V 

When  you  arrive  on  top  of  the  ridge,  you  see  a  farmer 
ploughing  in  the  field,  east  of  the  woods.  He  is  moving 
from  north  to  south,  close  to  the  edge  of  the  woods. 

What  do  you  intend  to  do? 

SERGEANT  HILL'S  SOLUTION 

I  intend  to  signal  the  patrol  to  march  by  the  left  flank 
and  move  west.  While  giving  the  farmer  a  chance  to  reach 
the  south  end  of  the  field,  the  patrol  will  go  to  the  west 
edge  of  the  woods  and  take  a  look  in  that  direction. 

DISCUSSION 

In  warfare  in  civilized  countries,  the  local  inhabitants 
generally  seem  unwilling  to  suspend  any  of  their  work,  even 
though  armies  are  close  by.  As  a  matter  of  policy  they  are 
disturbed  as  little  as  possible,  but  naturally  we  must  give 
them  no  opportunity  to  injure  us  by  conveying  information 
to  troops  of  their  own  army. 

Even  if  you  managed  to  capture  the  farmer  without 
attracting  the  attention  of  some  one  that  you  have  not  yet 
seen,  you  would  merely  have  a  white  elephant  on  your  hands. 
The  farmer  would  be  unwilling  to  give  you  any  information, 
and  probably  knows  very  little  in  any  event.  You  could 
not  release  him  after  questioning  him.  You  can  not  spare 
a  man  to  guard  him,  or  to  take  him  to  the  picket  while  the 
rest  of  the  patrol  continues,  and  you  cannot  tie  him  up  or 
kill  him.  He  will  soon  be  out  of  your  way  if  you  let  him 
alone,  but  give  him  a  chance  to  be  far  away. 

SITUATION     VI 

When  you  reach  the  west  edge  of  the  woods  you  see,  in 
the  ravine  200  yards  south  of  the  southwest  corner  of  the 
orchard,  a  Red  soldier  walking  rapidly  northeast  towards 
the  house  on  the  road.     After  watching  him  a  moment. 


A  RECONNOITERING  PATROL  125 

you  notice  that  he  has  spurs,  but  no  hat  or  rifle. 
What  do  you  intend  to  do? 

SERGEANT  HILL'S  SOLUTION 

I  intend  to  avoid  being  seen,  and  to  return  at  once  to 
the  east  edge  of  the  woods. 

DISCUSSION 

Having  read  the  preceding  problem,  you  probably  sus- 
pect that  the  Red  soldier  belongs  to  the  patrol  that  clashed 
with  Corporal  Nelson's  cossack  post,  and  that  he  escaped. 
He  is  more  dangerous  than  the  farmer,  inasmuch  as  he  will 
be  the  bearer  of  information  to  the  Red  commander  if  he 
succeeds  in  returning.  But  it  is  not  likely  that  his  infor- 
mation will  add  materially  to  what  is  already  known  of  our 
brigade.  He  is  apparently  unarmed,  and  it  would  probably 
be  very  easy  to  capture  him,  and  to  prevent  him  from  re- 
porting what  little  he  knows,  but  he  would  be  as  much  of 
a  white  elephant  as  the  farmer.  Furthermore,  you  are  not 
going  to  settle  the  war  by  picking  up  single  men  here  and 
there.  When  you  are  given  a  distinct  and  important  task, 
you  should  not  permit  any  trivial  thing  to  lead  you  from 
the  direct  prosecution  of  that  task.  At  the  present  moment 
you  are  an  important  part  of  the  brigade  commander's 
team,  and  he  wants  teamwork.  He  wants  you  to  obtain 
for  him  a  certain  thing;  information  as  to  what,  if  any- 
thing, is  in  Heidlersburg.  Do  not  start  your  own  little  war 
or  campaign,  but  do  all  in  your  power  to  get  the  desired 
information. 

SITUATION     VII 

When  you  were  about  half  way  through  the  woods, 
you  heard  hoof-beats  on  the  road  to  the  north,  apparently 
three  or  four  horses.  You  now  arrive  in  the  edge  of  the 
woods,  on  the  top  of  the  ridge,  about  300  yards  southwest 
of  roadfork  578.  There  appear  to  be  several  Red  cavalry- 
men halted  near  roadfork  545,  but  the  trees  in  the  ravine 
make  it  difficult  to  distinguish  them.     The  road  that  runs 


L26  NINTH    PROBLEM 

west  from  Heidlersburg  is  clear  of  the  enemy,  but  near 
the  main  crossroad  of  the  village  you  see  a  hundred  or  more 
dismounted  cavalrymen  holding  their  horses.  After  watch- 
ing them  for  a  few  moments,  you  realize  that  the  horses  are 
being  watered. 

It  is  now  4-55  P.  M. 

What  do  you  do? 

SERGEANT  HILL'S  SOLUTION 

I  write  the  following  message : 

No.  1  Sgt.  Hill's  Patrol 

'■  mile  W.  of  heidleksbi jrg 
4-55  P.  M. 
Two  or  more  troops  cavalry  in  heidlersburg.     Now  halted  and 
watering:  horses.     Red  patrols  on  roads  to  west  and  southwest  of  heii>- 

LERSBURG. 

Hill, 
Sgt. 
I  call  Brown  and  say : 

Read  this  message.     Now  tell  me  what  the  contents  arc,  without 
looking  at  it. 

When  he  has  done  so,  I  add : 

i 

<m>  hack  by  the  route  we  came  and  give  the  message  to  Sergeant 
Holmes.     Tell  him  I  remain  here. 

DISCUSSION 

«  In  written  messages  or  orders,  geographical  names  are 
always  written  in  capital  letters,  as  a  precaution  against 
error. 

There  are  two  things  frequently  found  in  messages,  but 
omitted  in  the  one  you  sent  back.  First,  the  message  itself 
does  not  indicate  the  person  for  whom  it  is  intended.  But 
Brown  knows,  and  if  it  falls  into  the  hands  of  a  stranger 
it  is  better  that  the  stranger  should  not  know.  It  would 
be  absurd,  for  example,  to  address  the  message :  "Ser- 
geant Holmes,  Outguard  No.  2,  Support  No.  1,  Plainview 
Bridge."  In  this  form  the  message  would  contain  infor- 
mation of  no  possible  value  to  Sergeant  Holmes,  but  of 
considerable  value  to  the  enemy,  if  Brown  should  be  inter- 
cepted. Second,  the  message  does  not  state  what  your 
further  movements  will  be.     This  information  can  also  be 


A   RECONNOITERING  PATROL  127 

given  verbally  to  Sergeant  Holmes.  If  it  is  included  in  the 
message  and  the  message  falls  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy, 
you  may  be  hunted  out  of  your  position.  It  is  even  doubt- 
ful whether  you  should  write  on  the  message  "h  mile  west  of 
Heidlersburg."  It  would  serve  your  purpose  just  as  well, 
and  possibly  better,  if  Brown  were  ordered  to  tell  First 
Sergeant  Holmes,  "I  am  a  half  mile  west  of  Heidlersburg 
and  shall  remain  here."  At  all  events,  you  should  remem- 
ber that  a  message  should  not  contain  anything  that  is  of 
value  to  the  enemy  and  of  no  value  to  your  own  commander, 
or  that  may  be  given  orally  just  as  well.  Also,  the  mes- 
senger should  know  the  contents  of  the  message,  unless 
there  are  good  reasons  to  the  contrary,  in  order  that  he  may 
convey  the  information  in  case  he  should  lose  the  message 
or  be  obliged  to  destroy  it.  We  would  not  advise  you  to 
trust  the  messenger's  memory  with  a  verbal  message  in 
the  present  case.  The  message  is  too  long  to  be  delivered 
accurately. 

The  regulations  say  that  in  the  enemy's  country  im- 
portant messages  should  be  sent  by  two  messengers,  or  in 
duplicate  by  two  single  messengers  returning  by  different 
routes.  But  your  patrol  was  made  small  because  it  was 
foreseen  that  this  principle  does  not  apply  in  your  case. 
Yours  is  not  a  distant  patrol.  Your  route  affords  excel- 
lent cover,  and  your  messenger  is  not  obliged  to  pass  farm 
houses,  settlements,  trails,  or  roads. 

You  probably  have  no  doubt  as  to  the  propriety  of 
sending  back  the  information  you  have  obtained  so  far, 
nor  as  to  the  necessity  for  continuing  your  observation. 
It  would  be  unnecessary  to  attempt  to  cross  the  road  to  the 
north  in  search  of  a  more  advantageous  observation  point. 
You  have  a  good  station  and,  under  the  circumstances,  you 
might  defeat  the  object  of  your  further  reconnaissance  by 
attempting  to  cross  the  road  in  search  of  a  better  observa- 
tion point. 

SITUATION     VIII 

At  5-10  P.  M.,  the  Red  cavalry  mounted  and  rode  west 
through  roadfork  578  with  an  advance  guard  of  about  a 


NINTH  PROBLEM 

troop.  Your  patrol  was  well  concealed  and  you  were  able 
to  time  the  main  body  as  it  trotted  past  roadfork  578  in 
column  of  twos.  It  required  the  main  body  two  minutes 
and  twenty  seconds  to  pass  the  roadfork.  The  group  that 
appeared  to  be  a  patrol  near  roadfork  545  has  disappeared, 
but  you  were  unable  to  see  where  it  went.  The  enemy  did 
not  send  a  patrol  along  the  ridge  on  which  you  are  stationed. 
While  the  main  body  of  the  Red  cavalry  was  passing  road- 
fork 578,  you  heard  firing  about  a  mile  to  the  south,  by  less 
than  a  dozen  rifles,  and  for  less  than  a  minute.  The  tail 
of  the  cavalry  main  body  has  now  disappeared  and  is  about 
north  of  you.  The  sound  indicates  that  the  cavalry  is  still 
trotting. 

What  do  you  intend  to  do? 

SERGEANT  HILIAS  SOLUTION 

1  intend  to  observe  Heidlersburg  at  least  five  minutes 
longer. 

DISCUSSION 

An  infantry  column  would  probably  patrol  the  woods 
in  which  you  are  located.  Cavalry  generally  patrols  far- 
ther to  the  flanks  and  pays  less  attention  to  minor  places 
of  concealment  along  the  route  of  march.  It  would  be  out 
of  place  to  discuss  the  reason  for  this,  but  the  fact  explains 
why  you  were  not  molested. 

We  can  imagine  circumstances  under  which  you  would 
return  at  once  with  the  information  you  have  received.  For 
example,  if  this  were  a  column  of  infantry  and  artillery 
you  could  arrive  at  the  outpost  with  your  information  in 
time  to  make  the  information  of  real  importance.  In  the 
present  case,  there  are  two  reasons  why  you  should  re- 
main in  observation.  First,  if  the  hostile  party  intends 
to  attack  any  part  of  the  outpost  for  the  purpose  of  deter- 
mining its  location  or  strength,  it  will  strike  our  outguards 
before  you  can  return  with  your  information.  Second,  the 
cavalry  may  be  in  advance  of  an  infantry  column.  If  you 
remain  in  your  present  position  a  short  time,  you  may  be 
able  to  discover  -igns  that  will  settle  this  question.     Even 


A  RECONNOITERING  PATROL  129 

if  the  leading  infantry  element  of  such  a  column  were  now 
as  much  as  two  or  three  miles  northeast  of  Heidlersburg. 
there  would  be  more  or  less  activity  between  the  infantry 
column  and  its  independent  or  advance  guard  cavalry  (as 
the  cavalry  would  then  be  called)  which  has  just  passed 
you.  Of  course,  a  cavalry  column  operating  alone  may  be 
followed  by  patrols  which,  on  account  of  having  been  sent 
to  the  flanks,  have  lost  distance;  but  many  of  these  will 
have  re-joined  during  the  long  halt  in  Heidlersburg.  Fur- 
thermore, a  cavalry  main  body  does  not  travel  as  rapidly 
as  its  flank  patrols,  and  these  local  patrols  usually  rejoin 
quickly. 

You  might  very  properly  have  sent  Brown  to  the  west 
edge  of  the  woods  to  observe  the  enemy's  direction  of  march. 
The  advisability  of  doing  so  depends  upon  the  exact  charac- 
ter of  the  woods  and  underbrush,  and  in  reality  the  ques- 
tion could  be  decided  correctly  only  on  the  ground. 

SITUATION     IX 

Although  you  remain  in  observation  ten  minutes  longer, 
you  observe  no  further  signs  of  Red  troops  in  or  around 
Heidlersburg,  except  about  twenty  troopers  who  followed 
the  main  body  by  about  a  half  mile,  apparently  a  small 
rear  guard.  You  have  seen  a  few  civilians  in  the  village. 
The  sun  set  a  half  hour  ago  and  it  will  be  dark  in  another 
half  hour.     Naturally,  you  decide  to  return. 

1.  What  route  do  you  select? 

2.  What  report  do  you  make? 

SERGEANT  HILL'S  SOLUTION 

1.  To  the  wyest  edge  of  the  woods,  then  south  to  the 
first  stream,  then  along  this  stream  to  crossroads  502,  then 
to  the  picket. 

2.  I  report  to  Sergeant  Holmes : 

A  Red  squadron  halted  in  Heidlersburg  for  about  twenty  min- 
utes and  left  there  at  5-10  P.  M.,  marching  west  at  a  trot,  with  an 
advance  guard  of  one  troop.  It  took  the  main  body  two  minutes  and 
twenty  seconds  to  pass  a  given  point  in  column  of  twos  at  a  trot. 
No  other  troops  were  in  Heidlersburg  when  I  left  there  at  5-25  P.  M. 


130  NINTH  PROBLEM 

DISCUSSION 

You  went  first  to  the  west  edge  of  the  woods,  not  only 
to  get  a  final  glimpse  of  the  Red  cavalry  if  possible,  but 
also  for  your  own  safety. 

Two  hundred  cavalrymen  in  column  of  fours  will  trot 
by  a  given  point  in  one  minute ;  in  column  of  twos  in  two 
minutes.  A  troop  of  our  cavalry  will  have,  roughly,  75  men 
in  ranks.  But  if  there  is  any  doubt  as  to  the  organization 
of  the  enemy's  cavalry,  you  can  at  least  say  that  its  main 
body  contains  about  225  troopers. 

*  .•:=  *  *  =:=  *  * 

For  comparison  with  Sergeant  Hill's  patrol,  we  re- 
commend that  you  study  the  leading  of  "An  Infantry 
Patrol,"  Page  99,  Studies  in  Minor  Tactics,  1915.  This 
patrol  has  a  different  mission,  a  longer  route,  and,  because 
of  the  time  of  day  and  the  duration  of  the  patrol,  it  carries 
a  different  equipment. 


Tenth   Problem 


A  Visiting  Patrol 


EXPLANATION 

The  preceding  problems  have  probably  shown  the  na- 
ture and  purpose  of  visiting  patrols.  A  brief  re-capitula- 
tion, however,  will  be  made. 

Visiting  patrols  consist  of  two  or  more  men  each.  They 
are  sent  out  from  supports  or  pickets,  or  both,  to  keep  up 
communication  with  adjoining  outguards. 

"For  patrolling  between  the  groups  or  along  the  lines 
of  an  outpost,  or  for  the  simpler  patrols  sent  out  from  a 
covering  detachment,  the  average  soldier  will  be  a  com- 
petent leader."      (I.  D.  R.  608). 

We  have  seen  that  these  patrols  are  not  necessary  in 
day  time  when  all  the  ground  along  the  line  of  observation 
can  be  observed  by  sentinels.  At  night,  however,  visiting 
patrols  are  indispensable.  They  inform  us  as  to  conditions 
along  the  front  and  at  our  sentinel  posts  and  outguards. 
By  using  them  properly  we  lessen  the  likelihood  of  the  un- 
observed approach  of  the  enemy,  between  sentinel  posts,  in 
a  force  larger  than  a  patrol,  and  frequently  we  are  able  to 
discover  and  drive  off  hostile  patrols.  Visiting  patrols  are 
the  means  of  exchanging  the  latest  information  among  the 
elements  of  the  outpost  and,  in  many  cases,  they  take  over 
strangers  detained  by  outlying  outposts  and  deliver  them 
to  the  picket  or  support  commander.  Visiting  patrols  also 
give  lonely  cossack  posts  or  sentry  squads  the  feeling  that 
there  is  co-operation  and  mutual  support  among  the  out- 
post elements. 

SITUATION     I 

Based  on  Situation  VII,  Seventh  Problem.  You  are 
Private  Towney,  in  charge  of  the  first  relief.  Read  the  in- 
structions given  you  by  the  First  Sergeant    (page   102). 

131 


132  TENTH  PROBLEM 

You  have  been  over  the  route  once  by  daylight,  and  three 
times  with  Willis  after  dark.  It  is  now  12-30  A.  M.  You 
and  Willis  have  been  awakened  and  are  about  to  start  out 
again. 

1.  What  preparations  do  you  make? 

2.  What  formation  do  you  adopt  while  advancing  to- 
wards the  cossack  post  southeast  of  your  picket? 

TOWNEY'S     SOLUTION 

1.  I  carry  only  my  belt,  rifle,  and  bayonet ;  the  bayonet 
rixed  to  the  rifle.  I  inspect  these  articles  to  see  that  they 
are  in  working  order.  Then  I  inspect  Willis  to  see  that  he 
is  equipped  in  the  same  manner  and  that  his  equipment  is 
in  working  order.  Then  I  direct  him  to  follow  me  at  8 
paces. 

2.  The  formation  will  be  single  file,  with  myself  in 
the  lead  and  Willis  8  paces  in  rear. 

DISCUSSION 

Your  patrol  does  not  require  the  same  equipment  that 
Sergeant  Hill  used  in  the  Ninth  Problem.  Even  the  canteen 
may  be  left  behind ;  it  may  rattle  and  is  sometimes  trouble- 
some, and  your  trip  is  short.  It  is  not  necessary  to  carry 
materials  for  writing  messages,  since  you  will  carry  back 
in  person  whatever  information  you  get.  A  small  electric 
flashlamp,  however,  is  a  convenient  article  for  you  at  night. 
A  company  will  probably  have  many  of  these  lamps  in  time 
of  war. 

The  patrol  leader  should  be  in  front  on  account  of  the 
fact  that  things  frequently  happen  suddenly  and  require 
quick  decision.  Although  the  other  man  is  only  8  paces  in 
rear,  that  distance  makes  a  great  difference  in  the  ability  to 
see.  The  exact  distance  between  yourself  and  Willis  would 
depend  upon  how  far  you  can  see  at  night.  As  far  as  the 
ability  to  see  is  concerned,  there  is  a  much  greater  differ- 
ence between  one  night  and  another  than  there  is  between 
one  day  and  another.  On  account  of  the  fact  that  nearly 
the  entire  route  lies  through  woods,  or  along  the  edge  of 
woods,  we  assumed  that  the  distance  would  be  quite  short. 


A  VISITING  PATROL  133 

On  a  clear  night  and  in  open  country  or  roads,  the  distance 
might  be  as  great  as  20  paces.  If  the  patrol  were  larger, 
so  that  two  men  could  march  in  the  lead,  the  distance  could 
be  even  greater  than  20  paces,  provided,  of  course,  that  the 
leading  men  could  be  seen  easily. 

The  outguard  commander  arranged  only  two  reliefs  for 
your  patrol.  You  are  obliged  to  leave  the  outguard  every 
two  hours  and  your  sleep  will  be  very  much  broken  up. 
Even  so,  you  are  better  off  than  the  sentinels  who  are  one 
hour  on  and  two  hours  off.  Your  patrol  can  cover  the  route 
in  a  half  hour.  The  patrol  that  crosses  the  Conewago  has 
twice  the  distance  that  you  have,  but  since  it  can  use  the 
roads,  it  may  be  able  to  cover  its  3,500  yard  route  in  forty 
minutes.  If  a  visiting  patrol  has  a  very  long  route,  and  if 
there  are  enough  men  available,  the  outguard  commander 
will  naturally  organize  the  patrol  into  three  reliefs. 

SITUATION     II 

You  are  now  in  the  patch  of  woods  500  yards  south- 
east of  the  picket  and  you  hear  four  shots,  apparently  fired 
in  the  vicinity  of  our  sentinel  post  at  crossroads  502. 

What  do  you  intend  to  do,  assuming  that  no  other 
shots  are  fired? 

TOWNEY'S     SOLUTION 

I  intend  to  halt  and  listen  for  a  short  time,  then  con- 
tinue on  my  way. 

DISCUSSION 

In  a  preceding  problem  we  have  stated  that  much  of 
the  firing  which  occurs  at  night  along  an  outpost  line  has  no 
special  significance.  Your  only  object  in  halting  and  listen- 
ing would  be  to  gain  information.  From  your  present 
position  you  may  be  able  to  hear  something  that  would 
amount  to  useful  information  to  the  outguard  commander 
on  your  return.  For  example,  if  you  heard  several  horses 
galloping  along  the  road  across  the  Conewago  from  where 
you  now  are,  that  information  would  assist  the  outguard 
commander  in  clearing  up  the  situation. 


134  TENTH   PROBLEM 

SITUATION     III 

Continuing'  along  the  bank  of  the  Conewago,  you  ar- 
rive at  a  point  which  you  know,  from  your  previous  trips, 
is  30  or  40  yards  from  the  cossack  post  sentinel. 

What  do  you  do  ? 

TOWNEY'S     SOLUTION 

I  halt  and  give  the  signal  twenty-three,  and  then  listen 
for  the  answer. 

DISCISSION 

It  is  not  wise  to  appear  suddenly  within  sight  of  an  out- 
post sentinel.  Sentinels  are  sometimes  nervous.  If  it  so 
happened  that  no  night  signal  had  been  prescribed,  you 
could  call  out  "Towney's  patrol,"  but  only  loud  enough  to 
be  heard  by  the  sentinel  if  he  actually  is  where  you  think  he 
is.  Of  course,  signals  or  calls,  even  though  given  very 
carefully,  may  attract  the  attention  of  an  enemy  who  might 
be  near  by,  but  this  would  happen  very  seldom.  In  the 
long  run.  a  signal  or  call  will  give  better  results;  it  is  good 
insurance  against  a  rifle  shot  which  may  not  only  hurt 
some  one  unnecessarily,  but  which  may  also  reveal  the 
location  of  the  cossack  post  to  an  enemy  far  beyond  the 
hearing  of  your  signal  or  call. 

SITUATION     l\ 

Your  signal  was  answered,  and  after  you  advanced  you 
were  recognized  by  the  sentinel. 

What  do  you  intend  to  do  while  you  are  at  the  cossack 
post  ? 

TOWNEY'S     SOLUTION 

I  intend  to  ask  the  sentinel  what  he  knows  about  the 
liring,  and  whether  he  heard  anything  after  the  firing.  I 
intend  to  ask  him  for  other  news  and  to  tell  him  the  latest 
news  from  our  picket.  Then  I  shall  start  on  the  return 
trip. 


A  VISITING  PATROL  135 

DISCUSSION 

If  the  commander  of  the  cossack  post  is  not  awake, 
there  is  nothing  to  be  gained  by  awakening  him.  The  sen- 
tinel knows  all  that  the  commander  knows,  and  perhaps 
more,  as  far  as  the  events  of  the  last  half  hour  are  con- 
cerned. When  you  exchange  news  with  the  sentinel,  you 
would  limit  yourself  strictly  to  business,  and  talk  in  as  low 
a  voice  as  possible ;  then  leave  at  once. 

SITUATION     V 

You  have  passed  through  the  patch  of  woods  500  yards 
southeast  of  the  picket,  and  you  are  now  advancing  along 
the  fence  towards  the  trench,  with  the  patch  of  woods  about 
50  yards  behind  you.  You  hear  footsteps  in  front  of  you 
and  halt,  crouching  to  the  ground.  A  moment  later  the 
figure  of  a  man  looms  up. 

What  do  you  intend  to  do? 

TOWNEY'S     SOLUTION 

I  intend  to  let  the  man  approach  until  he  is  so  close 
that  he  cannot  escape ;  then  challenge  him. 

DISCUSSION 

There  would  be  no  object  in  warning  the  man  by  using 
the  night  signal,  even  if  you  suspected  that  other  men 
might  be  following  him.  If  he  or  his  party  is  friendly, 
your  challenge  will  serve  the  purpose  just  as  well.  On 
the  other  hand,  if  he  or  his  party  is  hostile,  or  if  he  is  an 
unauthorized  stranger,  and  you  use  the  night  signal  as 
soon  as  you  hear  his  footsteps  or  first  see  the  outline  of 
his  figure,  you  are  simply  warning  him  in  time  to  let  him 
escape.  You  remember  that  one  of  the  important  duties 
of  a  visiting  patrol  is  to  pick  up  all  strangers  in  the  vici- 
nity of  the  outpost.  If  you  permit  them  to  escape,  you 
may  claim  that  you  have  driven  them  off,  but  it  is  much 
more  important  to  capture  strangers  than  to  drive  them 
off.  Comparing  this  situation  with  the  one  which  precedes 
it,  you  will  observe  that  there  are  times  when  night  signals 


L36  TENTH    PROBLEM 

should  be  used,  and  other  times  when  they  should  not 
be  used.  Experience  and  a  little  common  sense  will  enable 
you  to  decide  a  doubtful  case. 

Sergeant  Hill's  patrol  (Ninth  Problem),  and  the  pa- 
trol that  we  shall  study  in  the  Thirteenth  Problem,  are 
obliged  to  dodge  any  strangers  they  may  meet,  because 
these  patrols  are  seeking  information.  Your  visiting  pa- 
trol is  of  the  kind  that  may  be,  and  sometimes  is,  called 
a  covering  patrol;  that  is,  they  make  the  outpost  line  as 
tight  as  possible  in  order  to  prevent  the  enemy  or  strangers 
from  penetrating  it  in  either  direction. 

SITUATION     VI 

The  man  you  challenged  made  no  effort  to  escape.  He 
was  dressed  in  the  uniform  of  a  private  of  the  Blue  army. 
You  searched  him  for  weapons  and  found  that  he  had  none. 

In  answer  to  your  questions  he  states  that  he  is  a 
member  of  Company  D  of  your  regiment,  and  that  his  com- 
pany is  in  the  outpost  reserve.  He  also  states  that  he  is 
on  his  way  to  Conewago  Creek  to  take  a  bath.  Neither 
you  nor  Willis  remember  having  seen  the  man  before. 

What  do  you  intend  to  do  ? 

TOWNEY'S     SOLUTION 

I  intend  to  take  the  man  with  me  to  the  picket,  order- 
ing him  to  march  quietly  in  front  of  Willis. 

DISCUSSION 

By  asking  questions  you  might  easily  satisfy  yourself 
whether  the  man  really  belongs  to  Company  D.  You  might 
ask  him  to  name  his  officers,  his  first  sergeant,  and  other 
noncommissioned  officers,  the  cooks,  the  company  clerk, 
etc.,  confining  your  questions  to  persons  that  you  or  Wil- 
lis know,  and  that  no  private  would  be  likely  to  know  unless 
he  belonged  to  Company  D.  However,  your  orders  are 
strict.  All  the  men  of  the  picket  were  told  to  bring  in  all 
persons  picked  up  by  patrols  except  members  of  Company 
A.  patrols   from  Company  B,  and  officers  whom  you  are 


A  VISITING  PATROL  137 

sure  you  know.  There  is  no  use  wasting  time  trying  to 
find  out  whether  the  man  is  really  a  Blue  soldier  or  some 
stranger  disguised  as  a  soldier.  If  you  will  leave  this  to 
the  sergeant  on  watch  at  the  picket,  you  will  get  a  few 
minutes  more  sleep  before  you  start  out  again  on  patrol. 


Eleventh  Problem 

A  Detached  Post 


EXPLANATION 

A  detached  post  is  one  which,  on  account  of  distance, 
or  the  road  net,  or  location  with  respect  to  the  line  of  re- 
sistance is  separated  from  the  general  outpost  line. 

A  detached  post  may  be  sent  out  by  the  outpost  com- 
mander, or  by  the  main  body  commander;  it  depends  upon 
the  situation  and  terrain.  If  sent  out  by  the  outpost  com- 
mander, it  may  be  assumed  that  he  considers  the  post  a 
necessary  part  of  the  line  entrusted  to  him,  but  too  distant 
or  inconveniently  located  to  be  under  the  command  or  su- 
pervision of  one  of  the  support  commanders.  If  sent  out 
by  the  main  body  commander,  it  may  be  assumed  that  he 
considers  the  post  necessary,  but  too  distant  or  incon- 
veniently located  to  be  placed  under  the  command  or  su- 
pervision of  the  outpost  commander.  In  Situation  VI,  Se- 
venth Problem,  both  kinds  of  detached  posts  were  referred 
to. 

The  duties  of  a  detached  post  are  ordinarily  the  same 
as  those  of  an  element  of  the  outpost  proper.  Its  size  and 
location  determine  whether  it  will  resemble  a  cossack  post, 
sentry  squad,  picket,  or  support.  Naturally,  the  outpost  is 
between  the  enemy  and  our  main  body.  A  detached  post, 
if  used  at  all,  is  ordinarily  on  a  flank. 

In  the  present  problem  we  shall  deal  very  briefly  with 
a  detached  post  sent  out  by  the  main  body,  to  illustrate  the 
fact  that  such  a  post  adopts  practically  the  same  means 
for  security  as  an  element  of  the  outpost  proper. 

SITUATION     I 

In  the  Seventh  Problem  you  were  reminded  to  note  the 
detached  post  between  hill  712  and  Bridge  S.  H. 

It  will  simplify  matters  if  we  use  names  with  which 
138 


A  DETACHED  POST  139 

we  are  already  familiar.  For  convenience,  therefore,  we 
shall  re-state  the  situation  in  such  manner  as  to  use  the 
First  Platoon,  Company  A.  You  are  First  Sergeant  Holmes, 
in  command  of  that  platoon. 

Our  brigade  has  been  marching  northeast  from  Gettys- 
burg, on  the  McElheny — Plainview — Heidlersburg  road,  in 
the  enemy's  country.  It  has  been  reported  that  the  enemy 
is  several  miles  to  the  northeast,  and  that  our  brigade  will 
halt  south  of  Conewago  Creek  until  tomorrow  or  the  day 
after,  to  await  reinforcements. 

The  Conewago  is  reported  to  be  fordable  only  at  the 
fords  shown  on  the  map.  It  is  Nov.  1st,  and  the  corn  is 
in  shock. 

The  Second  Battalion  and  Machine  Gun  Company  of 
our  regiment,  with  a  troop  of  cavalry,  form  the  advance 
guard.  Our  battalion  has  marched  at  the  head  of  the  main 
body  and  is  now  halted  near  crossroads  561.  The  brigade 
adjutant  arrives  and  consults  Major  Crosby.  He  then 
sends  for  you  and  says: 

Take  this  map  and  examine  it  (he  points  out  on  the  map  or 
on  the  ground  the  places  to  which  he  refers  later).  The  enemy  is 
on  the  Harrisburg  road  about  four  miles  northeast  of  Plainview. 
Our  brigade  is  going*  into  camp  about  where  it  is  now  halted.  The 
First  Battalion  and  Machine  Gun  Company  of  your  regiment,  and 
one  platoon  of  cavalry,  will  form  our  outpost  a  mile  northeast  of 
here,  astride  the  road  through  Plainview  and  the  road  to  Hershey 
Mill.  March  your  platoon  over  that  hill  (712 — 707)  and  establish 
a  detached  post  covering  the  Conewago  crossings  near  Bridge  S.  H. 
Three  mounted  orderlies  will  report  to  you  very  soon  for  duty  with 
the  detached  post.  You  will  be  connected  with  brigade  headquarters 
by  telephone.  Your  battalion  commander  will  inspect  your  position 
later. 

What  security  would  you  provide  for  the  march  towards 
Bridge  S.  H.,  assuming  that  the  mounted  orderlies  do  not 
join  before  you  start? 

THE  FIRST  SERGEANT'S  SOLUTION 

I  send  Sergeant  Hill  and  one  squad,  as  advance  guard, 
with  instructions  to  patrol  off  the  road  when  necessary ; 
the  remainder  of  the  platoon  to  follow  at  400  yards. 

DISCUSSION 

It  is  our  purpose  to  deal  with  your  detached  post  in 


140  ELEVENTH  PROBLEM 

the  briefest  manner  possible,  to  avoid  details  that  are  in- 
cluded in  preceding  problems. 

We  must  assume  that  the  map  given  you  by  the  brigade 
adjutant  is  one  of  the  kind  that  is  ordinarily  available  in 
time  of  war,  and  does  not  show  the  many  details  which 
we  find  on  the  map  we  are  now  using.  From  the  cross- 
roads, therefore,  you  have  only  a  general  idea  of  the  country 
to  the  west  and  northwest.  You  will  be  obliged  to  march 
about  a  mile  on  a  road  that  the  advance  guard  may  have 
patrolled,  but  as  far  as  you  know,  there  are  now  no  Blue 
troops  in  that  direction.  The  distance,  together  with  the 
fact  that  you  may  need  flank  reconnaissance  and  cannot 
plan  it  in  advance,  makes  it  unwise  to  send  the  squad  for- 
ward as  a  point.  You  will  remember  that  a  point  is  a  patrol 
that  leads  the  way,  but  does  not  leave  the  road.  If  it  be- 
comes necessary  to  send  out  flank  patrols,  these  patrols 
could  not  be  sent  from  your  main  body  and  be  of  any  use, 
unless  the  main  body  halted  until  the  patrols  reached  the 
places  to  which  they  were  sent.  If  you  merely  tell  Ser- 
geant Hill  that  his  squad  will  march  out  as  point,  he  may 
assume  that  he  is  not  to  leave  the  road.  It  is  better  to  call 
the  squad  the  advance  guard,  and,  to  be  doubly  sure  of  a 
complete  understanding  and  proper  protection,  it  is  well 
to  add  that  he  will  take  care  of  flank  reconnaissance.  He 
can  send  out  two  patrols  of  two  men  each  and  still  have  five 
men  on  the  road.  It  is  not  likely  that  he  will  be  obliged  to 
use  more  than  two  patrols. 

All  the  officers  of  the  brigade  will  be  busy  for  the  next 
half  hour  or  more,  getting  the  men  off  their  feet  and  into 
camp  with  as  little  effort  and  loss  of  time  as  possible.  This 
is  their  most  important  duty  at  this  particular  time.  Hence, 
both  Major  Crosby  and  the  brigade  adjutant  are  too  busy 
now  to  go  with  you  and  see  that  your  detached  post  is  well 
placed  with  respect  to  the  ground  and  the  outpost  and  main 
camp.  The  fact  that  an  officer  has  been  ordered  to  inspect 
your  dispositions  is  no  reflection  on  your  ability.  Outpost 
elements  are  always  inspected  by  someone  higher  in  au- 
thority, and  the  inspector,  who,  in  your  case,  represents 
the  brigade  commander,  is  supposed  to  order  whatever 
changes  he  thinks  are  necessary. 


A  DETACHED  POST  141 

SITUATION     II 

Assuming  that  you  have  arrived  on  the  ground  and 
that  the  mounted  orderlies  have  reported;  also,  that  you 
have  made  your  preliminary  reconnaissance  and  have  found 
that  the  Conewago  is  not  fordable  except  as  shown  on  the 
map,  describe  briefly  the  day  position  of  the  detached  post. 

THE  FIRST  SERGEANT'S  SOLUTION 

The  platoon  entrenches  just  off  the  road  and  east  of 
it,  350  yards  southeast  of  Bridge  S.  H.,  so  as  to  cover  the 
bridge  nearest  Bridge  S.  H.  A  cossack  post  is  placed  at  the 
bridge  nearest  Bridge  S.  H.  and  another  cossack  post  is 
placed  in  or  near  the  west  end  of  the  orchard  300  yards 
northwest  of  712.  Two  mounted  orderlies  are  placed  as 
a  standing  patrol  on  hill  586,  1,500  yards  northwest  of 
Bridge  S.  H.  The  other  mounted  orderly  remains  with 
me. 

DISCUSSION 

The  position  selected  for  the  trench  enables  the  pla- 
toon to  fire  effectively  on  the  first  bridge.  After  the  trench 
is  completed,  the  men  would  not  occupy  it  except  when 
the  enemy  must  be  opposed.  It  is  difficult  to  determine  on 
the  map  the  best  resting  place  for  the  platoon.  It  is  pro- 
bable, however,  that  you  would  place  the  men  in  the  woods 
across  the  road  from  the  trench.  By  cutting  the  fences 
and  placing  a  screen  of  brush  from  the  edge  of  the  woods 
to  the  end  of  the  trench,  the  three  squads  would  be  able  to 
occupy  the  trench  in  a  very  short  time,  and  without  ex- 
posure. Your  sentinels,  particularly  the  two  men  on  hill 
586,  would  give  you  ample  warning  of  the  approach  of  the 
enemy. 

In  the  Seventh  Problem,  we  placed  the  cossack  post  at 
the  second  bridge  northeast  of  Plainview  on  account  of  the 
fact  that  it  was  necessary  to  guard  against  the  destruc- 
tion of  both  bridges  by  Red  patrols.  The  brigade  expects 
to  use  those  bridges  when  reinforcements  arrive  and  the 
advance  is  resumed.  In  the  present  situation,  however, 
the  bridges  northwest  of  Bridge  S.  H.  have  not  the  same 


L42  ELEVENTH   PROBLEM 

importance.  It  may  not  be  wrong  to  send  the  cossack  post 
to  the  second  bridge,  but  we  prefer  the  position  nearer  the 
platoon.  The  bridges  are  useful  to  Blue  patrols,  but  if 
the  second  bridge  is  wrecked,  there  still  remains  the  ford 
a  half  mile  west  of  it. 

The  ford  just  mentioned  is  easily  seen  by  the  standing 
patrol  on  hill  586 ;  hence,  it  is  not  necessary  to  place  a 
cossack  post  in  that  direction.  The  question  arises  as  to 
the  action  of  the  platoon  in  case  the  enemy  advances  by  way 
of  the  ford.  The  platoon  would  move  in  that  direction  and 
resist  to  the  best  of  its  ability.  It  cannot  be  in  two  places 
at  once,  and,  in  any  event,  it  will  have  accomplished  its 
purpose  when  it  has  given  the  brigade  ample  warning  of 
the  enemy's  advance.  The  outpost  near  Plainview  is 
squarely  in  front  of  the  enemy,  and  is  expected  to  hold  the 
line  of  resistance,  which  is  the  same  line  as  the  line  of  sup- 
ports. In  view  of  the  cavalry  and  outpost  reconnaissance, 
it  is  not  likely  that  a  large  Red  force  can  pass  unobserved 
around  one  of  our  flanks.  A  small  Red  force  may  be  able 
to  do  so,  but  in  this  case  a  detached  post  can  warn  the 
brigade  in  time  to  permit  the  deployment  of  a  force  large 
enough  to  stop  the  enemy.  Detached  posts,  therefore,  are 
primarily  warning  detachments,  although  they  resist  to  the 
best  of  their  ability. 

"For  observing  from  some  point  in  plain  view  of  the 
command  *  *  *  two  men  are  sufficient."  (I.  D.  R.  607). 
Mounted  men  make  useful  sentinels  at  favorable  observa- 
tion points  which  are  too  far  away  to  be  used  by  dismoun- 
ted men.  They  are  usually  posted  in  pairs.  From  hill 
586,  the  sentinels  have  an  extended  view  in  every  direc- 
tion. If  the  enemy  approaches,  the  fact  can  be  signalled 
directly  to  the  picket,  and  the  sentinels  can  mount  up  quick- 
ly and  retire  by  way  of  the  ford  or  the  bridges  if  necessary. 
The  other  orderly  will  be  useful  to  you  as  a  messenger. 

The  cossack  post  near  the  orchard  northwest  of  712 
has  an  extended  view  to  the  west  and  northwest.  It  cannot 
see  the  bridge  near  Fidler,  but  it  can  see  the  road  north- 
west and  southeast  of  the  bridge. 

One  squad  should  furnish  both  cossack  posts;  this 
makes  it  easier  to  keep  a  company  duty  roster.     The  cor- 


A  DETACHED  POST  143 

poral  should  take  the  cossack  post  at  the  bridge,  and  No.  2 
of  the  squad  should  take  the  other. 

It  is  now  evident  that  the  platoon  itself  must  have 
two  sentinels  in  day  time;  one  in  or  near  the  trench  to 
keep  the  Bridge  S.  H.  cossack  post  and  the  country  to  the 
east  in  sight,  and  one  in  the  west  edge  of  the  woods  to  keep 
the  other  cossack  post  and  the  standing  patrol  on  hill  586 
in  sight. 

On  your  right  flank,  you  will  locate  the  left  element 
of  the  outpost  proper.  On  your  left  flank,  you  must  be 
satisfied  if  you  provide  security  as  far  as  the  ford  south- 
east of  hill  586.  The  Fidler — 588  road  is  too  far  away  for 
you  to  cover  except  indirectly  by  observation  from  a  dis- 
tance as  already  mentioned.  If  that  road  is  important 
and  requires  more  attention  tonight  than  cavalry  patrols 
can  give  it,  the  brigade  commander  will  probably  send 
another  detached  post  in  that  direction. 

SITUATION     III 

The  left  element  of  the  outpost  proper  is  a  small  out- 
guard  near  the  bend  in  the  road  600  yards  southwest  of 
Hershey  Mill.  When  Major  Crosby  arrived  to  inspect  your 
detached  post,  he  approved  your  dispositions  and  asked 
whether  you  had  considered  a  plan  for  night  positions. 

What  plan  would  you  suggest? 

THE  FIRST  SERGEANT'S  SOLUTION 

I  would  withdraw  the  standing  patrol  on  hill  586 ;  com- 
bine the  two  cossack  posts  and  send  them  as  a  sentry  squad 
about  50  yards  northwest  of  the  roadfork  1,000  yards  west 
of  Bridge  S.  H.,  with  double  sentinel  towards  the  ford; 
and  move  the  platoon  forward  to  the  south  side  of  the  Cone- 
wago,  at  the  first  bridge,  posting  a  double  sentinel  direct- 
ly from  the  platoon  to  watch  the  bridge,  the  road  to  Beat- 
rick,  and  at  the  same  time  serve  as  picket  sentinels ;  the 
first  bridge  to  be  barricaded,  and  a  part  of  the  planking 
of  both  bridges  to  be  removed.  One  visiting  patrol  (3 
reliefs)  would  go  from  the  platoon  bivouac  to  Beatrick; 
then  follow  the  fences  southeast  400  yards,  northeast  300 


ELEVENTH    PROBLEM 

yards,  and  southeast  400  yards  to  the  outguard;  then  south- 
est  along  the  farm  road  to  main  road;  then  northwest  on 
the  main  road  to  the  platoon  bivouac.  Another  patrol  (3 
reliefs)  would  go  west  500  yards  along  the  Conewago,  and 
another  500  yards  along  the  farm  road;  then  to  the  sentry 
squad  ;  then  to  the  road  fork  200  yards  northwest  of  the  ford; 
then  east  and  southeast  along  the  main  road  to  the  platoon 
bivouac. 

DISCUSSION 

In  a  previous  problem  we  have  stated  the  reasons  that 
would  prompt  you  to  move  the  platoon  to  the  bridge.  The 
move  results  in  placing  your  platoon  rather  far  from  the 
supporting  troops,  but  this  can  seldom  be  avoided  when  we 
deal  with  detached  posts.  The  sentry  squad  near  the  ford 
is  also  rather  far  away.  The  outpost  proper  ordinarily 
would  not  place  small  detachments  so  far  apart. 

The  enemy  cannot  make  a  .rush  attack  by  way  of  the 
bridges,  on  account  of  missing  planks  and  the  barricade. 
A  double  sentinel  at  the  platoon  bivouac  will  therefore  serve 
the  double  purpose  of  observing  the  first  bridge  and  act- 
ing as  bivouac  guard  ;  thus  saving  at  least  four  men. 

We  would  not  recommend  sending  a  fresh  squad  to  the 
lord.  By  combining  the  two  cossack  posts,  the  squad  that 
is  used  will  get  credit  for  a  complete  tour  of  outpost  senti- 
nel duty. 

Naturally,  the  standing  patrol  on  hill  586  is  useless  at 
night.  It"  the  members  of  this  patrol,  and  their  horses, 
have  an  uninterrupted  night's  rest,  they  will  be  in  condition 
to  return  to  the  hill  shortly  after  daylight.  Two  or  more 
reliefs  for  this  patrol  are  unnecessary.  The  men  them- 
selves can  arrange  to  divide  the  time;  one  man  on  observa- 
tion being  enough,  while  the  other  holds  the  horses  under 
cover.     Their  meals  can  be  sent  to  them  from  the  platoon. 

In  this  situation,  the  routes  of  the  visiting  patrols  are 
-<>  long  that  two  rebel's  would  not  give  the  men  enough 
rest. 

SITI  VTIOIN     l\ 

Sergeant   Hill  made  an  outpost  sketch.  By  visiting  the 


A  DETACHED  POST  145 

standing  patrol  on  hill  586  he  was  able  to  extend  the  sketch 
to  show  creeks,  farmhouses,  roads,  and  woods  north  of  the 
Conewago  as  far  as  the  587 — 554 — 582  road.  An  impress- 
ed guide,  who  lives  near  crossroad  666,  furnished  Ser- 
geant Hill  the  names  of  the  farmers  whose  houses  appeared 
on  the  sketch.  Farm  buildings  near  the  Conewago  have 
been  vacated. 

The  night  passed  quietly.  Shortly  after  daylight  you 
resumed  your  day  positions.  After  breakfast,  you  were 
called  to  the  telephone  and  told  as  follows : 

This  is  Captain  Hall,  the  brigade  quartermaster.  Take  paper 
and  pencil  and  make  note  of  the  following.  A  farmer  named  Bream 
has  a  farm  about  a  mile  northwest  of  Bridge  S.  H.,  and  on  the  main 
road  just  southwest  of  Friends  Grove  S.  H.  It  is  reported  that  he 
has  a  fine  herd  of  ten  or  twenty  cattle.  The  brigade  commander  di- 
rects that  you  send  a  patrol  at  once  to  bring  them  in. 

What  do  you  do? 

THE  FIRST  SERGEANTS  SOLUTION 

To  Corporal  Clark : 

Get  your  squad  ready  for  patrol.  Carry  belt,  rifle,  and  canteen 
only. 

While  Corporal  Clark  is  making  his  preparations,  I 
write  the  following  on  a  piece  of  paper. 

Nov.    2. 

Received  of  Mr.   Bream head  of  cattle,  taken   by   order   of 

brigade  commander.     Account  payable  by  quartermaster. 

Holmes, 
1st  Sergt.  Co.  A,  1st  Inf. 

When  Corporal  Clark's  squad  is  ready,  I  lead  it  to  the 
road  and  give  the  corporal  the  following  orders  in  the  pres- 
ence of  the  whole  squad : 

Examine  this  sketch  and  make  a  copy  of  what  you  need.  A  mile 
and  a  quarter  out  this  road  to  the  northwest  there  is  a  crossroad.  Just 
north  of  it  there  is  a  school  called  Friends  Grove  School.  A  short  dis- 
tance west  of  the  crossroad,  on  the  road  leading  west,  there  is  a  farmer 
named  Bream.  It  is  reported  that  he  has  10  or  20  head  of  cattle.  Go 
out  and  bring  the  cattle  in.  Bring  Bream  or  a  member  of  his  family 
with  you.  If  there  is  no  one  on  the  farm,  fill  out  the  blank  space  in 
this  receipt  and  leave  it  at  the  house.     Repeat. 

DISCUSSION 

The  brigade  commander's  orders,  transmitted  through 


l  16  ELEVENTH   PROBLEM 

a  staff  officer,  the  quartermaster,  was  purposely  made  less 
definite  than  would  ordinarily  be  the  case,  in  order  to  bring 
more  forcibly  to  your  attention  some  important  matters  re- 
lating to  the  taking  of  private  property  in  hostile  country. 

When  we  march  through  hostile  country,  we  generally 
find  that  the  enemy  has  removed  many  of  the  supplies  we 
would  find  there  under  other  conditions.  Nevertheless,  we 
search  the  country  for  such  supplies  as  are  useful  to  us,  in 
order  to  lessen  the  amount  that  must  be  hauled  to  the  troops 
by  railroad,  auto  trucks,  and  wagons,  and  to  give  the  men 
and  animals  a  variety  of  food  which,  on  account  of  bulk  or 
rapid  deterioration,  cannot  be  hauled  at  all.  It  is  important 
for  every  soldier  to  understand  that,  if  we  take  such  supplies 
and  do  not  pay  for  them,  or  do  not  pay  a  fair'price  for  them, 
the  inhabitants  will  remove  or  carefully  hide  whatever  they 
possess.  On  the  other  hand,  if  we  pay  a  liberal  price,  the 
fact  soon  becomes  known  to  the  inhabitants,  and  we  shall 
probably  have  the  benefit  of  a  great  many  desirable  things 
found  locally.  The  soldier's  condition  and  well-being  would 
suggest  to  him  the  advantage  of  seeing  to  it  that  the  owner 
of  supplies  is  properly  protected.  You  must  remember  that 
the  inhabitants  of  a  hostile  country  cannot  sell  supplies  to 
us  without  being  liable  to  severe  punishment  by  their  own 
government.  The  supplies  must  be  taken  away  from  them 
against  their  will,  and  it  is  not  against  the  law  of  their  own 
country  to  accept  payment  for  supplies  taken  in  this  manner. 
If  we  avoid  unauthorized  looting,  and  if  we  pay  generously 
for  what  we  take,  we  shall  find  that  many  inhabitants  will 
place  their  property  where  we  can  see  it,  or  they  may  even 
inform  us  secretly  that  they  have  it.  In  the  present  case, 
it  is  not  at  all  unlikely  that  Farmer  Bream  has  heard  rumors 
that  we  have  good  discipline,  that  we  do  not  take  property 
except  under  competent  orders,  and  that  we  pay  generously; 
and  for  these  reasons  he  has  left  his  cattle  in  a  field  or  pas- 
ture, where  they  have  been  seen  by  one  of  our  cavalry 
patrols. 

The  best  plan  would  be  to  have  Bream  come  to  the  out- 
post with  his  cattle.  A  supply  sergeant  could  meet  him 
there  later  and  pay  him.  or  deliver  to  him  the  formal  receipts 
of  the  Quartermaster  Corps  (page  128,  Rules  of  Land  War- 


ELEVENTH   PROBLEM  147 

fare) .  The  objection  to  using  or  encouraging  receipts  of 
the  kind  you  prepared,  lies  in  the  fact  that  some  of  our  men 
are  not  always  scrupulous,  and,  if  such  informal  receipts 
are  customary,  unscrupulous  men  might  offer  fictitious  and 
unauthorized  receipts  in  exchange  for  small  plunder.  The 
owner  of  the  property  might  be  deceived  by  the  receipt  if 
it  is  generally  understood  in  the  community  that  informal 
receipts  are  in  use.  If  it  is  not  so  understood,  he  might 
make  up  his  mind  to  follow  the  plunderers  and  report  them. 
The  plunderers  would  merely  use  such  receipts  to  allay  the 
owner's  suspicions,  and  thus  escape  detection. 

It  would  be  well  to  let  the  standing  patrol  on  hill  586 
know  that  Corporal  Clark's  patrol  is  going  out,  but  we  would 
not  send  an  ordinary  message  to  this  effect  by  semaphore 
or  wigwag.  If  Corporal  Clark  passes  near  the  hill,  he  may 
be  able  to  communicate  with  the  sentinels,  but  it  is  more  im- 
portant for  him  to  avoid  exposure.  Since  several  infantry 
or  cavalry  patrols  may  go  out  from,  or  through,  your  post, 
it  would  be  a  good  plan  to  have  a  simple  set  of  prearranged 
signals.  For  example.:  "Eight  canteens"  could  mean  "8 
men  going  out  by  way  of  the  bridges."  "Three  cups"  could 
mean  "3  men  going  out  by  way  of  the  ford."  Patrols  that 
must  move  cautiously  may  be  mistaken  for  the  enemy  by 
our  own  sentinels.  It  is  a  decided  advantage  to  all  concern- 
ed to  inform  sentinels  when  patrols  are  likely  to  be  near 
them. 


Twelfth  Problem 

\   Requisitioning  Detachment  or  Patrol 


EXPLANATION 

The  name  "patrol"  ordinarily  conveys  the  idea  of  a 
detachment  sent  out  to  gain  information,  or  to  cover  a  road 
or  area  that  needs  watching.  "In  special  cases  patrols  may 
be  given  missions  other  than  these."      (I.  D.  R.  605). 

"The  term  patrols  is  used  to  designate  small  detach- 
ments employed  for  a  variety  of  purposes,  the  name  of  the 
detachment  indicating  its  duty,  as  visiting  connecting,  com- 
bat, exploring,  reconnoitering,  flanking,  harassing,  pursuing 
patrols,  etc."      (Footnote,  F.  S.  R.,  page  17). 

A  patrol  or  detachment  sent  out  by  our  local  command- 
er to  seize  property  or  supplies  that  will  be  useful  to  our 
troops,  operates  legitimately  under  the  laws  of  war  (Rules 
of  Land  Warfare,  347).  It  is  an  entirely  different  matter 
when  a  group  of  soldiers  seize  such  property  or  supplies  in 
the  enemy's  country  on  their  own  responsibility.  We  would 
not  call  the  latter  a  requisitioning  detachment  or  patrol. 

SITUATION      I 

You  are  Corporal  Clark  and  have  received  orders  to 
take  your  squad  on  patrol  as  indicated  in  the  First  Ser- 
geant's solution,  Eleventh  Problem  (page  145). 

What  preparations  do  you  make? 

CORPORAL  CLARK'S  SOLUTION 

J  order  the  squad  to  form  for  inspection  with  rifle,  belt 
and  ammunition,  and  canteen  of  water.  In  addition,  I 
<»rder  McGowan  to  carry  his  wire-cutter  and  I  borrow  for 
myself  an  extra  wire-cutter  and  the  first  sergeant's  field 
glass  and  compass.  1  then  make  a  copy  of  so  much  of 
Sergeant  Hill's  sketch  as  shows  the  country  between  Bridge 
S.  H.  and  the  line  Bream — Friends  Grove  S.  H.     I  then  in- 

!  18 


A  REQUISITIONING  DETACHMENT  OR  PATROL        149 

spect  the  men  and  their  equipment  and  explain  the  first 
sergeant's  orders  to  the  squad. 

DISCUSSION 

In  the  whole  range  of  military  affairs  correct  prepara- 
tion means  a  successful  start  and  generally  means  a  success- 
ful finish.  Throughout  these  problems  we  have  laid  special 
emphasis  on  preparation.  There  is  another  point  worth 
mentioning  in  this  connection:  If  your  first  sergeant,  or 
lieutenant,  or  captain  gives  you  a  patrol  to  handle,  or  any 
other  task,  for  that  matter,  and  observes  that  you  then  make 
the  correct  preparations  in  a  businesslike  way,  he  will  prob- 
ably say  to  himself,  "Clark  certainly  knows  how  to  start 
this  thing.  I  will  not  worry  about  his  ability  to  finish  it." 
If  a  man  really  knows  how  to  handle  a  task,  he  knows 
enough  to  make  the  correct  preparations;  which  is  nearly 
the  same  as  saying  that,  if  a  man  makes  the  correct  pre- 
parations, it  is  a  sign  that  he  knows  how  to  handle  the  task. 
In  the  present  situation  you  may  have  little  use  for  a  com- 
pass or  field  glass,  but  suppose  you  had  started  to  march 
off  without  wire-cutters.  The  first  sergeant  would  have 
suspected  that  you  intended  to  drive  the  cattle  through  gates 
and  along  highways,  regardless  of  what  the  ground  might 
be.  We  doubt  that  a  first  sergeant  who  has  shown  enough 
ability  to  be  entrusted  with  the  command  of  an  important 
detached  post  would  fail  to  observe  your  omission.  In  fact, 
we  believe  that  he  would  have  mentioned  wire-cutters  in  his 
orders,  but  in  this  problem,  as  in  all  peace  time  exercises, 
we  prefer  to  give  noncommissioned  officers  an  opportunity 
to  think  for  themselves. 

SITUATION  II 

You  have  made  your  preparations  and  have  received 
your  final  orders. 

What  formation  and  route  do  you  intend  to  use,  up  to 
the  time  that  you  reach  the  north  bank  of  the  Conewago, 
assuming  that  nothing  occurs  to  interfere  with  your  plans? 


TWELFTH  PROBLEM 
CORPORAL  CLARK'S  SOLUTION 

I  intend  to  have  the  squad  follow  me  in  column  of  twos 
through  the  woods  along  the  west  side  of  the  road  as  far  as 
the  cossack  post.     After  telling  the  commander  of  the  cos- 

•k  post  where  I  am  going,  and  asking  him  for  the  latest 
information,  I  intend  to  send  the  men  in  pairs,  at  about  50 
yards  distance  between  pairs,  across  the  bridge  and  then 
off  the  road  to  the  right,  going  as  far  as  the  woods  at  the 
south  end  of  the  second  bridge,  where  the  squad  will  as- 
semble. From  this  point  the  squad  will  use  the  same  for- 
mation in  crossing  the  second  bridge,  and  the  squad  will 
re-assemble  in  the  woods  west  of  the  north  end  of  the  bridge. 

DISCUSSION 

II  you  march  down  the  road  to  the  cossack  post,  you 
might  be  observed  from  a  distance  and  the  observer's  curi- 
osity as  to  your  future  movements  and  intentions  might 
finally  result  to  your  disadvantage.  Likewise,  in  crossing 
the  two  bridges,  you  should  avoid  attracting  attention.  If 
the  Conewago  were  easily  fordable,  you  would  cross  it  near 
the  mouth  of  Opossum  Creek  and  thus  avoid  exposure. 
There  would  be  no  advantage  in  crossing  at  the  ford.  The 
distance  is  greater  and  you  would  be  obliged  to  cross  long 
open  spaces. 

SITUATION     III 

The  squad  has  re-assembled  as  planned  in  the  last  so- 
lution. You  have  seen  no  signs  of  the  enemy  or  of  Red 
inhabitants. 

What  formation  and  route  do  you  intend  to  use,  up  to 
the  time  that  you  reach  the  587-554-582  road? 

CORPORAL  CLARK'S  SOLUTION 

I  intend  to  follow  the  wooded  creek  (Opossum  Creek) 
that  parallels  the  534-554  road ;  marching  in  the  woods,  but 
close  to  the  west  edge,  so  as  to  avoid  being  seen  from  the 
houses  along  the  road.  I  intend  to  send  two  men  ahead  as 
point;  then  myself  and  three  other  men  in  single  file  with 


A  REQUISITIONING  DETACHMENT  OR  PATROL        151 

myself  in  the  lead,  following  the  point  at  about  75  yards; 
then  a  rear  point  following  us  at  about  50  yards. 

DISCUSSION 

In  the  previous  problem,  the  first  sergeant  provided 
for  flank  reconnaissance  for  the  platoon  during  its  march 
from  crossroads  561  towards  Bridge  S.  H.  The  present 
case  is  not  similar.  You  are  advancing  with  as  much  se- 
crecy as  possible  and  do  not  require  flank  patrols.  Natur- 
ally you  will  watch  your  flanks,  but  you  will  not  detach  men 
from  the  column  for  its  protection.  The  safest  method  is 
to  depend  upon  the  concealment  afforded  by  the  woods,  but 
a  point  in  front  and  another  in  rear  will  probably  prevent 
the  squad. from  being  surprised  as  a  whole. 

SITUATION     IV 

When  the  point  reached  the  bridge  between  Bream  and 
crossroads  554,  you  signalled  it  to  halt.  The  remainder 
of  the  patrol  advanced  to  the  bridge. 

You  now  observe  that  the  bridge  stringers  are  only 
three  feet  above  the  ground ;  that  from  the  east  end  of  the 
bridge  an  observer  can  see  the  Heidlersburg  road  as  far  as 
the  house  400  yards  east  of  crossroads  554,  and  the  higher 
points  of  the  road  to  the  north  as  far  as  J.  Fohl;  that  the 
road  to  the  west  can  be  seen  as  far  as  the  bridge  800  yards 
from  where  you  are;  that  a  herd  of  twelve  cattle  is  about 
300  yards  north  of  Bream's  house,  grazing  in  the  stubble 
field. 

What  do  you  do? 

CORPORAL  CLARK'S  SOLUTION 

Orders  to  Pine: 

Pine,  take  Stone  with  you.  Pass  under  this  bridge  and  post 
yourself  near  the  east  end  of  it,  in  the  edge  of  the  woods,  where  you 
can  see  the  roads  to  the  the  east  and  north.  If  Reds  approach,  go 
to  the  west  edge  of  the  woods  and  signal  the  fact  to  the  rest  of  the 
squad;  then  hide  and  watch  the  Reds,  and  signal  o.  k.  when  they  have 
disappeared.     Repeat. 

Orders  to  Brown : 

P>rown.  take  Hagen,  McGowan  and  Schafer  with  you  to  drive 


152  TWELFTH  PROBLEM 

the  cattle  to  this  bridge.  Going  out,  pass  under  the  bridge  and  through 
the  woods  along  the  creek  to  that  fence  along  the  north  side  of  the 
field  (400  yards  north  of  Bream's  house).  Drive  the  cattle  east  to 
the  woods,  then  to  this  bridge  where  I  shall  meet  you.  Detail  a  man 
to  watch  towards  this  bridge  for  signals  from  Pine,  and  to  watch 
towards  Bream's  house  for  signals  from  me.  If  we  signal,  Enemy 
in  eight,  pet  into  the  woods  and  hide  until  we  signal,  o.  k.,  then  resume 
your  job.     If  we  fire,  join  us  at  once  by  the  shortest  route.     Repeat. 

Then  I  add : 

Ames  and  I  are  going  to  visit  that  house  (100  yards  west  of 
the  bridge)  and  then  the  second  house,  which  is  Bream's,  to  cut  out 
their  telephones,  watch  the  occupants  and  see  Bream  or  his  family. 

DISCUSSION 

Your  orders  hardly  require  discussion.  They  indicate 
that  security  and  warning  are  necessary  and  that,  if  Reds 
appear,  the  patrol  will  hide  as  best  it  can  until  the  danger 
is  past ;  also,  that  the  whole  patrol  must  assemble  in  case  of 
discovery  and  a  fight  in  self-defense. 

When  we  are  in  the  enemy's  country,  telephones  are  a 
constant  source  of  annoyance  and  apprehension  for  our 
patrols  or  small  detachments.  In  the  present  situation,  for 
example,  it  may  be  that  the  enemy  has  a  cavalry  detachment 
that  is  using  Heidlersburg,  or  Center  Mills,  or  some  other 
nearby  point  as  a  base  from  which  patrols  are  sent  out. 
Such  a  detachment  may  have  a  man  at  the  local  telephone 
exchange,  and  farmers  may  have  been  forewarned  to  call 
up  the  telephone  exchange  whenever  any  Blues  appear  in 
their  vicinity. 

The  success  of  your  patrol  depends  largely  upon  se- 
crecy. Nevertheless,  you  are  now  obliged  to  expose  at 
least  six  men,  but  you  should  not  on  that  account,  be  careless 
and  do  imprudent  things.  For  example,  you  should  not  cut 
the  fences  at  the  bridge  until  the  cattle  are  actually  there 
and  ready  to  be  driven  south.  Such  action  would  result  in 
needless  exposure.  The  occupants  of  the  houses  to  the  west 
might  divine  your  intentions  before  their  telephone  connec- 
I  ion  was  destroyed. 

SITUATION     V 

You  found  Bream  at  home  and  brought  him  with  you 
to  the  bridge.     Here  the  patrol  assembled.     The  cattle  are 


A  REQUISITIONING  DETACHMENT  OR  PATROL        153 

in  the  southeast  corner  of  Bream's  field,  near  the  west  end 
of  the  bridge. 

What  route  and  formation  do  you  intend  to  use  on 
the  return  trip? 

CORPORAL  CLARK'S  SOLUTION 

I  shall  cut  the  fences  near  the  west  end  of  the  bridge 
and  return  by  the  same  route  that  we  used  in  coming  out, 
except  that,  from  the  bridge  near  534  we  shall  use  the  road. 
The  herd  will  be  driven  in  the  open  field  as  close  as  possible 
to  the  west  edge  of  the  woods  that  line  Opossum  Creek. 

Two  men  with  wire-cutters  will  precede  the  herd  by  50 
yards  as  far  as  the  bridge  near  534.  Bream  and  three  men 
will  drive  the  cattle,  Bream  taking  the  most  exposed  (west) 
tlank.  Three  men,  including  myself,  will  follow  the  herd 
at  200  yards.  From  the  bridge  near  534,  Bream  and  one 
man  will  drive  the  herd  along  the  road  to  our  detached  post. 
The  rest  of  the  squad  will  remain  near  534  until  the  herd 
reaches  the  north  bridge  across  the  Conewago,  and  then 
follow. 

DISCUSSION 

The  map  indicates  that  there  is  brush  in  the  woods 
along  Opossum  Creek.  The  effort  to  conceal  the  patrol  as 
much  as  possible  can  hardly  be  carried  to  the  extreme  of 
attempting  to  drive  the  herd  through  such  woods.  The 
woods  will  screen  the  herd  on  the  east  side,  and  the  high 
ground,  on  the  south  end  of  which  we  have  a  standing 
patrol  (586),  will  screen  it  on  the  west  side. 

Your  formation  resembles  that  of  a  convoy  on  a  small 
scale.  If  we  were  to  change  the  formation  at  all,  we  would 
reduce  the  point  to  one  man,  and  the  drivers  to  two  men, 
thus  making  five  men  available  for  the  rear  guard.  You 
can  readily  see  that  the  rear  guard  has  become  the  most  im- 
portant element  in  case  a  small  Red  party  discovers  what 
you  are  doing,  and  attempts  to  interfere  with  you  before  you 
reach  the  protection  of  the  detached  post.  For  this  reason, 
also,  you  may  dispense  with  a  point  when  you  reach  534  and. 
since  two  men  can  drive  a  herd  along  a  road  lined  with 


154  TWELFTH  PROBLEM 

fences,   the  entire  squad  is  available  to  prevent  interfer- 
ence before  the  herd  reaches  the  island  in  the  Conewago. 

While  you  were  marching  towards  Bream's  house,  you 
could  have  no  excuse  for  fighting  except  in  self-defense. 
But  on  the  return  trip  you  would  fire  on  any  Red  party,  if 
l>y  doing  so  you  could  prevent  a  discovery  of  your  real  op- 
eration, or  could  prevent  interference  with  it.  For  ex- 
ample, if  a  Red  patrol  arrived  at  crossroads  554  from 
the  east  or  north,  you  would  drive  it  off  if  its  further  pro- 
gress threatened  the  success  of  your  little  convoy.  There- 
fore, one  man  of  your  small  rear  guard  should  march  close 
to  the  edge  of  the  woods  so  as  to  be  able  to  see  the  ground 
east  of  Opossum  Creek. 


Thirteenth  Problem 

A  Contact  Patrol 


EXPLANATION 

The  patrols  that  we  have  studied  heretofore  in  con- 
nection with  the  Plain  view  outpost  are  of  the  kind  that  are 
intended  to  warn  us  if  the  enemy  approaches.  It  is  fre- 
quently just  as  important  to  know  whether  the  enemy  is 
going  away.  When  two  armies  are  in  close  contact  and 
one  feels  obliged  to  retreat,  the  start  is  frequently  at- 
tempted at  night.  For  example,  if  at  night  our  outpost 
line  faces  the  enemy's,  and  during  the  preceding  day  the 
enemy  has  been  badly  defeated,  or  we  have  been  heavily 
reinforced,  the  enemy  may  decide  that  it  is  dangerous  or 
unwise  to  remain.  If  he  begins  his  retreat  during  the  night 
(as  Lee  did  at  Gettysburg),  and  without  our  knowledge,  he 
will  have  a  good  start  by  the  time  we  discover  his  move, 
and  we  shall  lose  the  great  advantage  of  a  close  pursuit. 
Towards  morning  we  shall  be  in  contact  with  a  mere  skele- 
ton of  his  original  outpost;  possibly  only  a  line  of  small 
outguards.  The  main  body,  and  even  the  outpost  reserve 
and  supports,  may  be  gone.  Hence,  when  we  have  reason 
to  believe  that  the  enemy  may  retreat  during  the  night,  we 
should  get  our  patrols  behind  the  enemy's  line  of  observa- 
tion; as  near  the  larger  bodies  of  troops  as  possible.  A 
patrol  that  arrives  in  a  favorable  position  fastens  itself  to 
the  body  of  troops  which  it  has  found,  and  remains  there 
in  hiding  and  in  observation  as  long  as  possible.  It  at- 
tempts to  send  or  bring  back  information  if  it  discovers 
any  definite  signs  of  the  enemy's  intention  to  leave.  Such 
a  patrol  might  well  be  nick-named  "night  leech."  It  is  a 
difficult  patrol  to  lead  because  if  the  enemy  intends  to  re- 
treat, he  will  naturally  try  to  make  his  line  of  observation 
impenetrable, — "hog  tight,"  as  the  farmers  say  when  they 
refer  to  their  strongest  fences.     The  return  trip  of  mes- 

155 


156  A  CONTACT  PATROL 

sengers,  or  of  the  whole  patrol,  may  be  as  difficult  as  the 
trip  out. 

If  the  enemy  is  some  distance  away,  the  cavalry  usually 
furnishes  these  contact  patrols.  A  cavalry  patrol  will  leave 
its  horses  in  hiding,  in  charge  of  two  or  more  men,  while 
the  others,  on  foot,  attempt  to  penetrate  the  enemy's  out- 
post or  detached  posts.  But  when  contact  is  close — for  ex- 
ample, where  the  opposing  sentinels  are  only  a  few  hundred 
yards  apart — infantry  patrols  make  the  attempt  along  this 
front,  while  cavalry  patrols  may  be  sent  to  make  similar 
attempts  on  the  flanks. 

SITUATION     I 

Continuation  of  Sixth  to  Tenth  Problems  inclusive. 

In  the  Eleventh  and  Twelfth  Problems  we  arbitrarily 
borrowed  the  First  Platoon  for  convenience.  We  shall  now 
return  it  to  its  original  position  and  assume  that  it  has  been 
there  since  we  concluded  the  Tenth  Problem. 

You  are  Sergeant  Hill  of  the  First  Platoon.  The  First 
Platoon  formed  the  picket  near  the  bridges  northeast  of 
Plainview,  and  first  occupied  its  position  on  the  afternoon  of 
November  1st.  It  is  now  8-00  P.  M.,  November  2d,  and  it 
has  been  dark  since  5-45  P.  M. 

Important  things  have  happened  today.  Shortly  af- 
ter noon  the  enemy  made  a  sudden  attack  against  our  front 
along  the  Conewago,  from  the  bridges  where  our  platoon 
has  been  stationed  to  the  cavalry  detached  post  l.V  miles 
southeast  of  our  platoon.  The  enemy  failed  to  force  a  cross- 
ing at  our  two  bridges,  but  he  captured  the  three  fords  to 
the  southeast  of  us.  The  outpost  battalion  was  soon  de- 
ployed on  the  east  slopes  of  the  616  and  the  Plainview  spurs, 
but  it  was  in  serious  danger  nevertheless.  The  main  body 
of  the  brigade,  however,  went  forward  in  counter-attack 
along  both  sides  of  the  water  course  that  runs  almost  east- 
northeast  from  roadfork  535.  But  the  enemy  was  well 
equipped  with  artillery,  while  we  had  none ;  and  the  counter- 
attack was  stopped  when  it  reached  a  line  parallel  to,  and 
a  short  distance  east  of,  the  616 — 544  road.  Red  troops 
continued  to  cross  at  the  fords  and  severelv  hammered  our 


A  CONTACT  PATROL  157 

long  line  until  4  o'clock,  until  which  time  matters  looked 
very  serious-  for  us.  At  that  hour,  however,  the  first  of 
our  reinforcements  arrived;  a  full  regiment  of  artillery 
that  had  trotted  ahead  of  the  infantry  brigade  with  which 
it  had  been  marching.  The  regiment  carried  as  many  in- 
fantrymen as  its  guns  and  carriages  could  accommodate,  and 
three  troops  of  cavalry  rode  in  front  and  patrolled  the 
flanks.  When  our  artillery  opened  fire,  the  enemy  was 
through.  If  our  brigade  had  not  been  so  roughly  handled 
and  exhausted,  we  might  have  greatly  damaged  the  enemy. 
But  he  maintained  a  stubborn  firing  line  on  our  side  of  the 
Conewago  until  it  was  practically  too  dark  for  us  to  see  it. 
Under  cover  of  this  line,  the  other  Reds  on  our  side  of  the 
Conewago  re-crossed  the  creek.  At  dark,  when  the  firing 
line  of  our  brigade  finally  reached  the  creek,  the  men  found 
that  the  enemy  had  very  ingeniously  stretched  more  than 
100  lines  of  rope  across  the  Conewago,  fastening  the  ends  to 
trees.  That  explained  why  we  caught  so  few  Red  prisoners 
at  the  fords. 

The  Second  Brigade  arrived  at  dark,  but  the  hour  was 
then  too  late,  and  our  brigade  was  too  disorganized  to  permit 
a  change  of  outpost  troops  for  tonight.  The  First  Platoon 
lost  seven  men.  The  Second  Platoon  (Sergeant  Crane)  lost 
even  more.  These  two  platoons  were  consolidated  and 
stationed  as  a  picket  at  the  old  post  of  the  First  Platoon; 
that  is,  near  the  barricade  of  the  first  bridge,  with  a  sentry 
squad  at  the  south  end  of  the  second  bridge.  The  second 
bridge,  however,  was  badly  wrecked  during  the  fighting. 
The  other  changes  made  in  the  outpost  have  not  yet  been 
reported  to  the  picket. 

Yesterday  afternoon  three  rowboats  were  found  by 
another  picket  near  Hershey  Mill.  One  boat  was  turned 
over  to  our  picket  last  night,  and  has  been  kept  out  of  sight 
on  the  south  bank  of  the  west  end  of  the  large  island  on 
which  our  sentry  squad  is  posted. 

First  Sergeant  Holmes,  the  picket  commander,  now 
(8-00  P.  M.)  calls  you  and  says  : 

Get  yourself  and  Butler,  Quinn  and  Walinski,  ready  for  patrol 
through  the  enemy's  outpost,  and  then  report  to  me  for  orders. 


THIRTEENTH  PROBLEM 

When  you  are  ready,  the  first  sergeant  gives  you  the 
following  orders: 

The  enemy  has  sentinel  posts  at  various  points  along  the  road 
that  follows  the  opposite  bank  of  the  Conewago.  There  is  one  near 
the  crossroads  in  front  of  us  (502).  We  do  not  know  whether  the 
main  body  of  the  enemy  has  halted  across  the  Conewago  for  the  night, 
or  has  marched  off.  Our  picket  is  no  longer  sending  patrols  on  the 
roads  just  across  the  creek.  Other  patrols  like  yours  may  be  sent 
on  other  roads,  but  I  know  of  none,  and  you  are  not  likely  to  meet 
any.  Take  your  patrol  through  the  enemy's  outpost  line  and  follow 
the  Heidlersburg  road  to  locate  the  outpost  support  or  reserve.  If 
you  find  none  between  here  and  Heidlersburg,  come  back  at  once. 
If  you  find  one,  keep  it  in  sight  and  come  back  if  it  marches  off. 
In  any  case,  be  back  here  at  daylight.  You  have  already  been  in  that 
direction  on  patrol  and  know  the  country  as  well  as  I  do.  Cross  at 
the  ford  or  by  the  ropes  southeast  of  here,  or  take  the  boat  at  the 
west  end  of  the  island.     Let  me  know  which  you  choose.     Repeat. 

In  the  open,  you  can  see  a  man  at  about  100  yards  dis- 
tance if  he  is  on  the  skyline  and  standing;  otherwise,  about 
25  yards  if  he  is  standing,  and  about  10  yards  if  lying 
down. 

1.  What  equipment  will  the  patrol  carry? 

2.  What  route  do  you  intend  to  follow? 
•"..     What  formations  will  the  patrol  use? 

SERGEANT  HILL'S  SOLUTION 

1.  Each  man  will  carry  a  rifle,  belt  with  40  rounds  of 
ammunition,  and  canteen.  In  addition,  I  personally  shall 
carry  a  wire-cutter,  watch,  electric  flash  lamp,  and  note 
book  and  pencil ;  also,  of  course,  the  compass  which  is  a 
part  of  my  unit  equipment. 

2.  I  intend  to  cross  by  means  of  the  boat;  cross  the 
load  about  midway  between  crossroads  502  and  the  road- 

rk  700  yards  northwest  thereof;  pass  through  the  big 
loda  so  as  to  get  in  touch  with  the  Heidlersburg  road  at  a 
point  not  less  than  200  yards  northeast  of  crossroads  502; 
then,  using  the  telegraph  or  telephone  poles  as  a  guide,  ad- 
vance along  the  west  side  of  the  road  and  75  or'  100  yards 
from  it,  but  swinging  around  the  ridges  so  as  not  to  appear 
on  the  skyline,  and  swinging  around  any  farmhouse  that 
may  be  along  the  road. 

."..  After  landing  on  the  north  bank  of  the  Conewago, 
the  patrol  will  proceed  in  single  file,  with  10  pace  distances 


A  CONTACT  PATROL  159 

and  myself  in  the  lead ;  on  hands  and  knees  or  crawling  when 
necessary.  When  the  patrol  is  some  distance  inside  the  big 
woods,  it  will  be  formed  with  one  man  from  3  to  10  paces 
on  my  left  (exact  distance  depending  upon  the  amount  of 
light)  ;  behind  this  man  will  march  another  at  the  same  dis- 
tance, and  then  a  fourth  man  at  the  same  distance  behind 
the  third.  The  same  formation  will  be  used  after  the  pa- 
trol leaves  the  big  woods. 

DISCUSSION 

The  first  sergeant's  orders  indicate  that  you  are  prob- 
ably in  for  a  hard  night's  work.  Fortunately,  such  patrols 
are  not  a  daily  occurrence. 

First,  we  desire  to  say  a  word  about  the  equipment.  It 
is  November  2,  and  therefore  the  nights  are  cold,  but  we 
have  not  gone  into  details  as  to  the  clothing  of  the  troops. 
If  the  troops  have  their  overcoats,  the  members  of  your 
patrol  would  wear  theirs.  Otherwise,  you  would  try  to  rus- 
tle an  extra  flannel  shirt  and  sweater  for  each  of  the  men, 
so  that  each  man  could  wear  two  flannel  shirts  and  two 
sweaters.  Failing  in  this,  we  would  recommend  that  you 
carry  blankets.  Under  no  circumstances  should  you  fail 
to  make  provisions  for  keeping  the  men  fairly  comfortable. 
You  might  dispense  with  these  articles  if  the  patrol  were  to 
march  continuously,  but  it  is  likely  that  you  will  be  obliged 
to  remain  inactive  and  concealed  for  several  hours  and  you 
should  prepare  accordingly. 

The  men  of  the  visiting  patrol  in  the  Tenth  Problem 
carried  bayonets,  but  you  will  remember  that  this  patrol 
was  obliged  to  challenge  any  one  it  met,  and  to  make  pris- 
oners of  all  strangers.  You,  on  the  other  hand,  should 
under  no  circumstances  attempt  to  fight,  except  in  self  de- 
fense as  a  last  resort.  Under  these  circumstances,  we 
believe  that  a  patrol  such  as  yours,  which  should  march 
stripped  of  all  unnecessary  equipment,  will  be  better  off 
without  bayonets.  For  the  same  reason,  you  need  very 
little  ammunition,  but  the  length  of  time  that  your  patrol 
will  be  out  makes  it  advisable  to  carry  canteens  of  water. 
The  wire-cutter  can  be  carried  in  the  pocket  and  may  be 


L60  THIRThKXTH  PROBLEM 

very  useful.  The  flash  lamp  will  be  a  great  convenience  in 
■  use  you  have  to  examine  your  watch  or  compass,  or  have 
to  write  a  message.  In  using  it,  however,  you  should  lie 
close  to  the  ground  and  carefully  cover  your  hands  and  the 
lamp  with  your  hat  or  overcoat. 

The  first  sergeant  very  properly  made  no  reference  to 
crossroads  502  as  a  starting  point  for  your  patrol,  even  as- 
suming that  you  could  pick  your  way  across  the  bridge 
wreckage.  The  Red  sentinel  post  would  stop  you  at  the 
very  beginning.  The  same  objection  may  be  offered  with 
respect  to  the  ford  700  yards  southeast  of  our  picket.  Al- 
though the  ford  is  not  near  the  road,  it  is  quite  certain  that 
the  enemy  has  it  under  observation.  The  lines  of  rope 
might  enable  your  patrol  to  cross  without  being  observed, 
but  the  men  would  be  soaked,  and  the  night  will  probably 
be  a  long  and  cold  one.  However,  the  final  reason  for  choos- 
ing to  cross  by  means  of  the  rowboat,  is  the  fact  that  it 
places  the  patrol  on  the  most  favorable  side  of  the  Heidlers- 
burg  road,  as  we  shall  see  later.  To  tell  the  truth,  we 
forced  the  situation  when  we  allowed  the  first  sergeant  to 
leave  to  you  the  choice  of  your  crossing  place. 

In  addition  to  the  Red  sentinel  post  near  crossroads 
502,  you  may  as  well  take  it  for  granted  that  there  is  another 
Red  sentinel  post  at  the  roadbend  700  yards  northwest  of 
crossroads  502,  and  that  frequent  patrols  pass  between  these 
two  points.  You  will  be  obliged  to  use  the  utmost  care 
when  you  enter  the  boat,  paddle  it  across,  and  leave  it.  You 
cannot  use  the  oar-locks.  When  you  reach  the  opposite 
bank,  you  must  hide  the  boat  as  well  as  you  can  and  make 
note  Of  some  nearby  landmark. 

On  our  map  it  is  impossible  to  decide  upon  the  exact 
route  to  the  big  woods,  but  it  is  quite  probable  that  you  will 
be  obliged  to  approach  the  road  on  your  hands  and  knees 
and  then  cross  it  by  crawling.  You  must  lead  the  way, 
and  each  of  the  other  men  must  do  exactly  as  the  man  in 
front  of  him  does ;  that  is,  advance  on  his  hands  and  knees, 
or  crawl,  or.  lie  still.  If  the  road  were  lined  with  woods  on 
both  sides,  we  would  recommend  that  the  patrol  cross  in 
kirmish  line;  but  you  are  obliged  to  approach  the  road 
over  ground  that  is  as  open  to  view  as  the  road  itself.     It 


A  CONTACT  PATROL  161 

matters  little  at  what  point  you  strike  the  woods.  The 
main  thing  is  to  get  into  the  woods  undiscovered.  Once 
you  are  in  the  woods,  the  first  thing  to  do  is  to  get  safely 
away  from  the  road  that  you  have  just  crossed,  and  then  try 
to  find  the  Heidlersburg  road  at  a  point  that  is  a  safe  dis- 
tance from  the  sentinel  post  at  crossroads  502.  Your  ob- 
ject now  is  to  use  the  road  as  a  guide. 

As  soon  as  you  are  clear  of  the  woods,  you  will  see  the 
great  advantage  of  being  on  the  west  side  of  the  road  in- 
stead of  the  east  side.  The  greater  part  of  the  road  will 
appear  on  the  skyline;  the  tops  of  telegraph  or  telephone 
poles  will  almost  certainly  appear  on  the  skyline  through- 
out the  distance  to  Heidlersburg.  Your  patrol  will  be  either 
on  a  down  slope  or  on  low  ground,  with  a  dark  background 
when  viewed  from  the  road.  Hence,  your  patrol  can  walk 
parallel  to  the  road  and  100  yards  away  from  it  and  still  see 
the  poles  and,  in  many  places,  any  man  that  might  be  on  the 
road.  A  person  on  the  road,  however,  would  be  unable  to 
see  you,  though  he  might  be  able  to  hear  you.  It  becomes, 
then,  merely  a  question  of  how  quietly  you  advance.  Of 
course,  you  may  stumble  across  a  patrol,  or  even  a  sentinel, 
off  the  road.  To  reduce  the  chance  of  mishap  on  this  score, 
you  would  loop  around  the  spurs  that  run  westward  from  the 
road,  in  order  not  to  appear  on  someone  else's  skyline,  but 
the  road  is  still  the  guide. 

When  you  have  a  long  distance  to  go  at  night,  and 
must  avoid  discovery,  the  surest  method  is  to  find  a  road  or 
railroad,  or  a  combination  of  roads,  to  follow.  Study  care- 
fully the  road  or  combination  of  roads  that  will  lead  you 
to  your  destination  and  then,  if  possible,  choose  the  low  side 
for  your  advance  so  that  the  poles,  or  even  the  trees  or 
fences  alongside,  if  there  are  no  poles,  may  be  on  the  skyline. 
Even  in  daytime,  the  tops  of  a  line  of  poles  are  an  excellent 
guide  for  a  patrol  that  must  avoid  being  seen  from  the  road. 

Under  no  circumstances  would  we  consent  to  the  route 
you  followed  when  you  patrolled  towards  Heidlersburg  yes- 
terday afternoon  (Ninth  Problem).  You  are  now  looking 
for  the  camp  or  bivouac  of  one  of  the  larger  outpost  bodies. 

You  will  find  such  bodies  on  or  near  a  road,  particularly  at 
night;  and  you  are  ordered  to  confine  your  attention  to  the 


162  THIRTEENTH   PROBLEM 

Heidlersburg  road.  A  patrol  easily  loses  its  way  at  night. 
It  will  be  hard  enough  to  guide  on  the  road  when  you  con- 
sider the  ridges  around  which  you  must  pass,  and  the  farm- 
house squarely  between  the  ridges.  Farmers'  dogs  are  es- 
pecially troublesome. 

The  formation  of  the  patrol  while  advancing  parallel 
to  the  road  is  determined  by  the  ground.  The  task  of  ex- 
amining the  country  along  the  road  falls  on  you.  The  man 
on  your  left  must  watch  the  other  flank  and  guide  on  you. 
The  other  men  follow  him  because  he  is  farthest  from  the 
road  and  nearest  to  the  low  ground,  which  is  the  safe  ground. 
The  same  principle  is  observed  as  in  the  formation  of  your 
patrol  in  Situation  IV,  Ninth  Problem. 

SITUATION  II 

When  you  reach  the  cornfield  400  yards  north  of  cross- 
roads 502,  and  are  midway  between  the  water  course  and 
the  road,  you  see  on  the  road  east  of  you,  against  the  sky- 
line, three  men  marching  towards  crossroads  502. 

What  do  you  intend  to  do? 

SERGEANT  HILL'S  SOLUTION 

Lie  down  and  wait  until  the  Reds  are  safely  out  of  the 
way;  then  continue  towards  Heidlersburg. 

DISCUSSION 

As  long  as  you  have  a  decided  advantage  of  position,  it 
would  be  foolish  to  attempt  to  move.  The  three  Reds  prob- 
ably form  a  visiting  patrol,  or  they  may  be  a  relief  of  senti- 
nels going  out  to  be  posted ;  it  does  not  matter.  They  can- 
not see  you,  but  they  may  hear  you  if  you  move.  If  your 
patrol  is  properly  instructed,  the  men  will  naturally  lie  down 
when  you  do  so.     No  signal  or  sound  is  necessary. 

SITUATION     m 

As  you  continued  towards  Heidlersburg,  you  were  able 
to  examine  the  road  where  it  crosses  the  spur  a  half  mile 
northeast  of  crossroads  502.     In  the  vicinity  of  the  farm- 


A  CONTACT  PATROL  163 

house  you  experienced  greater  difficulty,  but,  observing  no 
signs  whatever,  and  in  view  of  the  fact  that  the  ground  in 
that  vicinity  is  very  low,  you  decided  that  there  was  no  large 
outpost  body  on  or  near  that  part  of  the  road.  Continuing 
your  advance  you  passed  through  the  cornfield  west  of  the 
house,  and  circled  around  the  west  slope  of  the  low  spur 
in  front  of  you. 

You  are  now  300  yards  northwest  of  the  house,  and 
about  ready  to  make  your  way  back  towards  the  road,  when 
you  observe  through  the  woods  a  number  of  small  fires  ap- 
parently 200  yards  northeast  of  your  present  position. 

What  do  you  intend  to  do? 

SERGEANT  HILL'S  SOLUTION 

I  intend  to  approach  carefully  until  I  can  see  whether 
there  are  any  men  around  the  fires. 

SITUATION     IV 

You  arrive  at  the  point  where  the  fence  enters  the  woods 
(400  yards  west  of  roadfork  545)  and  remain  in  observation 
for  several  minutes.  There  appear  to  be  20  or  30  very  small 
fires,  and  occasionally  men  pass  between  you  and  some  of 
these  fires.  Also,  you  catch  the  hum  of  low  conversation. 
From  other  signs  you  decide  also  that,  from  time  to  time, 
men  are  coming  to  the  fires  from  the  direction  of  the  road  to 
the  east  and  others  are  leaving  the  fires  and  going  towards 
the  road. 

What  do  you  intend  to  do? 

SERGEANT  HILL'S  SOLUTION 

I  intend  to  remain  in  observation  in  or  near  my  present 
position  as  long  as  the  present  activity  continues. 

DISCUSSION 

In  an  outpost  the  building  of  fires  is  generally  pro- 
hibited. In  that  case,  how  can  we  account  for  the  small 
fires  that  you  have  discovered?  The  explanation  is  prob- 
ably as  follows:     The  enemy  has  been  as  late  as  we,  or 


164  THIRTEENTH   PROBLEM 

later,  in  getting  his  outpost  established.  The  Reds  have 
had  nothing  to  eat  since  before  noon.  The  night  is  cold. 
The  men  need  hot  coffee  and  food.  After  a  battle  there  is 
always  a  temporary  disorganization  of  messing  arrange- 
ments. It  is  probable  that  the  Red  outpost  cannot  be  served 
with  hot  coffee  and  food  from  some  point  farther  back,  and 
there  must  be  some  reason  why  the  troops  immediately  in 
front  of  you  cannot  use  indoor  fires  in  Heidlersburg.  Hence, 
the  officer  responsible  for  the  fires  has  selected  a  ravine 
>  Teened  by  a  strip  of  woods  and  has  ordered  individual 
cooking,  probably  by  squads  and  in  relays.  Under  all  the 
conditions,  the  necessity  for  hot  coffee  and  food  outweighs 
the  necessity  for  complete  concealment  at  a  point  so  far  (1 
mile)  in  rear  of  the  Red  line  of  observation.  Whether  this 
explanation  is  correct  or  not,  your  discovery  has  undoubt- 
edly revealed  the  fact  that  you  have  located  a  large  outpost 
body,  probably  a  strong  support,  on  the  road  east,  or  nearly 
east,  of  where  you  now  are.  With  the  aid  of  our  map  we 
would  conclude  that  the  support  is  at  roadfork  545,  but  it 
is  not  likely  that  your  knowledge  of  the  ground  with  respect 
to  your  present  position  would  be  definite  enough  to  enable 
you  to  locate  the  support  so  precisely.  It  is  sufficient  to 
know  that  you  have  probably  located  an  important  outpost 
element. 

The  next  question  is,  can  you  approach  nearer  to  Heid- 
lersburg, or  improve  your  present  position?  We  would  not 
recommend  such  an  attempt  for  the  present.  Of  course,  you 
will  obtain  the  best  results  if  you  can  locate  the  enemy's 
main  body,  because  the  enemy  may  march  off,  leaving  sup- 
ports in  position  as  well  as  outguards.  But  there  are  times 
when  we  must  let  well  enough  alone.  You  cannot  approach 
nearer  to  Heidlersburg  unless  you  make  a  wide  detour 
through  the  woods  to  the  north.  As  we  have  said  before,  a 
patrol  easily  loses  its  way  at  night,  particularly  in  woods, 
and  you  may  eventually  come  out  of  the  woods  at  a  point 
where  your  discovery  is  almost  certain.  Even  if  it  exer- 
( rfses  the  greatest  care  and  skill,  a  patrol  passing  through 
woods  and  underbrush  at  night  has  many  collisions  with 
dry  branches  and  other  unseen  obstacles.  On  a  still  night 
its  progress  may  be  detected  by  sound  at  a  great  distance. 


A  CONTACT  PATROL  165 

*  :|<  *  *  *  *  ■    *  *  *  $  *  * 

Our  discussion  has  indicated  what  the  future  action  of 
the  patrol  would  be  under  ordinary  circumstances.  It  is 
therefore  unnecessary  to  carry  the  problem  farther.  One 
point  only  deserves  attention:  At  night  it  is  unwise  to 
send  back  information  or  messages  by  a  single  messenger. 
Ordinarily,  when  you  have  information  important  enough 
to  be  sent  back,  the  conditions  will  be  such  that  the  entire 
patrol  may  return  at  once ;  but  if  you  desire  to  send  a  mes- 
sage and  remain  in  observation,  you  should  send  two  mes- 
sengers. 


Remarks  on  the  Plainview  Outpost 


These  remarks  are  inserted  here  in  the  hope  that  they 
will  be  of  interest  to  officers  who  have  followed  the  preceding 
eight  problems,  and  who  may  have  inquired  into  the  larger 
aspects  of  the  protection  given  the  brigade.  It  is  a  further 
object  of  these  remarks  to  encourage  carefully  prepared 
and  complete  situations,  using  the  minor  parts  as  bases  for 
problems  for  noncommissionned  officers.  There  are  several 
interesting  points  in  connection  with  the  Plainview  outpost. 
Some  of  these  points  will  be  discussed.  Officers  may  de- 
rive much  value  from  studying  their  own  problems  in  like 
manner. 

It  was  assumed  that  the  brigade,  with  one  troop  of 
cavalry,  was  advancing  to  the  northeast  to  hold  the  line  of 
the  Conewago  until  tomorrow  or  the  next  day,  when  rein- 
forcements would  arrive  and  a  further  advance  would  be 
made.  Our  information  indicated  that  the  enemy  is  inactive 
for  the  present,  and  after  noon  today  our  cavalry  located 
him  in  camp  about  four  miles  northeast  of  Plainview.  Our 
advance  guard  battalion  and  one  platoon  of  cavalry  consti- 
tute our  outpost.  The  remainder  of  the  cavalry  is  relieved 
from  further  duty  with  the  advance  guard  and,  after  re- 
connaissance beyond  the  Conewago,  will  withdraw  to  the 
main  body. 

Outpost  cavalry,  if  too  weak  to  camp  in  advance  of  the 
outpost  proper,  is  usually  assigned  to  the  reserve  or  support, 
or  divided  between  two  or  more  supports,  sending  patrols 
from  the  element  to  which  it  is  assigned.  Why,  then,  did 
.Major  Crosby  order  the  outpost  cavalry  to  a  detached  post 
on  the  flank'.' 

Several  reasons  may  be  given  for  this  decision.  The 
platoon  is,  of  course,  too  small  to  be  posted  across  the  Con- 
ewago. The  picket  and  supports  are  connected  with  the  re- 
serve  by  telephone;  this  does  away  with  the  necessity  for 
mounted  messengers,  and  therefore  no  troopers  need  be 
detached  for  messengers.  The  river  is  unfordable  except 
at  well  known  places.     The  enemy  is  likely  to  send  strong 

166 


PLAINVIEW  OUTPOST  167 

patrols  to  the  Conewago,  particularly  at  night,  to  watch  the 
important  crossings  at  Hershey  Mills  and  northeast  of 
Plainview.  Under  these  circumstances,  it  is  just  as  easy 
to  send  cavalry  patrols  from  the  detached  post.  The  extra 
distance  by  way  of  side  roads  is  more  than  compensated  for 
by  the  fact  that  these  roads  and  the  Conewago  crossing 
which  leads  to  them  will  be  less  carefully  watched.  Finally, 
a  detached  post  at  the  point  selected  is  necessary.  The  post 
selected  is  rather  distant  for  an  infantry  platoon.  All  things 
considered,  it  is  a  good  position  for  the  outpost  cavalry.  A 
short  distance  to  the  southwest  ample  cover  will  be  found  for 
the  horses. 

If  the  brigade  commander  had  not  indicated  that  he 
would  send  a  detached  post  from  the  main  body  towards 
Bridge  S.  H.,  would  Major  Crosby  have  been  obliged  to  ex- 
tend his  outpost  far  enough  to  cover  that  road  ? 

Major  Crosby's  orders  were  to  establish  the  outpost  on 
the  general  line  of  the  ridge  southeast  of  Hershey  Mill 
and  northeast  of  Plainview.  An  order  in  this  form  im- 
plies that  the  outpost  will  prepare  to  resist  on  the  approxi- 
mate line  mentioned,  but  the  outpost  must  reach  beyond 
that  line,  if  an  extension  is  necessary  for  protection,  al- 
though the  elements  thus  placed  on  the  flanks  may  be  able 
only  to  warn  and  not  to  resist.  How  far  beyond  the  general 
line  should  an  outpost  thus  extend? 

The  question  is  not  always  easy  to  answer.  In  the 
■present  case,  however,  it  is  evident  that  the  outpost  must 
be  ready  to  resist  any  hostile  advance  by  way  of  Hershey 
Mill,  the  bridges  northeast  of  Plainview,  and  the  fords  east 
of  Plainview.  It  is  also  evident  that  the  main  body  should 
at  least  be  warned  in  case  of  a  hostile  advance  by  way  of 
Bridge  S.  H.,  or  the  crossing  at  which  the  cavalry  has  been 
posted.  Therefore,  if  the  brigade  commander  had  not 
placed  a  detached  post  on  the  Bridge  S.  H.  road,  Major 
Crosby  would  have  been  obliged  to  do  so. 

Has  the  brigade  sufficient  protection  on  its  east  flank? 

The  country  around  Woodside  S.  H.  is  fairly  open  to 
view  from  the  main  camp  and  the  outpost,  especially  from 
the  reserve  and  the  cavalry  detached  post.  What  with 
patrols  and  the  ordinary  daytime  activities  of  a  large  camp, 


L68  PLAIN VI KW  OUTPOST 

we  may  fairly  assume  that  the  brigade  is  amply  protected 
during  daylight.  At  night,  however,  there  should  be  a  de- 
tached post  near  544.  The  present  outpost  comprises  one- 
ninth  of  the  whole  command,  and  the  enemy  is  close  at 
hand.  Under  these  circumstances,  Major  Crosby  is  justi- 
fied in  requesting  the  brigade  commander  to  send  a  detached 
post  from  the  main  body.  If  Major  Crosby  prefers  not  to 
make  this  request,  or  if  the  brigade  commander  disapproves 
the  request,  another  detached  post,  not  less  than  a  platoon, 
must  be  sent  from  the  outpost  reserve,  unless  the  brigade 
commander  assumes  the  responsibility  for  leaving  that 
flank  open. 

Why  are  machine  guns  not  assigned  to  the  outpost? 

Machine  guns  were  omitted  for  the  purpose  of  the  prob- 
lem. The  machine  gun  company  of  our  regiment  should  be 
assigned  to  the  outpost.  Until  Major  Crosby  has  inspect- 
ed the  outpost  line  and  has  decided  where  the  machine  guns 
are  needed  most,  he  would  probably  leave  them  with  the 
reserve.  His  inspection  would  probably  prompt  him  to  send 
a  platoon  (two  guns)  to  each  of  the  outguards  of  Support 
No.  1. 

Why  do  the  outguards  entrench  a  day  position  some  dis- 
tance from  the  defiles  that  they  cover,  and  then  move  for- 
ward to  these  defiles  at  night? 

Let  us  assume  that  the  enemy  makes  a  vigorous  attack 
in  day  time  against  the  picket  which  covers  the  ford  east 
of  Plainview.  If  the  picket  lined  the  west  bank  with  a 
firing  line,  the  enemy,  in  greatly  superior  numbers,  would 
line  the  east  bank  and  smother  the  fire  of  the  picket.  With 
sufficient  force,  the  enemy  would  have  little  difficulty  in 
crossing  the  ford  quickly.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  picket 
entrenched  in  the  woods  400  yards  west  of  the  ford  and 
cleared  a  field  of  fire  to  the  island,  the  woods  that  line  the 
west  bank,  together  with  the  distance  and  the  trenches,  will 
greatly  reduce  the  effect  of  the  enemy's  fire,  and  the  picket 
may  be  able  to  concentrate  on  any  troops  that  attempt  to 
cross  the  ford.  At  night  the  situation  is  different.  The  en- 
emy will  not  be  able  to  fire  effectively,  even  at  the  short  dis- 
tance which  separates  the  two  banks.  The  picket  would  be 
at  the  mouth  of  the  defile,  prepared  to  meet  the  enemy's  nar- 


PLAINVIEW  OUTPOST  169 

row  front  with  fire  and  bayonet.  If  the  picket  remained 
in  its  trench,  the  enemy  could  cross  under  cover  of  dark- 
ness and  form  a  line  on  the  west  bank  before  advancing. 

In  a  previous  discussion  the  statement  was  made  that 
in  most  cases  reasons  will  be  found  for  entrenching  a  picket. 
To  illustrate  a  situation  that  would  make  entrenching  un- 
necessary, let  us  assume  that  our  brigade  arrived  in  its 
present  position  so  late  in  the  afternoon  that  the  outguards 
arrived  in  their  day  positions  an  hour  or  less  before  the 
time  for  moving  into  the  night  positions;  and  assume,  in 
addition,  that  it  is  definitely  known  that  the  brigade  will 
resume  the  march  at  daylight  tomorrow. 


Fourteenth  Problem 


\   Small  Outguard 


SITUATION     I 

Our  battalion  has  been  at  Biglerville,  guarding  the  rail- 
road. This  afternoon  several  companies  of  Reds  came 
from  the  south  and  attempted  to  destroy  the  railroad  bridge 
1,000  yards  east  of  Stiner.  Our  battalion  left  Biglerville  at 
once,  defeated  the  enemy  north  of  Stiner  just  before  dark, 
and  drove  him  south  on  the  Carlisle  road.  Our  battalion 
pursued  with  Company' A  as  advance  guard;  the  First  Pla- 
toon as  advance  party. 

It  is  now  a  half  hour  after  dark.  Except  against  the 
sky  line,  a  man  can  be  seen  at  a  distance  of  only  30  or  35 
yards.  The  battalion  has  halted.  The  advance  party  is  at 
Texas  crossroads.  The  point  (Sergeant  Hill  and  the  first 
squad)  is  probably  75  yards  south  of  Texas  crossroads. 

You  are  Corporal  Adams,  Third  Squad. 

Captain  Rowen  has  assembled  the  noncommissioned 
officers  of  the  advance  party  and  now  says : 

No  further  news  of  the  enemy.  The  main  body  of  the  battalion 
baits  for  the  night  at  the  bridge  that  we  crossed  a  half  mile  north  of 
here.  Company  A  will  be  the  outpost  and  will  bivouac  at  these  cross- 
roads. Second  Squad,  go  500  paces  west  on  this  road  and  establish 
Outguard  No.  1.  Third  Squad,  go  500  paces  south  on  this  road  and 
establish  Outguard  No.  2.  Send  back  the  connecting  files  and  the 
point  as  you  pass  them.  Fourth  Squad,  go  500  paces  east  on  this  road 
and  establish  Outguard  No.  3.  Night  signal:  Forward  march,  and 
Mention  to  orders,  (to  be    whistled).     Posts. 

What  do  you  do  up  to  the  time  you  pass  the  point? 

CORPORAL  ADAMS'  SOLUTION  ' 

I  return  to  my  squad  and  order: 

The  battalion  will  camp  at  the  bridge  a  half  mile  north  of  here. 
I  he  company  bivouacs  at  these  crossroads  as  outpost  for  the  battalion. 
This  squad  gens  r,00  paces  down  the  road  to  the  south  to  establish  Out- 
guard No.  2.      Everybody  march  quietly.    Kelley,  take  Miller  and  move 
out  as  point.     The  squad  will  follow  you  at  30  yards. 

170 


A   SMALL  OUTGUARD  171 

When  Kelley  and  Miller  have  gained  about  25  yards  dis- 
tance, I  add : 

Towney,  tell  me  when  we  have  gone  500  paces.  Follow  me  (to 
the   squad). 

I  follow  Kelley  and  Miller  at  as  great  a  distance  as 
possible  without  losing  sight  of  them.  As  I  pass  the  con- 
necting files  and  the  advance  guard  point,  I  inform  them  that 
they  are  to  return  to  the  crossroads.     I  count  my  paces. 

DISCUSSION 

Speaking  of  marches,  the  Infantry  Drill  Regulations  say 
that,  if  the  distance  to  be  covered  necessitates  either 
breaking  camp  before  daylight  or  making  camp  after  dark, 
it  is  better  to  do  the  former. 

There  are,  of  course,  many  disadvantages  in  making 
camp  after  dark,  but  the  necessity  for  doing  so  is  frequently 
imposed  upon  us  by  the  enemy,  as  in  the  present  case. 
Making  camp  in  the  dark  is  difficult  and  irritating.  Posting 
a  new  outpost  in  the  dark  in  unfamiliar  country,  if  not 
difficult  and  irritating,  is  at  least  an  unsatisfactory  pro- 
ceeding. It  involves  a  long  and  careful  reconnaissance  in 
the  dark  by  the  outpost  and  support  commanders.  The  ele- 
ments of  the  outpost,  after  the  men  have  settled  themselves 
in  a  position  which  they  hope  to  occupy,  are  likely  to  be  call- 
ed upon  to  move.  The  establishment  of  routes  for  visiting 
patrols  becomes  much  more  difficult.  It  will  frequently 
happen  that  the  outpost  dispositions,  when  examined  by 
daylight  the  next  morning,  will  be  found  very  defective  in 
the  light  of  conditions  that  could  not  be,  or  were  not,  dis- 
covered at  night. 

Captain  Rowen  had  no  reason  to  believe  that  each  of 
the  three  outguards  would  find  a  suitable  outguard  position 
on  its  own  road  and  exactly  500  paces  from  Texas  cross- 
roads. But  Captain  Rowen  must  inspect  the  outguard  po- 
sitions at  once,  and  his  experience  has  taught  him  that  he 
will  save  a  great  deal  of  time  and  annoyance  if  he  knows 
exactly  where  he  will  find  each  outguard.  Only  the  sentinels 
may  be  awake,  or  close  enough  to  see  the  road.  For  some 
reason,  possibly  lack  of  training,  sentinels  sometimes  per- 


172  FOURTEENTH   PROBLEM 

mit  unrecognized  persons  to  pass  by  them  without  chal- 
lenge.* Any  officer  who  has  posted  outguards  at  night,  es- 
pecially when  the  outguards  are  small  and  in  dense  country, 
has  learned  the  advantage  of  first  sending  them  an  arbitrary 
distance  from  a  known  starting  point.  During  his  inspec- 
tion he  discovers  landmarks  to  guide  himself  and  others  to 
the  final  position  of  the  outguard,  or  he  may  fix  the  position 
approximately  by  pacing. 

In  the  present  case,  you  are  expected  to  do  the  best 
you  can  in  the  matter  of  establishing  your  outguard  when 
you  have  arrived  500  paces  south  of  the  crossroads,  and  then 
await  the  arrival  of  Captain  Rowen. 

At  night,  the  distances  between  parts  of  a  marching 
column  are  greatly  reduced.  You  probably  observed  that, 
in  the  statement  of  the  situation,  the  advance  guard  point 
was  about  75  yards  ahead  of  the  advance  party;  also  that 
there  were  connecting  files  between  the  point  and  the  ad- 
vance party,  in  spite  of  the  short  distance.  When  you 
marched  your  squad  towards  the  outguard  position,  you 
needed  a  point  as  security  in  front,  but  instead  of  sending 
this  point  100  or  200  or  even  300  yards  as  you  would  have 
done  in  daytime,  you  sent  it  only  as  far  as  you  could  see.  If 
you  had  sent  it  farther  ahead,  you  would  have  been  obliged 
to  use  connecting  files  in  sight  of  each  other  or  lose  control 
over  the  point. 

The  enemy's  fire  will  have  no  effect  unless  the  men 
tiring  can  see  their  target.  If  your  point  encounters  a  party 
of  Reds  in  the  road,  these  Reds  may,  of  course,  see  your 
point,  but  they  cannot  see  your  squad.  You  need  only  a  few 
seconds  warning.  If  there  is  a  large  hostile  force  n^ar  by, 
you  will  probably  hear  it  before  you  see  it.  If  it  is  merely 
a  patrol,  you  may  not  hear  it  before  you  see  it,  but  in  that 
case,  a  sudden  meeting  is  no  disadvantage  to  you,  since  it 
gives  you  an  opportunity  to  drive  off  the  patrol  instead  of 
giving  the  patrol  an  opportunity  to  escape  unobserved  and 
remain  in  your  vicinity.  Of  course,  your  squad  will  march 
as  quietly  as  possible. 

In  a  former  problem  we  advised  outguard  commanders 


♦During    the    Philippine    Insurrection    this    mishap    befell    the    writer    twice    in 
one  month  and   resulted   in  a  useless  search   far  beyond  the  outguard  position. 


A  SMALL  OUTGUARD  173 

to  march  out  to  their  positions  as  soon  as  possible,  and  we 
pointed  out  the  fact  that  much  of  the  information  to  be  given 
the  members  of  the  outguard  can  best  be  given  at  the  out- 
guard  position.  In  practice,  your  judgment  must  deter- 
mine what  may  best  be  told  the  men  before  starting  out. 
For  example,  in  the  present  case,  we  prefer  to  tell  the 
squad,  before  leaving  the  crossroads,  that  the  company  will 
be  at  that  particular  point  during  the  night,  and  the  bat- 
talion will  camp  at  the  bridge  a  half  mile  to  the  north.  The 
point  to  be  emphasized  is  that  your  departure  should  not 
be  delayed  by  a  long  and  unnecessary  explanation  of  what 
the  squad  is  to  do. 

In  this  problem  we  have  used  another  system  of  night 
signalling.  Recruits  may  not  be  able  to  whistle  the  simple 
bugle  signals,  but  we  assume  that  your  men  are  not  recruits. 

The  call  is 

Forward  march. 

The  answer  or  acknowledgement  is 

Attention  to  orders. 

Although  there  are  but  few  short  bugle  signals,  the 
number  is  large  enough  to  permit  many  combinations. 

SITUATION  II 

You  arrived  500  paces  (about  440  yards,  taking  the 
average  soldier's  pace)  and  found  yourself  100  yards  south 
of  the  farmhouse.  We  assume  that  you  watched  the  house 
and  barn  closely  and  passed  them  quietly.  The  map  is  not 
detailed  enough  to  indicate  how  the  outguard  and  its  sentinel 
post  should  be  posted,  or  to  bring  out  anything  new  relative 
to  the  posting  of  the  outguard. 

When  Captain  Rowen  arrived,  he  moved  the  outguard 
back  to  the  point,  300  yards  south  of  the  crossroads,  where 
the  rail  fence  on  the  west  side  meets  the  road.  The  house 
and  barn  were  investigated  and  were  found  to  be  tempor- 
arily deserted.  The  sentinels  were  posted  at  the  point  in- 
dicated by  Captain  Rowen,  and  the  remainder  of  the  out- 
guard was  placed  in  the  cornfield  20  yards  north.  The  cap- 
tain's final  instructions  were : 


174  FOURTEENTB    PROBLEM 

At  daylight,  move  to  the  best  observation  point  within  300  yards 
to  the  south. 

Where  do  you  post  the  outguard  at  daylight? 

■tk:      The  corn   is  little  less  than  knee  high). 

CORPORAL  ADAMS'  SOLUTION 

I  place  the  sentinel  near  the  southwest  corner  of  the 
farmyard  (the  fence  corner),  about  400  yards  south  of 
Texas  crossroads,  and  place  the  remainder  of  the  squad  a 
short  distance  north  of  the  sentinel  and  along  the  west  fence 
of  the  farmyard,  the  exact  spot  depending  upon  the  cover 
that  can  be  found  or  provided. 

DISCUSSION 

First,  we  may  explain  why  Captain  Rowen  moved  the 
outguard  back  from  the  position  where  it  first  halted. 
Within  certain  limits,  the  distance  between  a  support  and 
one  of  its  outguards  is  not  important.  The  important  thing 
is  the  ability  to  observe  and,  in  the  case  of  a  picket  that  must 
resist,  a.  suitable  defensive  position.  The  sentinels  posted 
near  the  first  position  of  your  outguard  were  on  the  down 
slope  of  a  ridge  and  had  a  shallow  ravine,  or  draw,  in  their 
front.  The  range  of  their  vision  was  limited  to  about  30 
yards  in  every  direction,  except  to  the  north  and  northwest, 
in  which  directions  the  skyline  enabled  them  to  see  the  crest 
of  the  ridge  on  which  the  farmhouse  stands.  But  the  enemy 
is  supposed  to  be  to  the  south.  If  other  conditions  permit, 
a  skyline  within  100  yards  of  a  sentinel's  front  is  an  advan- 
tage. The  ridge  450  yards  south  of  the  farmhouse  is  too  far 
away  to  form  a  skyline  at  night.  Captain  Rowen's  choice  lay 
between  the  position  finally  selected,  and  a  position  on  the 
road  about  700  yards  south  of  Texas  crossroads.  Either 
position  might  be  satisfactory. 

At  daylight,  your  sentinel  post  must  be  moved  forward 
and,  naturally,  the  whole  squad  would  also  go  forward  in 
order  to  be  reasonably  near  the  sentinel  post.  From  the 
new  day  position,  the  sentinels  can  see  hill  707  and  the  roads 
east  and  west  of  that  hill.  Captain  Rowen  will  undoubtedly 
inspect  the  outguard  again  as  soon  after  daylight  as  pos- 


A  SMALL  OUTGUARD  175 

sible,  and  may  decide  to  send  a  cossack  post  or  sentry  squad 
as  far  as  hill  707,  unless  the  march  is  resumed  early  in  the 
day. 

At  night,  an  outguard  sent  out  to  watch  a  road  must 
be  on,  or  very  near,  that  road.  After  daylight,  however, 
the  outguard  need  not  remain  near  the  road,  but  it  must  be 
able  to  see  the  road.  Frequently  a  position  will  be  found 
some  distance  away  from  the  road,  from  which  position  not 
only  the  road,  but  other  parts  of  the  terrain,  can  be  observ- 
ed. In  the  present  case,  however,  the  controlling  reason 
for  leaving  the  road  is  to  get  away  from  the  house  and,  at 
the  same  time,  obtain  a  good  observation  position. 

In  the  Sixth  and  Seventh  Problems  the  outguards 
moved  forward  at  dark  and  back  at  daylight.  In  the  pres- 
ent problem  we  find  that  the  outguard  should  move  forward 
at  daylight  and  back  at  night.  If  you  study  a  hundred  situ- 
ations, all  different,  you  might  conclude  that  in  the  majori- 
ty of  cases  the  night  and  day  positions  of  an  outguard  are 
the  same ;  that  is,  no  change  is  made.  Even  so,  it  would  be 
just  as  wrong  to  say  that  the  rule  is  to  make  no  change,  as 
to  say  that  the  rule  is  to  move  forward,  or  the  rule  is  to 
move  back.  The  only  correct  thing  to  say  is,  "The  facts 
concerning  the  enemy  and  our  own  troops  are  so  and  so; 
the  facts  concerning  the  terrain  are  so  and  so.  Now,  what 
is  the  sensible  thing  to  do?"  Rules  are  sometimes  poor 
guides. 

Perhaps  it  is  unfortunate  that  we  have  used  as  exam- 
ples, in  previous  problems,  two  strong  outguards,  both  of 
which  moved  forward  at  night.  (Sixth  and  Seventh  Prob- 
lems). We  may  make  the  matter  clearer  by  saying  that  a 
picket  changes  its  position  at  dark,  and  again  at  daylight, 
when  the  change  makes  it  easier  for  the  picket  to  resist. 
Sentinel  posts,  and  therefore  cossack  posts  and  sentry 
squads,  which,  ordinarily,  are  merely  the  combined  reliefs 
of  particular  sentinel  posts,  placed  under  a  commander  and 
near  the  sentinel  post  for  convenience,  change  their  positions 
at  night,  and  again  at  daylight,  only  when  the  change  makes 
it  easier  for  the  sentinels  to  observe.  If,  in  daytime,  the 
men  of  a  sentinel  post  are  posted  and  relieved  directly  from 
a  picket,  but  the  post  of  the  sentinels  is  poor  for  observation 


L76  FOURTEENTH   PROBLEM 

at  night,  while  the  position  of  the  picket  itself  is  satisfac- 
tory, the  latter  would  not  change  its  position,  but  would 
change  the  sentinel  post,  making  it  a  cossack  post  or  sentry 
squad  if  the  new  position  is  far  from  the  picket,  as  it  gen- 
erally would  be  at  ni^ht. 


Combat  Instruction 


(See  note  following  preface,  page  vi) 

Since  this  book  is  designed  to  serve  in  part  as  a  guide 
to  company  commanders,  this  concluding  chapter  is  pre- 
sented in  the  belief  that  it  describes  a  useful  method  of  com- 
bat instruction. 

From  recruit  drill,  drill  in  close  order,  and  drill  in  the 
mechanism  of  extended  order  (I.  D.  R.  6b),  company  com- 
manders frequently  pass  immediately  to  complete  field  ex- 
ercises (I.  D.  R.  6c).  The  writer  has  found  that  by  em- 
ploying an  intermediate  step  better  results  are  obtained. 

A  field  exercise  (I.  D.  R.  6c)  is  based  on  an  assumed 
situation,  to  which  the  appropriate  tactical  principles  and 
formations  are  applied.  It  may  be  an  advance  guard,  rear 
guard,  outpost,  attack,  defense,  convoy,  etc.  A  combat 
exercise  (I.  D.  R.  6d)  is  also  a  field  exercise,  but  it  is  one 
which  involves  attack  or  defense  only. 

Our  limitations  as  to  observation  and  memory  are  such 
that,  in  a  complete,  uninterrupted  combat  exercise,  many 
important  things  escape  correction  and  proper  elucidation. 
Frequently  the  result  is  a  lack  of  the  true  discipline,  under- 
standing, particularity,  and  care  which  form  the  foundation 
for  infantry  leading  and  control  in  battle. 

The  proper  combat  instruction  of  the  company,  and 
particularly  of  lieutenants  and  noncommissioned  officers, 
includes  an  understanding  of  the  meaning  and  purpose  of 
the  forms  which  make  up  the  prescribed  drill  movements  in 
extended  order  and  firings.  This  is  best  accomplished  by 
conceiving  separate  phases  of  combat  and  designing  exer- 
cises to  illustrate  correct  leading  and  conduct  thereunder. 

The  examples  which  follow  will  illustrate  the  applica- 
tion of  forms  to  separate  phases  of  combat,  under  conditions 
which  permit  intelligent,  detailed  criticism  and  solid  in- 
struction. A  study  of  these  examples  will  probably  lead 
the  reader  to  suspect  that  a  company  commander  must  be  a 
lecturer  in  a  small  way.  If  so,  the  reader  has  caught  our 
idea  exactly.  The  training  of  lieutenants  and  noncommis- 
sioned officers  is  half  of  the  game:  and  it  cannot  be  sue- 


178  COMBAT  INSTRUCTION 

cessful  and  complete  without  intelligent  and  pertinent  ex- 
planation of  concrete  examples. 

Battalion,  regimental,  and  brigade  commanders,  and 
inspectors,  by  devising  and  using  exercises  of  this  kind  can 
more  quickly  and  accurately  judge  the  tactical  training  and 
skill  of  a  company  than  by  any  other  means  known  to  the 
writer.  Drill  is  a  necessary  part  of  an  inspection,  and  an 
excellent  drill  is  prima  facie  evidence  of  efficiency,  but  it 
is  not  conclusive  as  to  field  efficiency.  A  complete  field  ex- 
ercise, on  the  other  hand,  generally  moves  too  rapidly  for 
minute  inspection. 

FIRST  EXAMPLE 

The  company  is  in  camp  near  Plainview.  The  captain 
has  found  it  necessary  to  clear  up  the  situation  as  to  the 
purpose  and  proper  leading  of  platoon  columns.  The  com- 
pany is  brought  to  the  farmyard  300  yards  northwest  of 
Plainview,  and  the  captain  announces  to  the  assembled  offi- 
cers and  noncommissioned  officers : 

The  enemy  is  intrenched  just  south  of  the  road  that  you  see 
yonder  through  the  trees,  and  about  2,000  yards  north-northwest  of 
here  (the  600— 626— 632— 587  road).  He  has  artillery.  Our  brigade 
attacks  from  this  ridge  (indicating  the  Plainview — 712  ridge).  An- 
other brigade  is  on  our  right.  We  have  artillery.  The  creek  in 
front  is  easily  fordable.  There  are  troops  on  the  right  and  left  of 
our  battalion.  Face  as  I  face  (the  captain  faces  roadfork  626).  At 
2,000  yards,  a  house,  barn,  and  small  orchard.  The  house  is  at  a 
roadfork.  Take  the  house  as  reference  point.  Nine  o'clock.  Four 
fingers.  Another  roadfork.  Our  battalion  objective  is  the  enemy's 
trench  between  the  two  roadforks  mentioned.  Take  the  house  as 
reference  point  again.  Seven-thirty  o'clock.  Two  fingers.  The  roof 
of  a  house  (800  yards  south  of  roadfork  626).  Across  the  road  from 
the  roof  and  to  the  right  of  it,  a  patch  of  woods.  The  battalion  will 
move  first  to  that  patch  of  woods  without  firing.  This  company  is  on 
the  right  and  is  base  company.  Company  B  on  our  left.  Companies 
C  and  D  in  support.     Any  questions?     Posts. 

He  then  forms  the  company  in  skirmish  line,  under 
cover  on  the  smith  slope  of  the  ridge,  and  commands: 

Platoon  columns,  march 

When  about  a  third  way  from  the  house  to  the  creek,  he 
halts  the  company,  assembles  the  platoon  leaders  and  guides, 
and  with  them  examines  the  location  of  each  platoon.  From 
time  to  time  he  makes  criticisms  and  suggestions  which  we 


COMBAT  INSTRUCTION  17y 

shall  sum  up  and  condense  later.  The  company  then  con- 
tinues the  advance  for  another  hundred  yards,  and  the  lo- 
cation of  the  platoon  columns  is  examined  as  before.  A 
final  halt  and  examination  is  made  just  south  of  the  creek. 

It  would  be  impossible  to  reproduce  here  the  remarks 
of  the  captain  exactly  as  made  by  him.  The  sum  and  sub- 
stance of  them  is  as  follows ; 

The  company  is  somewhat  restricted  in  its  advance.  We  can- 
not move  very  much  to  the  right  or  left  without  running  foul  of  other 
troops.  The  whole  brigade  has  to  move  forward  in  a  rough  line, 
each  unit  using  the  formation  best  suited  to  escape  artillery  fire.  The 
best  formation  for  each  depends  upon  the  ground  that  it  must  cover. 
Our  battalion  can  use  platoon  columns  because  of  the  numerous  trees 
on  this  sloping  ground.  If  each  platoon  leader  will  remember  that 
the  enemy's  artillery  has  to  see  its  target  in  order  to  fire  upon  it 
effectively,  he  will  realize  that  all  he  has  to  do  in  order  to  escape 
artillery  fire  is  to  keep  out  of  sight.  On  this  down-slope  a  platoon 
leader  should  not  have  much  trouble  marching  his  platoon  so  that 
the  foliage  of  one  tree  after  another  serves  as  a  screen.  Behind 
the  enemy's  front  line,  and  perhaps  in  the  line,  there  are  buildings 
or  high  points  at  which  the  artillery  will  station  observing  parties, 
connected  with  the  guns  by  telephone.  If  these  observing  parties 
see  you,  you  may  draw  fire.  The  thing  to  do,  then,  is  to  keep  a  sharp 
lookout  and  see  to  it  that  the  platoon  is  exposed  as  little  as  possible 
to  a  view  from  any  of  the  buildings  or  high  points  that  might  be 
used  by  the  enemy  as  artillery  observation  stations.  A  platoon  does 
not  have  to  march  in  a  straight  line.  The  platoons  do  not  have  to 
keep  abreast  of  each  other.  They  should  zig-zag  whenever  it  is  ne- 
cessary to  get  the  cover  of  the  tree  foliage.  It  would  not  be  seriously 
objectionable  if  one  platoon  marched  behind  another  for  a  short  dis- 
tance, if  it  cannot  otherwise  get  cover. 

The  foregoing  remarks  contain  nothing  but  what  is  im- 
portant for  the  platoon  leaders  and  guides  to  know.  The 
captain  avoids  a  discussion  of  matters  that  concern  only 
the  higher  commanders. 

When  the  company  reaches  the  creek,  the  captain  sends 
it  back  to  the  beginning  point,  under  the  first  lieutenant, 
to  repeat  the  advance.  This  time,  however,  the  original 
platoon  guides  are  assigned  as  platoon  leaders  while  the  cap- 
tain and  the  original  platoon  leaders,  except  the  first  lieu- 
tenant, go  to  the  patch  of  woods  800  yards  south  of  626. 
From  this  high  ground  they  observe  the  advance  of  the 
company  with  a  view  to  further  criticism  and  suggestion. 
Meantime,  each  platoon  guide  has  an  opportunity  for  prac- 
tice in  seeking  cover  for  an  advancing  platoon. 

If  time  permits,  and  further  instruction  is  desirable. 


180  COMBAT  INSTRUCTION 

both  the  starting  point  and  the  battalion  objective  can  be 
changed  slightly  and  the  exercise  repeated. 

SECOND  EXAMPLE 

This  is  a  continuation  of  the  First  Example. 

The  captain  marches  the  company  to  the  bend  in  the 
road  400  yards  east  of  Hershey  Mill ;  halts  it  facing  north, 
and  announces: 

The  firing  line  of  the  battalion  (our  company  and  Company  B) 
reached  this  creek  in  platoon  columns,  crossed  to  the  north  bank,  and 
halted  under  cover  of  the  bank,  in  skirmish  line.  You  notice  that 
the  open  country,  between  this  point  and  the  patch  of  woods  that  we 
are  headed  for,  is  easily  seen  from  various  points  on  the  big  hill 
in  front  of  us  (Chestnut  Hill).  The  enemy's  artillery  may  have 
observation  parties  at  one  or  more  of  those  points.  If  we  advance 
by  platoon  columns,  or  in  ordinary  skirmish  line,  we  shall  probably 
draw  artillery  fire.  You  notice,  however,  that  the  enemy's  infantry 
in  the  trenches  probably  will  not  see  us  until  we  occupy  the  north 
edge  of  that  patch  of  woods.  The  battalion  commander  has  ordered 
the  firing  line  to  advance  in  thin  lines  to  the  patch  of  woods.  When 
the  company  flag  is  up  you  will  assume  that  you  are  under  artillery 
fire;  otherwise,  you  are  not  under  fire.  As  skirmishers,  guide  right, 
march. 

The  skirmish  line  is  then  moved  back  to  its  covered 
position  under  the  north  bank  of  the  Conewago,  the  right 
of  the  company  at  the  road  bend.     The  captain  then  orders : 

The  company  will  advance  to  the  woods  by  half  platoons  from 
the  right;  the  half  platoons  deploy  with  10  pace  intervals.  Mr. 
Allen  (the  first  lieutenant),  start  out  with  the  Fh-st  and  Second 
Squads. 

The  half  platoons  are  sent  in  successive  lines  about  150 
yards  apart.  The  captain  goes  forward  with  the  fourth 
line.  After  a  brief  examination  of  the  assumed  enemy's 
line,  he  announces  to  the  platoons  that  have  already  arrived : 

Target:  Trench  along  the  crest.  First  and  Second  Platoons, 
from  the  right  end  of  the  orchard,  then  three  o'clock  to  the  road. 
Overlap.  Third  and  Fourth  Platoons,  from  the  right  end  of  the  or- 
chard to  the  left  end.     Overlap.     What  is  the  range? 

The  target  designation  is  repeated  to  those  platoon 
leaders  who  arrive  later.  When  the  range  finders  have  re- 
ported, the  captain  orders : 

RaiiKV.  seven-fifty.  Leave  rifles  in  place,  sighted  on  the  target. 
Platoon  leaders  and  guides,  inspect  sight-setting  and  distribution. 


COMBAT  INSTRUCTION  181 

We  shall  assume  that  the  following  incidents  were  ob- 
served and  noted  by  the  captain : 

1.  Lt.  Allen  marched  the  First  and  Second  Squads 
directly  forward,  and  did  not  form  thin  line  until  he  reached 
the  road.  The  second  line  was  forewarned  to  deploy  under 
cover  of  the  creek  bank  before  advancing.  Thereafter, 
each  line  deployed  under  cover  as  soon  as  the  preceding  line 
advanced. 

2.  After  crossing  the  road,  the  first  line  alternated 
between  double  and  quick  time,  although  the  company  flag 
was  down  throughout  the  exercise.  The  second  line  did  the 
same.  The  other  lines  were  then  forewarned  not  to  do  so 
unless  the  company  flag  was  up,  indicating  effective  artillery 
fire. 

3.  Each  of  the  lines  had  a  tendency  towards  closing 
on  its  center,  particularly  the  fifth  line,  which  approached 
the  woods  with  less  than  5  pace  intervals  between  men. 

4.  The  first,  second,  and  third  lines,  upon  arriving  in 
the  woods,  properly  reduced  the  intervals  between  men,  but 
when  the  captain  arrived  he  found  these  six  squads  lying 
down  in  the  north  edge  of  the  woods,  exposed  to  the  enemy's 
view.  He  left  two  men  as  lookouts  and  ordered  the  line 
back  under  cover.  Later,  he  gave  the  orders  relative  to  tar- 
get and  range,  quoted  above. 

5.  In  other  respects  the  exercise  was  satisfactory. 
While  the  company  rests,  the  captain  assembles  the 

officers  and  non-commissioned  officers  and  says : 

This  is  another  example  illustrating  how  a  firing  line  may  ad- 
vance, without  firing,  to  a  position  as  near  as  possible  to  the  enemy's 
trench,  from  which  position  the  firing  line  makes  its  preparations  to 
start  a  vigorous  fire  and  an  energetic  advance  when  the  proper  time 
comes.  Platoon  leaders  report  accurate  sight-setting  and  correct 
aiming  for  distribution.     Some  other  things  were  not  so  good. 

The  first  line  should  have  deployed  as  skirmishers,  at  10  pace 
intervals  and  with  the  right  skirmisher  as  base  (i.  e.,  guide  right), 
before  the  line  left  the  cover  afforded  by  the  creek  bank.  But  that  is 
too  evident  to  require  further  comment. 

At  no  time  was  the  company  flag  up  to  indicate  that  you  were 
under  artillery  fire.  If  you  are  not  under  fire,  there  is  no  necessity 
for  double  timing.  Quick  time  is  good  enough,  and  saves  the  men 
unnecessary  fatigue.  If  special  conditions  require  a  faster  gait, 
even  though  we  are  not  under  fire,  the  major  will  tell  me  beforehand 
and  I  will  tell  you.  The  advance  by  rushes  in  the  fire  attack  is  an 
entirely  different  thing,  though  even  in  rushes  I  have  seen  a  combina- 


COMBAT  INSTRUCTION 

tion  of  long  distance  and  good  cover  that  made  it  wise  to  reduce  the 
gait  temporarily. 

You  must  correct  the  inclination  of  the  men  to  close  towards 
the  center  and  thus  "bunch  up"  the  line.  It  was  particularly  bad 
in  the  fifth  line.  Get  it  clearly  in  your  mind  what  thin  lines  are  for. 
When  we  came  down  that  hill  in  platoon  columns,  we  tried  to  avoid 
casualties  by  preventing  the  enemy  from  seeing  us.  But  from  the 
creek  to  these  woods  we  could  not  do  it  that  way.  We  had  to  cover  the 
ground  so  thinly  with  men  that,  although  the  men  were  visible  to 
the  enemy,  the  target  was  too  poor  to  shoot  at.  The  enemy  is  not 
going  to  fire  unless  he  can  get  results  that  are  worth  as  much  as  the 
ammunition  used.  If  we  keep  our  formation  thin  enough,  he  will  let  us 
alone  and  save  his  ammunition  for  a  more  critical  time  and  a  better 
target,  unless  he  has  less  sense  than  he  ought  to  have,  or  more  am- 
munition than  he  needs.  Probably  no  one  ever  had  so  little  sense 
or  so  much  ammunition.  But  I  am  talking  now  about  artillery  fire. 
Thin  lines  are  not  good  against  infantry  fire,  after  we  get  so  close 
to  the  enemy  that  our  men  can  easily  be  aimed  at  individually. 

The  best  that  a  3-inch  shrapnel  can  do  is  to  spatter  an  oval- 
shaped  piece  of  ground  about  20  yards  at  its  widest  dimension  and 
about  150  yards  at  its  longest.  The  shrapnel  has,  roughly,  250  bullets. 
Even  if  you  are  somewhere  in  the  exact  area  covered  by  a  shrapnel 
burst,  there  is  only  one  chance  in  twelve  that  you  will  be  hit.  At 
that  rate,  we  can  make  our  lines  so  thin  that  it  would  take  all  the 
ammunition  of  an  entire  battalion  of  3-inch  guns  to  put  20%  of  our 
one  company  out  of  commission.  But  even  this  percentage  of  casual- 
ties would  not  result  unless  we  exposed  ourselves  for  the  length  of 
time  necessary  to  fire  that  much  ammunition.  It  will  probably  never  be 
necessary  to  expose  the  company  that  long.  So  remember  that,  if 
your  line  is  thin,  you  will  probably  escape  artillery  fire;  but,  if  your 
men  "bunch  up,"  they  simply  invite  the  enemy  to  fire.  The  enemy's 
best  play  is  to  sweep  the  line  on  which  our  successive  lines  halt  and 
reform.  But  here  again  we  outplay  him  by  halting  and  reforming 
where  shrapnel  can  not  reach  us.  These  woods  give  us  good  cover 
against  shrapnel.  A  ditch,  or  dike,  or  stone  wall,  or  a  very  steep 
reverse  slope  would  do  just  as  well. 

Now,  just  a  word  about  unnecessary  exposure.  I  found  the 
first  three  lines  in  the  north  edge  of  these  woods,  visible  to  the  ene- 
my. Remember  that  artillery  observers  have  good  stations  and  pow- 
erful field  glasses.  Take  it  as  a  fixed  rule  that  when  you  are  in  a 
firing  position  your  men  must  be  as  completely  covered  or  hidden  as 
possible  until  you  want  them  to  creep  forward  to  locate  the  target 
or  other  thing  that  you  may  be  describing,  or  to  fire,  or  to  advance. 
If  you  have  completed  your  talk,  and  do  not  intend  to  fire  or  advance 
immediately,  or  if  you  cease  firing  for  a  while,  simply  caution,  "cover," 
and  see  that  the  men  slide  back  again  and  take  cover. 

I  hear  that,  in  some  companies  last  summer,  the  first  thin  line, 
on  reaching  a  position  like  this  and  in  a  situation  like  this,  would 
generally  open  lire  simply  because  the  enemy  was  in  sight  just  where 
he  was  expected  to  be.  That,  of  course,  is  all  wrong.  Sergeant 
Holmes,  when  may  the  first  line,  or  the  first  several  lines,  open  fire 
on  their  own  initiative?  Correct!  In  self-defense,  or  to  drive  back 
small  advanced  detachments  or  patrols.     Any  questions? 

We  shall  assume  that  the  second  lieutenant  asks  wheth- 
er the  advance  by  half  platoons  is  better  than  by  lines  con- 
sisting- of  one  man  from  each  squad,  as  prescribed  in  In- 


COMBAT  INSTRUCTION  183 

fantry  Drill  Regulations  (218).     The  captain  replies: 

It  amounts  to  the  same  thing  as  far  as  concerns  vulnerability 
and  the  likelihood  of  being  subjected  to  artillery  fire.  Drill  Regula- 
tions do  not  insist  on  any  prescribed  form.  Paragraph  218  is  merely 
a  suggestion.  The  method  we  used  is  better  in  our  particular  case 
for  the  following  reasons:  The  ground  between  the  creek  and  the 
cover  afforded  by  the  low,  wooded  ridge  where  we  now  are,  is  so 
open  and  devoid  of  cover  that  there  is  no  intermediate  line  on  which 
the  company  can  halt  and  re-form  its  skirmish  line.  In  other  words, 
we  cannot  very  well  make  the  advance  in  two  or  more  "hitches." 
That  being  the  case,  we  advance  in  a  single  hitch.  But  the  distance 
is  great,  and  it  finally  brings  us  dangerously  close  to  the  enemy. 
In  fact,  if  anyone  insists  that  we  have  gone  too  far  in  one  "hitch," 
I  can  only  answer  that  he  may  be  right.  In  the  last  analysis,  our 
safety  in  this  particular  case  would  depend  on  the  kind  of  progress 
the  other  battalions  are  making  on  our  right  and  left,  and  upon  how 
we  co-ordinate  our  progress  with  theirs. 

In  any  event,  from  the  standpoint  of  leadership  and  control,  it 
will  be  better  if  we  arrange  it  so  that  each  line  consists  of  complete 
units,  if  such  an  arrangement  is  possible.  What  makes  it  possible 
in  our  case?  It  is  made  possible  by  reason  of  the  fact  that  the  frac- 
tion selected  (a  half  platoon)  can  deploy  its  thin  line  under  cover  of 
the  bank  of  the  creek  before  advancing,  and  can  close  to  normal 
intervals  under  cover  when  it  arrives  here.  In  that  way  we  gradually 
build  up  our  strength  in  these  woods  with  the  least  disorganization. 
First,  we  have  a  platoon  leader  and  two  squads;  less  than  two  minutes 
later  we  have  a  complete  platoon;  then  a  platoon  and  a  half;  then 
two  platoons,  and  so  on.  Although  the  same  in  numbers,  one  com- 
plete platoon  is  better  and  stronger  than  a  line  consisting  of  two  men 
from  each  of  16  squads.  But  there  are  times  when  we  must  use  thin 
lines  consisting  of  one  or  two  men  of  each  squad,  or  even  single  men 
from  alternate  squads.  Assume  that  the  distance  to  be  covered  is 
600  or  800  yards,  and  that  the  ground  is  covered  with  weeds  and  brush 
which  will  conceal  the  men  if  they  select  their  positions  skillfully  and 
hug  the  ground  closely.  Such  cover  may  afford  protection  against 
accurate  artillery  fire.  We  might  then  find  it  best  to  advance  with  a 
man  from  each  squad  and  in  two  or  more  "hitches";  that  is,  we  may 
send  the  first  line  forward,  say  200  yards,  where  it  will  halt.  When 
all,  or  nearly  all,  of  the  lines  have  arrived  in  the  new  position,  we 
we  would  send  the  first  line  forward,  say  another  200  yards.  Natur- 
ally, in  such  a  case  we  could  not  use  half  platoons  in  thin  lines; 
there  would  be  too  much  deploying  and  closing  in  by  the  flank  in 
plain  view  of  the  enemy's  artillery  observation  stations.  And  if  we 
attempted  to  make  the  whole  distance  in  a  single  "hitch",  the  first 
line  or  two  may  eventually  be  so  close  to  the  enemy  that  he  might 
seize  the  opportunity  to  smash  us  with  a  counter-attack  at  a  time 
when  the  company  is  badly  scattered  and  beyond  real  control. 

"In  a  few  minutes  we  shall  return  to  the  road  bend  from  which 
we  started.  Then  the  company  will  begin  an  attack  from  the  same 
starting  point  and  with  the  same  objective,  but  with  all  other  con- 
ditions different  from  what  they  are  in  the  present  situation.  With 
the  contrast  fresh  in  your  mind,  I  shall  try  to  explain  some  things 
that  you,  particularly  the  platoon  leaders  and  guides,  should  know." 

(See    Third    Example.) 


1M  COMBAT  INSTRUCTION 

THIRD  EXAMPLE 

This  is  a  variation  of  the  Second  Example. 

The  captain  sends  two  men  to  post  themselves,  about 
60  yards  apart  and  kneeling,  in  the  best  firing  position 
obtainable  just  south  of  the  orchard  and  barn  near  road- 
fork  626.  He  then  leads  the  company  to  the  road  bend  400 
yards  east  of  Hershey  Mill  and  announces: 

"This  is  an  entirely  different  situation.  The  enemy  is  in  posi- 
tion more  than  a  mile  northeast  of  here,  near  the  town  of  Heidlers- 
burg.  Our  regiment  has  reached  this  point  and  is  about  to  advance 
to  that  high  ground  to  the  north  (hill  586)  from  which  place  it  will 
attack  towards  the  east.  It  will  then  be  on  the  left  flank  of  our  at- 
tack, with  other  regiments  on  its  right.  Our  company,  however,  has 
been  ordered  out  as  a  covering  detachment  (or  combat  patrol)  on  the 
left  and  will  go  to  an  east  and  west  road  a  little  less  than  a  mile 
north  of  that  mill  (Hershey  Mill).  Our  patrols  report  that  there 
is  a  hostile  detachment  posted  near  a  roadfork  less  than  a  mile  north 
of  the  mill,  where  the  road  from  the  mill  meets  the  east  and  west  road. 
The  company  will  drive  off  any  hostile  detachments  encountered. 

The  company  marches  off  with  the  First  Platoon  as 
advance  guard.  The  advance  guard  commander  is  told 
that,  as  soon  as  he  comes  in  sight  of  the  two  men  posted 
south  of  the  roadfork  (626),  he  will  assume  that  they  out- 
line the  enemy  and  that  he  is  fired  upon  by  20  or  30  rifles; 
and  he  will  act  accordingly,  one  man  in  each  squad  using 
blank  ammunition.  The  route  is  by  way  of  the  road  as  far 
as  the  wooded  ridge  700  yards  north  of  Hershey  Mill,  and 
thereafter  in  the  fields  west  of,  and  close  to,  the  road.  The 
main  body  follows  at  400  yards. 

We  assume  that,  after  the  advance  guard  has  disap- 
peared in  the  draw  midway  between  Hershey  Mill  and 
roadfork  626  (near  the  farmhouse),  it  opens  fire.  The 
captain  then  leads  the  main  body  off  the  road  and  to  the 
left,  to  the  trees  about  100  yards  southwest  of  the  farm- 
house, and  orders : 

Second  and  Third  Platoons,  as  skirmishers,  two  paces,  guide 
right,  march.  March  direction:  the  big  barn  (pointing  towards  road- 
fork <J2G).     Fourth  Platoon  in  support;  halt  in  the  woods. 

During  the  deployment,  the  captain  calls  a  corporal  of 
the  Fourth  Platoon  and  says  to  him : 

Take  three  men  of  your  squad  in  that  direction  (pointing  north- 


COMBAT  INSTRUCTION  185 

west)  about  a  half  mile  to  the  high  ground  you  see  there,  as  a  combat 
patrol  on  our  left  flank. 

Our  map  does  not  give  the  detailed  information  of  the 
ground  necessary  to  a  complete  statement  of  the  captain's 
orders.  However,  we  shall  make  the  following  assump- 
tions: The  support  is  ordered  to  follow  the  left  flank;  the 
distance  depending  upon  cover.  The  two  deployed  platoons 
advance  to  the  wire  fence  that  runs  west  from  the  road. 
Here  the  advance  guard  is  overtaken.  The  advance  con- 
tinues another  50  yards.  Then  the  necessary  orders  are 
given  and  the  whole  line  opens  fire.  A  moment  later  the 
captain  signals  cease  firing.  The  combat  patrol  is  recalled ; 
the  company  is  assembled;  arms  are  stacked  and  the  men 
fall  out.  The  captain  then  assembles  the  officers  and  non- 
commissioned officers,  and  says : 

Any  one  of  you  men  may  be  called  upon  any  day  to  command 
a  company,  or  half  company,  or  one  platoon,  in  a  detached  and  inde- 
pendent attack  like  the  one  we  have  just  started.  I  want  you  to 
understand  why  this  attack  is  so  radically  different  from  the  previous 
one  (Third  Example),  although  our  beginning  point  and  our  ob- 
jective, or  enemy's  position,  are  exactly  the  same  in  both  cases. 

We  did  not  go  to  the  wooded  ridge  in  thin  lines  for  three  rea- 
sons: First,  there  were  no  other  troops  on  our  right  or  left  and  we 
were  free  to  consider  only  our  own  convenience,  speed  and  safety. 
Second,  there  was  no  danger  or  probability  of  artillery  fire.  Third, 
thin  lines  take  time  and  we  had  a  chance  to  save  time. 

We  might  have  marched  in  column  of  squads  and  with  an  ad- 
vance guard  straight  across  fields  to  that  wooded  ridge  near  the  farm- 
house, but  a  march  by  the  road  is  easier  and  quicker.  If  we  had  had 
reason  to  fear  artillery  fire,  we  still  would  have  marched  in  column 
and  with  an  advance  guard,  but  our  route,  in  that  case,  would  probably 
have  been  by  way  of  the  creek  bed  to  those  woods  (southwest  of  the 
farmhouse)  in  order  to  escape  being  seen  by  artillery  observation 
parties.  We  could  not  take  that  route  in  the  first  attack  because  it 
would  have  broken  up  the  deployment  of  the  brigade  at  a  point  too 
close  to  the  enemy. 

In  the  last  attack  we  used  an  advance  guard  to  guard  against 
surprise  and  to  drive  off  any  small  patrols  that  might  be  met  be- 
tween us  and  our  objective.  In  the  first  attack  the  whole  brigade  was 
deployed  and  ready  for  surprise  parties.  Besides,  reconnaissance  to 
the  front  was  in  the  hands  of  higher  comanders. 

In  the  last  attack  we  sent  out  a  combat  patrol  of  4  men  on  our 
left  flank.  If  you  look  at  the  ground  you  can  readily  see  that  we 
would  need  warning  of  the  approach  of  enemy  infantry  or  cavalry 
from  that  direction.  Our  right  flank  was  safe  enough,  but  we  should 
keep  in  signal  communication  with  our  regiment. 

In  the  last  attack  we  kept  one  platoon  out  as  suppoit.  The 
Drill  Regulations  say  that  a  company  acting  alone,  as  we  were,  is 
handled  the  same  as  a  battalion;  allowance  being  made  for  the  dif- 
ference in  strength.  The  battalion  usually  deploys  whole  companies 
in  the  firing  line.     But  the  whole  of  our  company  could  not  be  de- 


18G  COMBAT   INSTRUCTION 

ployed  until  we  knew  that  there  was  no  immediate  danger  of  a  sur- 
prise party  on  our  left  flank,  or  until  the  fight  became  so  stubborn 
that  we  needed  the  Fourth  Platoon  in  the  firing  line  in  order  to  win 
and  had  to  take  a  chance  on  other  things.  I  can  imagine  a  situation 
where  a  platoon  acting  alone  should  hold  out  a  squad  or  two  until  the 
situation  became  clearer,  particularly  on  the  defensive;  but  ordinarily 
a  platoon  acting  alone  needs  its  whole  firing  strength  early  in  the 
game  and  it  must  depend  on  small  combat  patrols  to  guard  it  against 
surprise.  The  smaller  the  force  the  more  easily  it  can  withdraw  or 
change  its  front. 

In  the  first  attack  we  used  half  pace  intervals,  or  about  one 
man  per  yard  of  front.  In  the  second  attack  we  use  2  pace  inter- 
vals, or  about  one  man  to  a  little  more  than  two  yards  of  front.  We 
need  as  many  rifles  as  possible  against  the  enemy.  If  the  enemy's 
front  is  5,000  yards  long  we  need  5,000  rifles  against  his  front  and 
others  against  his  flanks.  But  a  platoon,  or  a  company,  or  even  a 
battalion,  if  attacking  alone,  may  deploy  with  only  a  half  rifle  to  the 
yard  and  still  have  all  its  rifles  effectively  in  action.  So,  if  you  see 
any  advantage  in  a  thinner  line  when  acting  alone  with  a  small  force, 
do  not  hesitate  to  use  it,  provided  you  do  not  lose  control,  and  pro- 
vided all  rifles  get  on  the  target.  In  our  last  attack  I  wanted  the 
right  of  the  company  near  the  road,  but  I  also  wanted  the  left  platoon 
to  get  forward  under  cover  of  that  patch  of  woods  (400  yards  north- 
west of  the  farmhouse).  We  deployed  three  platoons  on  a  front  of 
about  225  yards.  I  can  imagine  a  case  where  I  would  deploy  three 
platoons  on  a  front  of  325  yards,  but  I  would  first  make  sure  that  I 
could  easily  signal  the  platoon  leaders,  and  then  I  would  place  a  50 
yard  interval  between  the  platoons;  the  platoons  deploying  with  not 
more  than  2  pace  intervals  between  men  in  order  to  preserve  the 
control  of  platoon  leaders.  But  remember  this:  When  you  fight  a 
real  fight  with  thin  lines  you  are  playing  with  fire.  A  counter-attack 
may  put  you  out  of  business.  Speaking  off-hand,  there  are  practically 
only  three  cases  where  you  may  attack  on  a  broad  front  with  a  small 
force:  First,  a  fake  attack  that  you  do  not  intend  to  press  home. 
Second,  an  attack  against  an  enemy  greatly  inferior  in  strength  and 
whom  you  hope  to  drive  out  quickly  and  cheaply  by  threatening 
to  overlap  him.     Third,  fighting  against  poor  troops. 

In  the  first  attack  it  was  decided  beforehand  that  we  would 
probably  begin  the  fire  fight  when  we  reached  the  wooded  ridge  east 
of  the  farmhouse.  That  was  on  account  of  the  fact  that  we  were  only 
a  small  part  of  a  long  line.  But  in  the  second  attack,  where  we  had  no 
other  troops  to  co-operate  with,  we  pushed  ahead  until  we  began  to 
feel  seriously  the  effect  of  the  enemy's  fire  and  then  we  halted  and 
opened  fire.  We  could  not  tell  in  advance  where  the  halting  place 
would  be,  hut  we  wanted  it  to  be  as  close  as  possible  to  the  enemy. 

Are  there  any  questions? 

FOURTH  EXAMPLE 

The  use  of  cover  in  attack  is  largely  a  matter  of  the  in- 
dividual judgment  of  the  men.  I.  D.  R.  152-155  refers 
more  especially  to  single  men  or  patrols.  I.  D.  R.  156  points 
out  the  modifications  imposed  on  the  men  of  a  firing  line. 
In  spite  of  the  added  difficulties  of  a  firing  line  in  the  matter 
of  effecting  concealment,  it  will  surprise  many  to  learn  how 


COMBAT  INSTRUCTION  187 

well-trained  men  can  conceal,  and  therefore  partially  pro- 
tect, themselves  behind  objects  which  to  the  inexperienced 
seem  wholly  inadequate. 

The  captain  takes  the  company  to  the  small  orchard 
midway  between  Hershey  Mill  and  crossroads  616;  thence 
west  400  yards  to  the  fence  corner.  Between  this  point 
and  hill  707  the  fields  lie  fallow,  with  many  low  weeds.  The 
weeds  are  scattered  irregularly,  from  four  to  eight  feet 
apart.  None  is  over  knee  high.  Some  are  thin  in  foliage ; 
others  are  quite  dense.  The  ground  and  vegetation  are  such 
as  one  often  sees  in  pastures,  rank  meadows,  or  fallow  fields. 

The  captain  announces : 

First,  we  shall  see  how  much  cover  a  man  needs  to  prevent  the 
enemy  from  seeing  him;  or,  to  put  it  another  way,  I  am  going  to  de- 
monstrate how  little  cover  a  man  really  needs  in  order  to  conceal  him- 
self. 

The  captain  deploys  a  squad  with  2  pace  intervals,  fa- 
cing hill  707,  and  causes  the  men  of  the  squad  to  lie  down 
in  firing  positions  behind  the  lowest  and  thinnest  weeds 
which,  in  his  opinion,  will  screen  them  from  view  at  a  dis- 
tance of  200  yards  or  more.  He  then  explains  to  the  com- 
pany: 

Standing  here,  and  without  any  experience  in  the  matter,  you 
would  suppose  that  these  weeds  give  these  men  no  protection  what- 
ever. In  order  that  you  may  learn  the  value  of  slight  cover,  and 
learn  how  to  use  it,  I  am  going  to  show  you  that  while  these  men 
are  not  protected  by  anything  that  amounts  to  a  bullet-stop,  they 
are  protected  against  aimed  fire.  Protection  against  aimed  fire  may 
reduce  our  casualties  to  one-fifth  or  even  one-tenth  of  what  they 
otherwise  would  be. 

Leaving  the  squad  in  position,  with  instructions  to 
kneel  at  the  signal  "one  whistle  blast,"  and  lie  down  under 
cover  at  the  signal  "two  whistle  blasts,"  the  captain  marches 
the  company  200  yards  towards  hill  707,  faces  it  towards 
the  deployed  squad  and  asks : 

Can  anyone  see  the  squad? 

We  shall  assume  that  the  squad  has  been  well  placed 
and  is  concealed.  The  captain  then  signals  the  squad  to 
kneel  and  says  to  the  company : 

Each  man  select  a  man  of  the  squad  to  watch.  When  he  lies 
down  again,  pick  out  the  point  that  you  would  aim  at  if  you  were 


188  COMBAT  INSTRUCTION 

firing  on   him.     See  how  long  you  can  keep  your  eyes  on  that  point 
without  confusion  or  uncertainty. 

He  then  signals  the  squad  to  lie  down,  and  about  a  half 
minute  later  he  commandes: 

es  right.     Front.     Pick  up  your  aiming  point  again.     Those 
who  are  sure  they  have  found  it  hold  up  their  right  hands. 

Having  disposed  of  this  matter,  he  adds: 

The  effect  of  the  enemy's  fire  upon  you  depends  mostly  on  his 
ability  to  use  his  target  as  his  aiming  point.  Each  of  you  may  be 
considered  a  target;  but  if  you  can  not  be  seen,  you  can  not  be  an 
aiming  point,  although  you  are  still  the  real  target  that  the  enemy 
is  trying  to  hit.  You  can  not  help  being  a  target;  the  mere  fact 
that  you  are  a  soldier  makes  you  a  target;  but  you  can  frequently 
avoid  being  an  aiming  point,  and  if  you  succeed  in  doing  that,  you 
are  no  longer  a  good  target  for  the  enemy.  Now  if  your  enemy  sees 
you  disappear  behind  a  bush  or  weed,  you  are  still  the  target,  but 
the  bush  or  weed  becomes  the  aiming  point.  If  there  are  many 
bushes  around  you  the  enemy  soon  loses  sight  of  the  particular  bush 
behind  which  you  disappeared.  You  have  seen  what  a  trifling  ob- 
ject can  conceal  a  man  at  even  so  short  a  distance  as  200  yards. 
You  have  also  seen  how  easy  it  is  to  lose  your  aiming  point.  Re- 
member, then,  if  you  do  not  give  the  enemy  a  good  aiming  point,  your 
chance  of  being  in  good  health  at  the  end  of  the  fight  is  improved  from 
500  to  1,000  per  cent.  Ordinarily,  the  smaller  the  forces  engaged, 
the  greater  is  the  importance  of  individual  concealment,  because 
the  excitement  and  confusion  is  less  and  we  aim  at  individuals  in- 
stead of  areas.     But  concealment  is  always  important. 

The  captain  then  sends  the  first  lieutenant  with  half  of 
the  company  back  to  the  position  of  the  deployed  squad,  with 
instructions  to  deploy  the  half  company  with  2  pace  inter- 
vals and  attack  hill  707,  advancing  by  rushes ;  and  with  in- 
structions to  platoon  leaders  and  guides  to  inspect  and  cor- 
rect the  positions  of  their  men  at  each  halt.  ■  The  captain 
takes  the  other  half  of  the  company  to  the  wire  fence  on 
hill  707  to  observe  the  attack  and  the  use  of  cover.  When 
the  first  lieutenant  has  advanced  200  or  300  yards,  the  two 
halves  of  the  company  change  places,  the  captain  remain- 
ing on  hill  707.  He  comments  freely  on  the  faulty  positions 
or  movements  observed,  with  a  view  to  thorough  instruc- 
tion in  the  details  of  using  cover  while  advancing  in  attack. 
We  may  assume  some  of  his  comments  to  be  as  follows: 

Look  -harp  and  you  will  see  that  a  part  of  the  firing  line  is 
getting  ready  to  rush.  Two  or  three  men  are  on  their  knees  and 
elbows  with  their  backs  raised  and  no  longer  concealed.  They  should 
lie  close  to  the  ground  when  the  warning  for  a  rush  is  given.  It 
may  be  30  seconds  or  even  more  l>efore  the  platoon  leader  is  sure  that 


COMBAT  INSTRUCTION  189 

all  men  have  heard  or  seen  the  warning  and  are  ready  to  jump  when 
he  shouts,  "follow  me."  We  must  not  give  the  enemy  a  better  aim- 
ing point  during  that  preparation  for  a  rush,  nor  give  him  warning  of 
the  rush. 

Notice  those  men  with  their  rifles  vertical;  the  butt  probably 
resting  on  the  ground.  They  think  that  makes  it  easier  to  jump  when 
the  rush  is  ordered.     Maybe  it  does,  but  it  is  wrong. 

Some  of  those  men  would  conceal  themselves  better  by  aiming 
through  the  weeds  or  bushes  instead  of  along  the  right  edge.  When 
you  use  a  rock  or  tree  for  cover  you  are  obliged  to  aim  along  the 
right  side  of  the  tree  or  rock,  but  frequently  a  bush  or  clump  of 
weeds  will  be  so  wide  that  you  can  poke  your  rifle  somewhere  be- 
tween the  center  and  right  edge  and  thus  get  complete  concealment. 

Some  men  are  shifting  about  too  much,  long  after  the  halt.  That 
gives  the  enemy  a  chance  to  pick  up  his  aiming  point  again.  The 
men  should  do  all  of  the  necessary  shifting  just  after  dropping  be- 
hind cover.  They  must  be  able  to  fire  on  the  enemy,  but  they  should 
get  good  firing  positions  promptly,  and  after  they  have  them  they 
should  lie  still. 

FIFTH  EXAMPLE 

The  company  is  marched  to  the  vicinity  of  hill  707. 
The  captain  says  to  the  company : 

In  a  bayonet  charge  against  the  enemy's  position  the  company 
is  bound  to  be  mixed  up  and  disorganized.  Men  of  several  companies 
may  be  mixed  together.  Your  squad  leader  or  platoon  leader  or 
company  commander  may  be  out  of  action  or  lost  to  view  in  the  mix- 
up.  When  we  reach  the  enemy's  position  the  success  of  the  charge 
depends  mostly  on  every  man  knowing  just  what  he  ought  to  do. 
The  proper  thing  to  do  depends  on  the  situation  at  the  moment.  The 
confusion  will  probably  be  so  great  that  your  leaders  will  not  be  able 
to  tell  you.  In  other  words,  we  must  count  on  temporary  loss  of 
control  and  we  must  make  up  for  it  by  teaching  you  a  few  common- 
sense  rules  to  guide  you.  I  have  seen  companies,  at  the  end  of  a 
charge  in  a  combat  exercise,  simply  unfix  bayonets  and  assemble, 
as  though  the  fight  were  over.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  a  very  critical 
stage  is  reached  the  moment  we  are  in  the  enemy's  position  and  we 
have  to  see  the  thing  through  and  do  it  right.  We  shall  practice 
charging  several  times  and  change  the  situations  each  time. 

A  squad,  to  outline  the  enemy,  is  deployed  with  15 
pace  intervals  along  the  wire  fence  that  crosses  hill  707. 
The  squad  is  instructed  to  remain  at  the  fence  and  meet 
the  charge.  The  company  is  deployed  about  100  yards  to 
the  northeast  and  facing  the  fence.  The  men  are  told  that 
the  company  in  attacking  has  reached  this  point.  The  line 
opens  fire. 

A  moment  later,  "fix  bayonets"  is  signalled,  followed  by 
the  necessary  commands  and  signals  for  the  charge.  The 
outlined  enemy  meets  the  charge.  The  captain's  comments 
before  and  after  the  charge  may  be  summarized  as  follows : 


190  COMBAT   INSTRUCTION 

The  signal  "fix  bayonets"  seems  to  bring  the  tiring  to  a  com- 
plete stop  for  a  half  minute  or  less.  That  does  not  matter.  It  would 
not  happen  in  real  battle  because  in  the  noise  and  excitement  it  would 
be  probably  two  minutes  before  all  the  men  of  a  battalion  firing  line 
taught  and  understood  the  signal.  We  need  not  bother  to  drill  a 
;em  of  fixing  bayonets. 

Platoon  guides  must  ride  the  laggards  hard  and  see  that  the 
charging  line  is  as  compact  and  stiff  as  possible. 

Your  enemy  stayed  in  his  position  to  receive  the  charge.  He 
will  not  do  so  every  time,  but  when  he  does,  you  must  beat  him  by 
better  work  with  the  bayonet  or  clubbed  rifle,  or  probably  fire,  and 
by  better  teamwork.  To  beat  him  by  better  teamwork  you  should  pair 
off  with  the  man  nearest  you  and  the  two  of  you  should  go  after  one 
man  at  a  time.  If  you  can  not  find  a  man  to  pair  with,  join  the  near- 
est pair  and  then  the  three  of  you  go  after  one  man  at  a  time. 
Don't  fight  alone  if  you  can  avoid  it.  You  can  not  arrange  your  pair 
beforehand,  because  your  partner  may  not  be  near  you  when  you  need 
him.  At  the  last  moment  a  man  from  another  company  may  be  your 
nearest  neighbor. 

After  a  short  rest  the  charge  is  repeated,  but  the  men 
who  outline  the  enemy,  instead  of  meeting  the  charge,  run 
back,  according  to  instructions,  when  the  charging  line  is 
about  50  yards  off.  The  captain's  comments  may  be  sum- 
marized as  follows : 

When  the  enemy  retreats  across  open  country,  it  is  foolish  to 
chase  after  him;  at  least  until  your  officers  get  a  chance  to  restore 
order  and  size  up  the  situation.  The  enemy  is  fresher  than  you  are. 
He  will  outrun  you.  Go  forward  to  his  trench  if  you  can,  and  a  little 
beyond  it  if  necessary  for  a  fair  firing  position,  and  then  chase  him 
with  bullets.  As  long  as  he  is  in  sight  and  in  range,  fire  rapidly  but 
accurately  and  demoralize  him  as  completely  as  possible.  Keep  a 
harp  lookout  for  orders  or  signals  from  the  nearest  leaders,  but  re- 
member that  the  confusion  and  disorder  may  be  very  great.  It  may 
be  a  minute  or  two  before  some  planned  action  can  be  ordered  and 
we  want  every  man  to  know  that  during  that  short  time  a  hot  fire  will 
do  the  most  good. 

The  company  then  faces  northwest  and  charges  an 
outlined  enemy  posted  in  the  edge  of  the  woods  north  of 
707.  The  enemy  withdraws  when  the  charge  begins  and  is 
too  deep  in  the  woods  to  be  seen.  The  captain  shows  that 
the  proper  action  is  to  press  forward  in  the  woods,  with  as 
good  a  line  as  is  consistent  with  rapid  progress,  unless  or 
until  other  action  is  ordered. 

A  fourth  charge  may  be  made  in  which,  after  the  cap- 
ture of  a  first  line  trench,  one  platoon,  previously  designated, 
occupies  the  captured  trench  and  hastily  prepares  itself  and 
the  trench  for  defense  against  counter-attack,  while  the 
other  platoons  push  forward  to  charge  a  second  line  trench! 


COMBAT   INSTRUCTION  191 

Other  charges  may  be  made,  illustrating  the  numerous 
situations  that  may  confront  charging  infantry.  Most  of 
these  charges,  particularly  where  they  involve  the  organi- 
zation of  local  pursuit,  or  counter-attack  by  the  enemy, 
would  more  properly  be  battalion  or  regimental  exercises. 


